NCIS closes investigation into the 2006 deaths of three Guantanamo Bay detainees; investigative reports released

On June 10, 2006 the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) was notified that three detainees being held in Camp Delta at Guantanamo Bay Cuba had been found unresponsive in their cells at approximately 12:30 a.m., apparently having taken their own lives by hanging themselves with braided rope made from bed sheets and tee shirts.

Five block guards were on duty at the time of the deaths. Blankets and sheets had been used to obstruct the guards' views and to create the appearance that the detainees were asleep in their cells.

Two of the detainees-- Ali Abdulla Ahmed, from Yemen, (DOB August 1, 1979) and Mana Shaman Allabard al Tabi of Saudi Arabia (DOB Jan 1, 1976) were determined to be dead at the scene.

Lifesaving attempts were begun on the third detainee--Yasser Talal al Zahrani of Saudi Arabia (DOB Dec 26, 1983) who was transported to Naval Hospital Guantanamo where he was pronounced dead a short time later.

The detainees had last been seen alive at approximately 10:00 pm on June 9, 2006.

NCIS Special Agents based at Guantanamo were notified when the deaths were discovered and were on scene in the cellblock by 1:00 a.m.

Five Special Agents from the NCIS Southeast Field Office Major Case Response Team based in Mayport Florida were dispatched and arrived on scene at approximately 3:30 pm on June 10.

Though there were three detainee deaths it was determined that the best course of action was to combine the three incidents into a single investigation.

Autopsies were performed by physicians from the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology at Naval Hospital Guantanamo on June 10 and 11. The manner of death for all detainees was determined to be suicide and the cause of death was determined to be by hanging, the medical term being "mechanical asphyxia."

A short written statement declaring their intent to be martyrs was found in the pockets of each of the detainees.

Lengthier written statements were also found in each of their cells.

Due to similarities in the wording of the statements and the manner of suicides, as well as statements made by other detainees interviewed, there was growing concern that someone within the Camp Delta population was directing detainees to commit suicide and that additional suicides might be imminent. Representatives of other law enforcement agencies involved in the investigation were later told that on the night in question, another detainee (who did not later commit suicide) had walked through the cell block telling people “tonight’s the night.”

The cells of other detainees were searched during the week following the suicides in an attempt to find evidence regarding whether the suicides had been part of a larger conspiracy which might result in additional detainees also taking their lives.

During those searches a number of documents were seized as evidence and taken from the cells for translation and analysis. Those documents included additional handwritten notes found in cells other than those where the suicides took place.

Those documents filled 34 boxes and 1 bag. Their combined weight was 1065 pounds.

Due to the volume of material seized, and concerns that numerous documents stamped with “ACP” might possibly be protected by attorney client privilege, the NCIS Special Agent in Charge of the Southeast Field Office, directed that the documents be sealed and set aside until a process could be created to review the documents in a way that did not violate any attorney-client privilege.

With the assistance of the Department of Justice and consistent with orders of the federal District Court in Washington, D.C., the Department of Defense appointed a "walled off" team of individuals who were not involved in any other detainee cases or proceedings to determine whether any of these seized documents were relevant to the investigation and, if so, to provide them to investigators unless they were protected by an attorney client privilege. Although this team did provide documents to investigators, no attorney-client privileged materials were included and this team did not reveal any attorney-client material to anyone involved in the investigation.

That team was activated on October 23, 2006 at the Regional Legal Service Office at Naval Air Station Mayport Florida.

The team consisted of an NCIS Supervisory Special Agent from Cherry Point North Carolina, four Naval Officers from the Judge Advocate General’s Corps, 2 Naval Enlisted Administrative personnel, four foreign language translators, one NCIS evidence custodian from the NCIS Southeast Field Office and one additional NCIS Special Agent based at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia.

The NCIS investigation was conducted on behalf of the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

It is not unusual for an NCIS death investigation to remain open for a year or more due to a number of factors. Those factors include but are not limited to: the number of parties involved in the case, any unique characteristics of the incident location and environment, the amount of evidence collected and the level of effort involved in analyzing that evidence, and the level of supervisory case review given each investigation.

The Naval Criminal Investigative Service, as its name implies, is a fact-finding entity. It does not draw prosecutorial conclusions nor make recommendations regarding potential courses of action which could result from the investigative findings.

The NCIS case file, redacted consistent with applicable Freedom of Information Act exemptions, was provided to the Dickstein Shapiro law firm in response to their FOIA request.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360

JTF-GTMO-CDR 6 September 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, U.S. Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami Florida 33172

SUBJECT: Endorsement on AR 15-6 Investigation

1. On 20 July 2006, (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6) (USMC) was appointed under AR 15-6 to investigate whether: (1) the Camp Delta SOP was followed by relevant Joint Detention Group (JDG) personnel during the overnight hours of 9-10 June 2006; and, (2) if the SOP was not followed, whether this failure contributed to the ability of the detainees to commit suicide on that night.

2. (b)(3):10 USC completed an exhaustive review of the facts and circumstances concerning the actions of the guard force and other relevant JDG personnel during the overnight hours of 9/10 June 2006. He specifically concluded that guard force and other relevant JDG personnel committed 6 violations of the Camp Delta SOP during the over-night hours of 9/10 June 2006. The following pertains:

a. I accept his conclusion that violation of SOP Section (b)(2) (b)(2) contributed nothing to the ability of the detainees to commit suicides.

b. I reject his conclusion that violation of SOP Section (b)(2) (b)(2) contributed nothing to the ability of the detainees to commit suicides. The findings of fact contained in the report of investigation clearly reflect that the three deceased detainees required significant time to prepare the instruments with which they committed suicide, (b)(2) The possibility that the detainees used this uninterrupted gap in guard coverage on the tier to prepare these instruments cannot be ruled out.

c. I accept his conclusion that violation of SOP Section (b)(2) (b)(2) contributed nothing to the ability of the detainees to commit suicides. However, I reject his conclusion that this violation is insignificant. I have directed that the JDG institute procedures to ensure accountability in this process in the future.

d. I reject his conclusion that violation of SOP Section (b)(2) (b)(2) contributed nothing to the ability of the detainees to commit suicides. The first detainee was found hanging in his cell at approximately 0030, 10 June 2006. The medical examiner stated that the detainees had likely been dead for a "couple of hours" prior to the time of their discovery. He was unable to further refine the time of death. Had the head count been ordered on time, the guards would have been required to examine every cell, checking for (b)(2) (at 2300).

This would have been one and one half hours before the bodies were discovered. The possibility that the now deceased detainees were in fact alive at 2300 on 9 June 2006, cannot be ruled out.

e. I accept his conclusion that violation of SOP Sections (b)(2) (b)(2) and (b)(2) potentially contributed to the ability of the detainees to commit suicide.

f. I accept his conclusion that had the guard staff and other relevant JDG personnel fully complied with the SOP, it is possible that the detainees could have successfully committed suicide anyway.

3. In addition to the foregoing, the Investigating Officer concluded that the JDG's policy of permitting mutilation or alteration of clothing/uniforms (in technical violation of SOP Section 8-23c) contributed to the ability of the detainees to commit suicide. I agree with the Investigating Officer's assessment in this regard. However, in addition, other practices that are well documented in his report likely contributed to the suicides, as well. Specifically, the JDG's authorization for detainees to hang sheets, blankets, and other items within their cells and the dimming of lights on the tier contributed to the suicides. The detainees were able to use their blankets and sheets to hide themselves from the guards while they hung from their nooses and they took advantage of the reduced lighting when creating a ruse with sheets and other materials to make it look like they were in their cells sleeping.

4. I have concluded that a general confusion by the guard and JDG staff over many of the rules that applied to the guard force's handling of the detainees contributed to the detainee's ability to commit suicide. As described by the Investigating Officer in his report of investigation, there was general confusion about what the detainees were authorized to hang in their cells and where they were authorized to do so. The guards were also confused about how far they were supposed to go in sighting skin or movement of detainees at night and what actions they were authorized to take if they sighted neither.

5. Finally, the investigative report documents that the JDG leadership -- over a long period of time - - operated in an environment of increasing negotiation, acquiescence, and concession with the detainees in Camp Delta prior to the suicides. The detainees took advantage of concessions granted by the JDG to commit suicide on 9/10 June 2006. As documented in the report of investigation, many guards had raised concerns about concessions made to the detainees and had expressed their confusion over the applicability of portions of the SOP. Unfortunately, it does not appear that these concerns were addressed prior to the suicides.

6. Based on the facts and circumstances contained in the report of investigation, including the permissive environment that persisted within the JDG prior to the suicides and the JDG leadership's apparent failure to address the guards' concerns, disciplinary action is not warranted in this case.

7. However, considerable corrective action has been taken as a result of the suicides of 9/10 June, including the following:

a. Improved guard training - The guard training program has been improved, with increased focus on the need to remain vigilant on the tiers and a particular focus on the potential risk of future suicides and similar activities. The guards now receive training on specific "Detainees of Interest" that require additional vigilance.

b. SOP review/revision - The Camp Delta SOP is currently undergoing an extensive update and rewrite to conform written procedures to current practice and to formally adopt interim changes that have been promulgated in guard mount messages. The JDG Commander is also publishing daily the JDG Order of the Day, which contains Commanders guidance on various issues associated with the detention mission.

c. Increased guard manning - Following the suicides, the manning on each block was increased to include (b)(2 guards with the sole duty of walking up and down the blocks to observe (b)(2) to - (b)(other guards per block devoted to detainee showers, recreation time, meals, movements, etc. This allows all detainees to be checked within (b)(2)

d. Lighting - Lights on the tiers are no longer dimmed at night.

(b)(2)

f. Reduced access to Comfort Items - Detainees were provided numerous comfort items (two blankets, two sheets, etc:) prior to the suicides. This practice was re-evaluated and extra items, such as extra sheets and blankets were eliminated. Additionally, sheets are now issued to detainees each night at 2200 and collected each morning at 0500. The number of items detainees are permitted to keep in their cells has been greatly reduced.

8. The Investigating Officer's recommendations concerning personnel awards, development of junior leaders, intelligence analysis, and Detainee Information Management System (DIMS) revision are being considered appropriately.

9. My point of contact for this matter is (b)(3):10 USC JTF-GTMO-SJA. He may be contacted at (b)(2) should your staff have any questions.

HARRY B. HARRIS, JR.
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commanding

31 August 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR RADM Harry B. Harris, Jr., JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Report of AR 15-6 Investigation

(U) In accordance with your appointment letter (Tab A-1), I have conducted an informal investigation into whether anyone violated Camp Delta's Standard Operational Procedures (SOP) on the night of 9/10 June 2006, and if so, whether those violations contributed to the deaths by suicide of detainees ISN 093, ISN 588, and ISN 693.

~~(FOUO)~~ I must apologize for the substantial delay in producing this report, but the late-breaking discovery of a critical modification to the SOP disrupted my original timetable. Both the Joint Detention Group and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service had overlooked an important revision of the SOP table entitled "Authorized / Unauthorized Activities." The revision allowed detainees to (b)(2) and was in effect at the time of the suicides. This document made it necessary for me to discard or revise a substantial portion of work already completed, and to reconsider my previous answers to the investigation's core questions.

(U) With regard to the first question, the Alpha Block guard team violated potentially significant portions of the Camp Delta SOP, including:

(b)(2)

~~(FOUO)~~ With regard to your second question, however, SOP violations by the Alpha Block guard team did not directly facilitate the suicides, and an absence of violations by the Alpha Block guard team would not have prevented the suicides. This surprising conclusion is a function of the very short time required for a determined suicide to asphyxiate himself.

~~(FOUO)~~ One additional SOP violation stands out as contributing substantially and directly to the suicides. The relevant SOP passage is:

(b)(2)

~~(FOUO)~~ (b)(2) contributed substantially and directly to the suicides. This violation of SOP ¶8-23e facilitated detainee (b)(2) from which they hung themselves, and greatly complicated the on-going search for contraband. The violation was committed by senior leadership of the Joint Detention Group, not by Camp 1 guards—indeed, the guard force vocally disapproved of the violation.

~~(FOUO)~~ The nooses with which the detainees strangled themselves were the sole contraband that was essential to the suicides, which means that producing, concealing, and rigging a noose were essential activities for each detainee. To work effectively, the cords (b)(2) out (b)(2) It appears that JDG's permissive policy with regard to (b)(2) provided the cover needed for (b)(2)

~~(FOUO)~~ The evidence collected here reveals extensive confusion within all JDG ranks about just what the SOP stated. Key personnel lacked a unified understanding of important rules such as those pertaining to hanging items on cell walls and checking detainees while they slept. The detainees generated much of this confusion by alternately wheedling for compromise and raging against enforcement, all the while dangling a mirage of compliance just beyond the reach of chief petty officers and junior officers. The best defense against the detainee strategy of subversion would have been JDG's steady encouragement to Camp One's supervising CPOs and junior officers to enforce camp rules firmly, regardless of detainee behavior. Unfortunately, the Commander Joint Detention Group (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) pursued the same mirage.

Respectfully submitted,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

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(U) Findings of Fact: Introductory Material

I. (U) Narrative Overview

1. On the night of 09 June 2006 and the early morning of 10 June 2006 (09/10 June 2006), Yasser Talal Al Zahrani (Detainee ISN 093), Mana Shaman Turki Alutaybi (Detainee ISN 588), and Ali Abdullah Al Ahmed (Detainee ISN 693), were housed in Alpha Block, Camp 1, Camp Delta, JTF-GTMO.[1]

2. ~~(FOUO)~~ Alpha Block is a rectangular chamber divided into two rows of cells on opposite sides of a walkway known as the "tier."[2]

3. ~~(FOUO)~~ Cells (b)(2) are on the left side of the tier as seen from the guard shack.[3]

4. ~~(FOUO)~~ Cells (b)(2) are on the right side of the tier as seen from the guard shack.[4]

5. ~~(FOUO)~~ On 09/10 June 2006, detainee ISN 093 was housed in cell A-8.[5]

6. ~~(FOUO)~~ On 09/10 June 2006, detainee ISN 588 was housed in cell A-12.[6]

7. ~~(FOUO)~~ On 09/10 June 2006, detainee ISN 693 was housed in cell A-5.[7]

8. ~~(FOUO)~~ On 09/10 June 2006, cell A-5 was separated from cell A-8 by two empty cells.[8]

9. ~~(FOUO)~~ On 09/10 June 2006, cell A-8 was separated from cell A-12 by one empty cell and two occupied cells.[9]

10. ~~(FOUO)~~ On the night of 09/10 June 2006, Chief Warrant Officer (CWO2) (b)(3):1 (b)(3):1 was the Assistant Officer in Charge (AOIC) of Camp Delta.[10]

11. ~~(FOUO)~~ On the night of 09/10 June 2006, Master at Arms Chief (MAC) (b)(3):10 (b)(3): was the Platoon Leader for Camp 1.[11]

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[1] Detainee Information Management System (DIMS) Alpha Block Blotter (TAB J5)

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[8] Alpha Block diagram (TAB J2)

[9] Alpha Block diagram (TAB J2)

[10] Porter interview 7/28/2006 (TAB C12)

12. ~~(FOUO)~~ On the night of 09/10 June 2006, Cryptologic Technician (Maintenance) First Class (CTM1) (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was the Sergeant of the Guard for Camp 1.[12]

13. ~~(FOUO)~~ A scheduled guard shift change occurred on Alpha block at 1745.[13]

14. ~~(FOUO)~~ The oncoming shift consisted of Master at Arms First Class (MA1) (b)(3): (b)(3):10 Master at Arms Second Class (MA2) (b)(3):10 USC (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

15. ~~(FOUO)~~ The guards served evening meals to the Alpha block detainees at 1830.[15]

16. ~~(FOUO)~~ Evening meals lasted for approximately a half-hour and ended at 1900.[16]

17. ~~(FOUO)~~ Cleanup of the evening meal took about fifteen (15) minutes.[17]

18. ~~(FOUO)~~ The detainees began the fourth call to prayer at 1915.[18]

19. ~~(FOUO)~~ The Detainee Operations Center initiated a random headcount at 2004.[19]

20. ~~(FOUO)~~ The headcount entry recorded twenty-eight (28) detainees present, twenty-eight (28) detainees accounted for, and five (5) guards present.[20]

21. ~~(FOUO)~~ The detainees began to sing and chant at approximately 2015.[21]

22. ~~(FOUO)~~ The singing and chanting was louder than usual.[22]

23. ~~(FOUO)~~ The Sergeant of the Guard became concerned and called a translator to listen to the singing and chanting at 2020.[23]

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[11] Camp [redacted] Duty Roster, Night of 9/10 Jun 2006 (TAB B1)
[12] Camp Duty Roster, Night of 9/10 Jun 2006 (TAB B1)
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[21] NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
B3.a), N
[22] NCIS
[23] NCIS

24. ~~(FOUO)~~ The translator arrived at 2033, listened for several minutes, and then told the Sergeant of the Guard that the singing and chanting was harmless.[24]

25. ~~(FOUO)~~ The translator heard the detainees chant the word "yahodit" which he could not decipher.[25]

26. ~~(FOUO)~~ MASN (b)(3):10 USC heard the detainees chant a similar phrase: "Yahoo day!"[26]

27. ~~(FOUO)~~ The translator subsequently acknowledged that he did not understand what the detainees were singing.[27]

28. ~~(FOUO)~~ A linguist referred to as (b)(3):1 informed me that in Pashtu and Arabic, the word that I spell phonetically as ya-hoo-DE means Jewish.[28]

29. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA2 (b)(3): recalled observing detainees ISN 093, ISN 588, and ISN 693 alive at 2030 when he was on the tier.[29]

30. ~~(FOUO)~~ The detainees stopped singing and chanting for the fifth call to prayer at 2100.[30]

31. ~~(FOUO)~~ The detainees resumed singing and chanting after the fifth call to prayer.[31]

32. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 (b)(3):1 swept the tier between 2100 and 2130.[32]

33. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 (b)(3):10 remembered seeing the three deceased detainees alive when she swept the tier as late as 2130.[33]

34. ~~(FOUO)~~ The detainees quit singing and chanting around 2130.[34]

35. ~~(FOUO)~~ Most of the detainees were asleep by 2145.[35]

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[24] NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) 6/14/2006 (TAB C6.a)
[25] NCIS
[26] NCIS
[27] NCIS
[28] Lingui -26 Interview (Tab I-1)
[29] NCIS (b)(2 6/15/2006 (TAB B3.a)
[30] NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) 3
C1.a), N
[31] NCIS
(TAB C
[32] NCIS
[33] NCIS
[34] NCIS
(TAB C
[35] NCIS

36. ~~(FOUO)~~ At 2200, lights were shut out on the left side of the tier; the left side of the tier includes cells A-5, A-8, and A-12.[36]

37. ~~(FOUO)~~ Starting at 2200, guards walked the Alpha block tier in half-hour watches according to an informal schedule.[37]

38. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 (b)(3):10 USC §130b, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) had watch and walked the tier from 2200-2230.[38]

39. ~~(FOUO)~~ MASN on had watch and walked the tier from 2230 to 2300.[39]

40. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 had watch and walked the tier from 2300 to 2330.[40]

41. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA2 d MA3 (b)(3):10 USC went to chow at 2300.[41]

42. ~~(FOUO)~~ MAC rrived at Alpha block at 2320.[42]

43. ~~(FOUO)~~ MAC alked the tier for three minutes with MA1 (b)(3):10[43]

44. ~~(FOUO)~~ MAC ft Alpha block at 2323.[44]

45. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA1 d watch and walked the tier from 2330-2400.[45]

46. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA2 d MA3 (b)(3):10 USC returned from chow at 2345-2355.[46]

47. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 and MASN (b)(3):1 went to chow at 2345--2355.[47]

48. ~~(FOUO)~~ The Detainee Operations Center initiated a random headcount at 2335.[48]

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[36] NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

[37] NCIS

[38] NCIS

[39] NCIS

[40] NCIS

[41] NCIS
B3.a)

[42] NCIS
C1.a)

[43] NCIS
C1.a)

[44] NCIS
C1.a)

[45] NCIS

[46] NCIS

[47] NCIS

[48] Detainee Information Management System (DIMS) Head Count Report, 09JUN2006 2335L (TAB J6)

49. ~~(FOUO)~~ The 2350 Alpha Block random headcount entry recorded twenty-eight (28) detainees present, twenty-eight (28) detainees accounted for, and five (5) guards present.[49]

50. ~~(FOUO)~~ No guard remembers performing the 2350 headcount.[50]

51. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA2 (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) ad the watch and began walking the tier at 2400.[51]

52. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 switched shifts with MA2 (b)(3):10 between 0005 and 0010.[52]

53. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 walked the tier from 0005 until he detected a problem in cell A8.[53]

54. ~~(FOUO)~~ As he walked the tier, MA3 (b)(3): stopped at cell A-8 at approximately 0025.[54]

55. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 (b)(3):1 first saw the outline of what appeared to be legs and a torso on ISN 093's rack (b)(2).[55]

(b)(2)

57. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(attempted to wake detainee ISN 093 and got no response.[57]

58. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 obtained assistance from MA1 (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) who were present on Alpha block in the guard shack.[58]

59. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA1 (b)(3): reached through the bean hole of cell A-8, pulled the (b)(2) aside, and got no response.[59]

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[49] Detainee Information Management System (DIMS) Head Count Report, 09JUN2006 2335L (TAB J6)
[50] NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) B6.a)
[51] NCIS B4.a)
[52] NCIS C14.a)
[53] NCIS B2.a)
[54] NCIS B2.a), N
[55] NCIS
[56] NCIS B2.a)
[57] NCIS
[58] NCIS B2.a)
[59] NCIS B2.a)

60. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA1 (b)(then pulled the (b)(2) that covered detainee ISN 093's rack.[60]

61. ~~(FOUO)~~ When the (b)(2) was moved, the guards saw the outlines under the (b)(2) that MA3 (b)(3):1 (b)(2) (b)(2)

62. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA2 (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(was also present at (b)(2 block and heard the commotion.[62]

63. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA2 (b)(2),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) opened an outer shutter on cell (b)(and looked through the window.[63]

64. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA2 saw detainee ISN 093 hanging by his neck near the sink behind a (b)(2) at 0030.[64]

65. ~~(FOUO)~~ Detainee ISN 093's feet were an inch to an inch and a half off the ground.[65]

66. ~~(FOUO)~~ Camp 1 guards including MA1 (b)(3):10 USC and MA3 (b)(3):1 entered the cell, cut the noose, and lowered detainee ISN 093.[66]

67. ~~(FOUO)~~ Camp 1 guards removed detainee ISN 093 from cell A8, (b)(2) per SOP, secured him to a backboard, and rapidly carried him to the Camp Delta clinic.[67]

68. ~~(FOUO)~~ At 0045 medical personnel at Camp Delta medical clinic administered Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) and Atropine x2 in an attempt to revive detainee ISN 093.[68]

69. ~~(FOUO)~~ These measures met with negative results.[69]

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[60] NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
B2.a)
[61] NCIS
B2.a).
[62] NCIS
[63] NCIS
[64] NCIS
[65] NCIS
[66] NCIS
B2.a), N
[67] NCIS
B2.a), N
[68] NCIS
(TAB F
(TAB F
(TAB F

70. (~~FOUO~~) An ambulance from NAVHOSP GTMO conveyed ISN 093 from the Camp Delta clinic to NAVHOSP GTMO at 0111 on 10 June 06.[70]

71. (~~FOUO~~) Detainee ISN 093 was pronounced dead at 0150 on 10 June 06 by Dr. (b)(3):10 USC CAPT, Chief of Joint Medical Group.[71]

72. (~~FOUO~~) As recorded in a final autopsy report, a medical examiner found that detainee ISN 093's death was caused by suicidal hanging.[72]

73. (~~FOUO~~) Shortly after the discovery of detainee ISN 093, Camp 1 guards checked the other occupied cells in Alpha Block.[73]

74. (~~FOUO~~) Detainee ISN 588 was found by MASN (b)(3):10 USC and MASN (b)(3):10 USC hanging by his neck in cell A-12 with a sheet wrapped around his head and obscured by a sheet hanging in the corner of his cell.[74]

75. (~~FOUO~~) Camp 1 guards, including MASN (b)(3):10 USC MASN (b)(3):10 USC (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) cut the noose, and lowered ISN 588.[75]

76. (~~FOUO~~) The guards removed ISN 588 from cell A12, shackled him per SOP, secured him to a backboard, and rapidly carried him to the Camp Delta clinic.[76]

77. (~~FOUO~~) At 0050, detainee ISN 588 was administered Cardiac Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) and Atropine x1.[77]

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[69] NC (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
(TAB
(TAB
(TAB
[70] NC
(TAB
NCIS

[71] NCIS Information regarding victims' time of death (TAB K2)

[72] Final Autopsy Report for Yasir T. al Zahrani (ISN 093), Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, dated 2 August 2006 (TAB H1)

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

78. (~~FOUO~~) These measures met with negative results.[78]

79. (~~FOUO~~) On 10 June 06 at 0115, Dr (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) CDR, Senior Medical Officer, Medical Detention Hospital, pronounced ISN 588 dead.[79]

80. (~~FOUO~~) The final autopsy report found that detainee ISN 588's death was caused by suicidal hanging.[80]

81. (~~FOUO~~) The time of death for detainee ISN 588 was estimated in the final autopsy report to be "at least a couple of hours prior to the discovery of his body."[81]

82. (~~FOUO~~) Shortly after the discovery of detainee ISN 588, Camp 1 guards found ISN 693 hanging by his neck in his cell with a (b)(2) around his neck and obscured by two blankets in the rear corner of his cell.[82]

83. (~~FOUO~~) Camp 1 guards, including (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) MASN (b)(7)(C) cut the noose, and lowered ISN 693.[83]

84. (~~FOUO~~) Camp 1 guards removed ISN 693 from cell A5, (b)(2) per SOP, secured him to a backboard, and carried him to the Camp Delta clinic.[84]

85. (~~FOUO~~) Detainee ISN 693 was administered Cardiac Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) and Atropine x2.[85]

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

[80] Final Autopsy Report for Mani Shaman Turki Alutaybi (ISN 588), Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, dated 2 August 2006 (TAB H2).

[81] Final Autopsy Report for Mani Shaman Turki Alutaybi (ISN 588), Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, dated 2 August 2006 (TAB H2).

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

86. (~~FOUO~~) The attempted measures met with negative results.[86]

87. (~~FOUO~~) Detainee ISN 693 was pronounced dead at 0116 on 10 June 06 by Dr. (b)(3):10 USC CDR, SMO, Medical Detention Hospital.[87]

88. (~~FOUO~~) The final autopsy report found that detainee ISN 693's death was caused by suicidal hanging.[88]

89. (~~FOUO~~) The time of death for detainee ISN 693 was estimated in the final autopsy report to be "at least a couple of hours before he was discovered."[89]

II. (U) Relevant Billets

1. (~~FOUO~~) The Camp Delta SOP ¶5-1a—h lists the following billets and their duties in its introduction to the Camp Delta chain of command:

2. (~~FOUO~~) The Commander, Joint Detention Group (CJDG), is responsible for all facets of operations in Camp Delta.

3. (~~FOUO~~) The Deputy Commander, Joint Detention Group (DCJDG), is appointed by CJDG to assist in execution of duties.

4. (~~FOUO~~) The Operations Officer (JDG S3) plans and oversees all Camp Delta Operations, with a focus on the safe, secure, and efficient operation of Camp Delta and other JTF GTMO facilities.

5. (~~FOUO~~) The Field Grade in Wire (FGIW) is a watch-standing officer who personally represents the CJDG in the camps, and keeps the CJDG informed regarding significant events affecting safety and livelihood.

6. (~~FOUO~~) The Camp Duty Officer (CDO) is a watch-standing officer in the Detainee Operations Center. As directed by the JDG S3, the CDO is responsible for all aspects of the operation of Camp Delta, to include the day-to-day humane care, custody, control, discipline, safety, and welfare of all detainees. The CDO is also responsible for overall care, conduct, and discipline of guard force.

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

[88] Final Autopsy Report for Ali Abdullah Ahmed (ISN 693), Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, dated 1 August 2006 (TAB H3).

[89] Final Autopsy Report for Ali Abdullah Ahmed (ISN 693), Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, dated 1 August 2006 (TAB H3).

7. (~~FOUO~~) Each subordinate camp in the Camp Delta complex has a camp Platoon Leader (PL), a watch-standing commissioned or warrant officer who assists the CDO in day-to-day operations.

8. (~~FOUO~~) The watch-standing Sergeant of the Guard (SOG) is the immediate shift supervisor of duty Block NCOs and Sally Port/Gate Guards. The SOG's responsibilities include care, conduct, and safety of guard force. The SOG enforces accountability, control, safety, care, and humane treatment of detainees. Additionally, the SOG ensures that guard personnel perform assigned duties and tasks to standard, and conform to Camp Delta SOP. The SOG coordinates logistical support of guard force and detainees, and ensures that meals are IAW Schedule of Calls. The SOG must be the pay grade of E-7 or above.

9. (~~FOUO~~) The Block NCOIC is responsible for every aspect of the custody, control, care, shelter, feeding, and treatment of all detainees housed in the block. The Block NCOIC ensures accountability over all plastic utensils and oversees cleanup after meals.

10. (~~FOUO~~) The DOC NCO and Assistant NCO control, report, and track all aspects of detention facility operations.

11. (~~FOUO~~) The Escort Control NCO and Assistant NCO are responsible for all aspects of Camp Delta escort operations.

12. (~~FOUO~~) The Detention Hospital Security Force NCO is responsible for all security provided at Detention Hospital, for custody and control of all detainees treated at the hospital, and for operational control of all guards assigned to the hospital.

III. (U) Relevant Portions of the Camp Delta SOP

a. The complete Camp Delta SOP is attached to this report at Tab A-1. I list here the relevant portions of the SOP, which are addressed in greater detail in subsequent sections. These items are arranged according to the order in which I first discuss them; the relevant sections are indicated in parentheses. My conclusions concerning possible violations of SOP are contained in section XXXIII.

2. (~~FOUO~~) SOP (b)(2)

(b)(2)

3. (~~FOUO~~) SOP table (b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

4. ~~(FOUO)~~ SOP table "(b)(2)
(b)(2)

5. ~~(FOUO)~~ SOP ¶(b)(2)
(b)(2)
(b)(2) (X) Not violated.

6. ~~(FOUO)~~ SOP ¶(b)(2)
(b)(2)" (XXXII) Not violated.

7. ~~(FOUO)~~ SOP ¶(b)(2) (b)(2)
(b)(2)" (XXXII) Not violated.

8. ~~(FOUO)~~ SOP table "(b)(2)
(b)(2)
(b)(2)

9. ~~(FOUO)~~ SOP (b)(2)
(b)(2)
(b)(2) (XIII)

10. ~~(FOUO)~~ SOP ¶(b)(2)
(b)(2) (XI, XII)

11. ~~(FOUO)~~ SOP ¶(b)(2) (XII)
Not violated.

12. ~~(FOUO)~~ SOP ¶(b)(2)
(b)(2) (b)(2)" (XVI, XVII)

13. ~~(FOUO)~~ SOP ¶8-8g "(b)(2)
(b)(2)
(b)(2)" (XV, XVI, XVII)

14. ~~(FOUO)~~ SOP ¶32-9o: (b)(2) (b)(2) [redacted]

15. ~~(FOUO)~~ SOP ¶8-6f “(b)(2) (b)(2) (b)(2) ” (XIV)

16. ~~(FOUO)~~ SOP (b)(2) (b)(2) (XI)

17. ~~(FOUO)~~ SOP (b)(2) (b)(2) (XX)

18. ~~(FOUO)~~ SOP (b)(2) (b)(2)

19. ~~(FOUO)~~ Per SOP (b)(2) (b)(2) [redacted] (b)(2) (XV)

20. ~~(FOUO)~~ SOP (b)(2) (b)(2)

IV. Detainee Information Management System

1. ~~(FOUO)~~ The Detainee Information Management System (DIMS) is the primary system for Camp Delta guards to record everything related to detainees and events that occur in the blocks, as well as the primary system employed by the JDG staff in performance of staff duties.

2. ~~(FOUO)~~ DIMS generates and transmits numerous reports or messages, to include guard messages concerning policy changes, important events, rosters to inform Block NCOs about present detainees, Significant Activities Sheets that inform the JDG S2 about major events such as assaults, meal refusals, and the like.[90]

3. ~~(FOUO)~~ At the cell block level, guards enter log entries into DIMS at the beginning of each shift, and throughout the shift. These entries are reviewed by Platoon Leaders, Sergeants of the Guard, Block NCOs, and sometimes the FGTW officer, before and during the watch. Because DIMS entries are mandatory,

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[90] SOP *passim*.

continually updated, and thorough, they provide a significant source of information as to the events that occurred on 9 June 2006.

4. (~~FOUO~~) I used the following types of DIMS documents in this report:

   5. (~~FOUO~~) Block Blotter;[91]

   6. (~~FOUO~~) Guard Messages, aka Guard Mount Messages;[92] and

   7. (~~FOUO~~) Random Headcounts.[93]

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[91] Alpha Block Blotter, 9 June 2006 to 10 June 2006 (TAB J5)

[92] Guard Messages, aka Guard Mount Messages, 7 December 2005 to 10 June 2006 (TAB A3).

[93] Tab J-6, Tab J-7

(U) Findings of Fact: Manner and Time of Death

V. (U) Manner of Death: Armed Forces Medical Examiners' Opinions

1. (~~FOUO~~) The three deceased detainees each died of asphyxiation due to hanging, and the manner of death was suicide in each case.

    2. (~~FOUO~~) The Final Autopsy Report for ISN 093 states that "This 21 year-old detainee died of hanging." The report further states that "After an extensive investigation there is no evidence to suggest that anyone else was involved in this death. Based on the information available, the manner of death is suicide."[94]

    3. (~~FOUO~~) The Final Autopsy Report for ISN 588 states that "This 30 year-old detainee died of hanging." The report further states that "Based on the information available at this time, the manner of death is Suicide."[95]

    4. (~~FOUO~~) The Final Autopsy Report for ISN 693 states that "This 37 year-old detainee died of hanging." The report further states that "Based on the investigative information of this date, there is no evidence of anyone else being involved with this death." The report concludes that "Based on currently available information, the manner of death is suicide."[96]

5. (~~FOUO~~) Medical examiners' estimated the time of death for ISN 588 and ISN 693. The medical examiner did not estimate time of death for ISN 093.

    6. (~~FOUO~~) The Final Autopsy Report for ISN 093 does not include an estimated time of death.[97]

    7. (~~FOUO~~) The Final Autopsy Report for ISN 588 states that "The description of the body during the attempted resuscitation indicates that the death occurred at least a couple of hours before he was discovered."[98]

    8. (~~FOUO~~) The Final Autopsy Report for ISN 693 states that "based on the medical documentation of the remains during the attempted resuscitation, the

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[94] Final Autopsy Report for Yasir T. al Zahrani (ISN 093), Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, dated 2 August 2006 (TAB H1).

[95] Final Autopsy Report for Mani Shaman Turki Alutaybi (ISN 588), Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, dated 2 August 2006 (TAB H2).

[96] Final Autopsy Report for Ali Abdullah Ahmed (ISN 693), Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, dated 1 August 2006 (TAB H3).

[97] Final Autopsy Report for Yasir T. al Zahrani (ISN 093), Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, dated 2 August 2006 (TAB H1).

[98] Final Autopsy Report for Mani Shaman Turki Alutaybi (ISN 588), Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, dated 31 July 2006 (TAB H2).

decedent had been dead for at least a couple of hours prior to the discovery of his body."[99]

VI. (U) Medical Evidence from Subject-Matter Expert Regarding Strangulation

1. ~~(FOUO)~~ On 15 August 2006, CPT (b)(3):10 USC (b)(7)(C) (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) spoke with Professor (b)(3):10 Professor (b)(7)(C) is an expert in the field of strangulation and asphyxiation deaths. Professor [redacted] has performed consultation work for the Navy and for the Department of Defense. With regard to self-inflicted strangulation, Professor (b)(7)(C) offered the following:[100]

2. (U) In the "typical jail house hanging" (self-inflicted strangulation) the individual is unconscious within two minutes and dead within four minutes.

3. (U) The two-minute/four-minute time frame is applicable even if the individual strangled himself or herself lying down using a ligature wrapped around the neck.

4. (U) Most self-inflicted strangulations are not full-suspension hangings; that is to say, there is some contact between the floor or another object and the body.

5. (U) Death will occur much quicker in a full-suspension hanging.

6. (U) Autopsies are generally unhelpful in determining how long it took any particular person to die from strangulation.

7. (U) Foreign airway obstructions in the throat may cause death faster than asphyxiation without foreign matter in the throat.

VII. (U) Estimated Time of Death: Discovery of the Bodies

1. ~~(FOUO)~~ Alpha Block guards discovered the body of ISN 093 in cell A8 at about 0030 on 10 June 2006.

2. ~~(FOUO)~~ CTM1 (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) notified him of the problem in A8 around 0025 to 0030.[102]

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[99] Final Autopsy Report for Ali Abdullah Ahmed (ISN 693), Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, dated 1 August 2006 (TAB H3).

[100] Summary of (b)(7)(interview, Tab I-3

[102] NCIS (b)(3):1 6/14/2006 (TAB C6.a)

3. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):10 USC stated that he went to Alpha Block at about 0027 and saw other guards looking into cell A8.[103]

4. (~~FOUO~~) MA1 (b)(7)(C) stated that he saw Alpha Block guards running around at 0030. By that time the guards already had carried ISN 093 to the medical clinic and returned.[104]

5. (~~FOUO~~) MA2 (b)(3):10 stated that he returned from chow around 2345. He began his rounds at midnight, and then traded almost immediately with MA3 (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b estimated that approximately 15 to 30 minutes later (i.e., between 0015 and 0030), MA3 (b)(3):10 spotted the problem in cell A8.[105]

6. (~~FOUO~~) MAC (b)(3):10 USC §13 a stated that he was notified of the problem sometime after midnight.[106]

7. (~~FOUO~~) MA1 stated that MA3 (b)(3):1 noticed a problem with cell A8 while MA3 (b)(3):1 was walking the tier from 0030 to 0100 on 10 June 2006.

8. (~~FOUO~~) MA (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) s tier shift as starting before MA3 J rned from chow.[107]

9. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 USC stated that he "went to chow at approximately 2345."[108]

10. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that she went to chow with MASN (b)(3):10 USC and returned from chow about 2340.[109]

11. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):10 USC stated that he returned from chow at about 2355, and that he remembers taking over MA2 (b)(3): s tier shift at about 0036.[110]

12. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 USC thought that he heard the (b)(2) alert for ISN 093 at approximately midnight.[111]

13. (~~FOUO~~) MA1 (b)(3):10 thought he heard the (b)(2) alert for ISN 093 approximately five to ten minutes before midnight.[112]

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

[103] NCIS /2006 (TAB C13.a)
[104] NCIS 5/2006 (TAB C16)
[105] NCIS 006 (TAB B3.a)
[106] NCIS 006 (TAB C1.a)
[107] NCIS 06 (TAB B2.a)
[108] NCIS /2006 (TAB B6.a)
[109] NCIS /2006 (TAB B4.a)
[110] NCIS 2006 (TAB B5.a)
[111] NCIS /14/2006 (TAB C2.a)
[112] NCIS 2006 (TAB C5.a)

14. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 USC did not provide an approximate time for the discovery of ISN 093.

15. (~~FOUO~~) Camp 1 guards discovered the body of ISN 588 in cell A12 at about 0035 on 10 June 2006.

16. (~~FOUO~~) MA1 (b)(3):1 0 USC stated that he saw Alpha Block guards running around at 0030. By that time the guards already had carried ISN 093 to the medical clinic and returned. When he walked up to Alpha Block he heard "(b)(2) Alpha 12."[113]

17. (~~FOUO~~) Camp 1 guards discovered the body of ISN 693 in cell A5 at about 0040 on 10 June 2006.

VIII. (U) Estimated Time of Death: Pronouncement of Death

1. (~~FOUO~~) Findings of fact regarding the pronouncement of death for ISN 093 (cell A8) include the following:

2. (~~FOUO~~) JDG escort team members who accompanied ISN 093 to the Naval Hospital Guantanamo Bay stated that medical personnel at the hospital declared ISN 093 to be dead at 0150 on 10 June 2006.

3. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):10 stated that "ISN 093 was pronounced dead at 0150."[114]

4. (~~FOUO~~) MA2 (b)(3): 10 stated that "At about 0150, a doctor at the Naval Hospital pronounced ISN 093 dead."[115]

5. (~~FOUO~~) Findings of fact regarding the estimated time of death for ISN 588 (cell A12) include the following:

6. (~~FOUO~~) Camp Delta medical clinic personnel report that the Senior Medical Officer, Dr. (b)(3):10 USC §130b (b)(6) (b)(7)(C pronounced ISN 588 dead at 0115 on 10 June 2006.

7. (~~FOUO~~) (b)(3):10 USC stated that "The SMO came back in [to exam room #11 in the Camp Delta medical clinic] at 0115 and asked how long we have been administering CPR. We told him

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[113] NCIS (b)(3): 6/13/2006 (TAB C16)
[114] NCIS 10 6/14/2006 (TAB C4.a)
[115] NCIS USC 15/2006 (TAB C9)

for about half an hour. The SMO [(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b) pronounced the detainee dead at that time [0115]."

8. (~~FOUO~~) (b)(3):10 stated that ISN 588 "was pronounced dead by the Senior Medical Officer [Dr. (b)(3):10 at about 0115-0120.[117]

9. (~~FOUO~~) (b)(3):10 stated that "At 0115 the doctor [Dr. (b)(3):10 pronounced the second detainee [ISN 588] dead."[118]

10. (~~FOUO~~) HM3 (b)(3):10 stated that "Both of the detainees [ISN 588 and ISN 693] in the two exam rooms were pronounced dead about 0115—0116."[119]

11. (~~FOUO~~) HN (b)(3):10 stated that "At 0115, Dr. (b)(3):10 made the decision that the detainee was dead."[120]

12. (~~FOUO~~) Findings of fact regarding the pronouncement of death for ISN 693 (cell A5) include the following:

13. (~~FOUO~~) Camp Delta medical clinic personnel report that the Senior Medical Officer, Dr. (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C pronounced ISN 693 dead at 0115 on 10 June 2006.

14. (~~FOUO~~) HM2 (b)(3) stated that "CDR (b)(3):10 'called it' meaning that he was pronouncing the time of death. I looked [my] watch and it was 0115."[121]

15. (~~FOUO~~) HM3 (b)(3):10 stated that "Both of the detainees [ISN 588 and ISN 693] in the two exam rooms were pronounced dead about 0115—0116."[122]

16. (~~FOUO~~) HN (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) detected no signs of life [in ISN 693] and called the time of death at 0116."

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[116] NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) 5/2006 (
[117] NCIS 5/2006 (TAB F3)
[118] NCIS /2006 (TAB F6)
[119] NCIS 16/2006 (TAB F7)
[120] NCIS 6/16/2006 (TAB F9)
[121] NCIS 006 (TAB F4)
[122] NCIS 16/2006 (TAB F7)

IX. (U) Estimated Time of Death: Medical Examiners' Final Autopsy Reports

1. (~~FOUO~~) The final autopsy report for ISN 093 does not include an estimated time of death.

2. (~~FOUO~~) The final autopsy report for ISN 588 states that "The description of the body [of ISN 588] during the attempted resuscitation indicates that the death occurred at least a couple of hours before he was discovered."[123]

3. (~~FOUO~~) The final autopsy report for ISN 693 states that "The description of the body [of ISN 693] during the attempted resuscitation indicates that the death occurred at least a couple of hours before he was discovered."

4. (~~FOUO~~) The medical examiner's estimate of a couple of hours narrows the range of possible times for the deaths of ISN 588 and ISN 693.

> 5. (~~FOUO~~) If a couple of hours equaled two hours, then ISN 588 and ISN 693 would have died between 2230 and 2300, during the tier watch of MASN (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(
>
> > 6. (~~FOUO~~) (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7 was the guard whose attention was drawn to cell A12 (ISN 588) during his 2230—2300 tier watch. MASN (b)(3):10 stated that: "When I arrived at A12, I saw a blue blanket on the floor. The blanket appeared to have something or someone under it so I proceeded on. I interpreted this to be the detainee lying underneath it. I did not visually scan the cell to see if anything or anyone was hanging inside. I proceeded past (b)(2) but I didn't look in any of the cells because I was thinking about the blanket on the floor in A12."[124]
> >
> > 7. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 also stated that "I feel that the guards and myself on Alpha block did an inadequate job monitoring the detainees that night to make sure that they were following the rules as to show[ing] some kind of skin while sleeping. I feel this happens with everyone on every block, everyday. We see and do the same things every day, and it gets old and boring. I wish I would have been more attentive and could have done something to save the detainees. I don't know if the detainees died on my watch, but I somehow feel responsible for their deaths."[125]

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[123] NCIS (b)(3):1 /16/2006
[124] NCIS 0 USC /14/2006 (TAB B6.a)
[125] NCIS §130b,(/14/2006 (TAB B6.a)

8. (~~FOUO~~) If a couple of hours equaled more than two hours, then the next earlier tier watch on which ISN 588 and ISN 693 may have died would be the 2200—2230 shift by (b)(3):10 USC

9. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 was the guard who discovered the initial detainee suicide, in cell A8.[126]

10. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 is a brig MA; he told me that "in a brig, 'The SOP is how it goes.'"[127]

11. (~~FOUO~~) Later in the same interview, in response to my question "How did you check detainees for a head count?" MA3 (b)(3):10 said he "Looks at one at a time; also looks for contraband, but doesn't take it until detainee wakes up. It takes 6--10 minutes to view sleeping detainees; sometimes you have to watch several minutes [to detect movement]."

12. (~~FOUO~~) If a couple of hours was more than two and a half hours, then the detainees hanged themselves while the tier was fully illuminated.

13. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that "I am positive that all three detainees were alive when I completed sweeping. This would have been shortly before 2130."[128]

14. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 0 USC stated that after assuming the 2200—2230 tier watch, he mopped up some puddles and then reminded the other guards to turn (b)(2) [29]

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[126] (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) 6/14/2006 (TAB B5.a)
[127] iew 7/26/2006 (TAB B5.c)
[128] 6/15/2006 (TAB B4.a)
[129] 6/14/2006 (TAB B5.a)

(U) Findings of Fact:
Physical Presence of Required Guard Force Personnel

X. (U) Presence of Camp 1 Duty Leadership, 9 June 2006

1. (~~FOUO~~) Per the SOP, ¶5-3a, "*Continuous leadership presence is required in each camp at all times. Camp Leadership of either the PL [Platoon Leader] or the SOG [Sergeant of the Guard] will remain present within their respective camps, in the causeway or on one of the blocks, at all times during a shift.*"

2. (~~FOUO~~) No evidence suggests that either the Camp 1 Platoon Leader or Sergeant of the Guard CTM1 (b)(3):10 was absent from his appointed place of duty.

3. (~~FOUO~~) MAC (b)(3) was duty Platoon Leader (PL) in Camp 1 for the night watch from about 1745 on 9 June 2006 to about 0545 on 10 June 2006.[130]

   4. (~~FOUO~~) MAC (b)(3): conducted a walk-through inspection of Alpha Block at about 2320.[131]

   5. (~~FOUO~~) At approximately 0040, MAC (b)(3): heard "(b)(2) Alpha Block" on his radio and ran to Alpha Block.[132]

6. (~~FOUO~~) CTM1 (b)(3):10 was duty Sergeant of the Guard (SOG) in Camp 1 for the night watch from about 1745 on 9 June 2006 to about 0545 on 10 June 2006.[133]

   7. (~~FOUO~~) CTM1 (b)(3):10 USC spoke with the Alpha Block NCO around 2030.[134]

   8. (~~FOUO~~) CTM1 (b)(3):10 USC visited the Alpha Block guard shack between 2130 and 2200.[135]

   9. (~~FOUO~~) CTM1 (b)(3):10 visited the Alpha Block guard shack shortly after 2300.[136]

   10. (~~FOUO~~) At approximately 0040, MA1 (b)(3):10 USC of an apparent suicide. CTM1 (b)(3):10 ran into Alpha Block, and on seeing ISN

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[130] Watch Bill, NCIS Exhibit 2; NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

[131] DIMS 09JUN2006 2320L, entry by
6/15/2006 (TAB B2 a)

[132] NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

[133] Watc

[134] DIMS

[135] NCIS

[136] NCIS

093 called (b)(2) over his radio; (b)(2) is the brevity code for a suicide attempt.[137]

XI. (U) Presence of Alpha Block Guard Team, 9 June 2006

(b)(2)

2. (~~FOUO~~) As noted above in section V, Presence of Camp 1 Duty Leadership, the duty Camp 1 Platoon Leader and Sergeant of the Guard visited Alpha Block at least four times on 9 June 2006.

3. (~~FOUO~~) CTM1 (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) spoke with the Alpha Block NCO around 2030.[138]

4. (~~FOUO~~) CTM1 visited the Alpha Block guard shack between 2130 and 2200.[139]

5. (~~FOUO~~) CTM1 visited the Alpha Block guard shack shortly after 2300.[140]

6. (~~FOUO~~) MAC (b)(3):10 conducted a walk-through inspection of Alpha Block at about 2320.[141]

7. (~~FOUO~~) The DIMS Alpha Block Blotter for 9 and 10 June 2006 contains the following entry at time 2320: "PL ON BLOCK."

8. (~~FOUO~~) The DIMS Alpha Block Blotter for 9 and 10 June 2006 contains the following entry at time 2323: "PL OFF BLOCK."

9. (~~FOUO~~) MA (b)(3):10 USC stated that "During my 2300-2330 watch, MA1 (b)(3 and MAC (b)(3 did a walk-through. I was approximately in the middle of the tier when they arrived. They came up behind and passed me. They walked to the end of the tier, turned around and walked back toward the guard shack. I do not know if they looked into each cell and by the time they passed me, they had passed cells A-5, A-8 and possibly A-12."[142]

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[137] DIMS 10JUN2006 0038L, entry by MAC (b)(3):10 USC 6/14/06 (TAB C6).
[138] DIMS 6/9/06 2030; NCIS CTM1 (b)(3):1 6/14/06.
[139] NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
[140] NCIS
[141] DIMS
6/15/200
[142] NCIS

10. (~~FOUO~~) The Alpha Block guard team agreed upon an informal watch bill to take turns maintaining a constant presence on the block.

11. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(2) (b)(2)

12. (~~FOUO~~) MA2 (b)(3): 10 stated "That day [9 June 2006] MA3 (b)(3):1 did the watch bill.[144]

13. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that "The guards were assigned watches for 30 minute intervals. This night [9 June 2006] they were:"[145]

14. 2130—2200 MA1 (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

15. 2200—2230 MA3

16. 2230—2300 MA3

17. 2300—2330 (b)(3):10 [No watch stander is indicated in MA3 (b)(3):10 list for the period 2300—2330, but elsewhere in her statement she says explicitly that she stood the 2300-2330 shift.]

18. 2330—2400 MA3 (b)(3):1 [actually MA1 (b)(3):10 USC 's listing of herself here is an error, as discussed in the "Conclusions" section and illustrated in Appendix C.]

19. 2400—0030 MA2 (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) exchanged to 0030-0100]

20. 0030—0100 MA3 (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) exchanged to 0001—0030]

21. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 further stated that "It is my understanding that (b)(3):10 changed watches with MA2 (b)(3):[146]

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[143] NCIS (b)(3): 10 USC §130b, /14/2006 (TAB B5.a)

[144] NCIS 15/2006 (TAB B3.a)

[145] NCIS /8/2006 (TAB B4.b)

[146] NCIS /15/2006 (TAB B4.a)

XII. (U) Possibility that Guards Left Alpha Block Unattended, 9 June 2006

1. (~~FOUO~~) Per SOP (b)(2) (b)(2)

2. (~~FOUO~~) Per SOP ¶8-15i, (b)(2) (b)(2)

3. (~~FOUO~~) One Alpha Block guard stated that as a consequence of violating SOP ¶8-15i, there was a period of ten minutes after serving food to the detainees during which "No one was watching the detainees."[147]

> 4. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 stated that "After serving the food to the detainees [at about 1900 on 9 June 2006], the all of alpha block crew met outside of the guard shack towards the Sallys. We ate some of the extra food that the detainees did not want and had a short conversation, which last[ed] approximately 10 minutes. No one was watching the detainees at that time."[148]

5. (~~FOUO~~) Two Alpha Block guards acknowledged some of the basic facts of MASN (b)(3):10 statement, but distinguished between being off the tier and off the block.

> 6. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 responded to the questions "Do guards step out of the block for leftover chow? Did that happen on night of 9-10 June?" MA3 by stating that "I have seen guards eat in (b)(2) block when the chow has been left out. On the night of 9-10 of June all of the block guards stayed on the block after chow was handed out, we sat at the bottom of the stairs in the front of the block and talked about work and personal subjects."[149]

> 7. (~~FOUO~~) MA2 (b)(3) responded to the questions "Do guards step out of the block for leftover chow? Did that happen on night of 9-10 June?" by stating that "Guards often step off the tier, to my knowledge, not off the block, to eat snacks of left over meals. It is a common occurrence amongst night shift personnel because we were only authorized one meal break per 13 hour shift, usually 30-45 minutes in the middle of shift, whereas on days you are authorized two meal breaks. Most guards I knew on nights would skip meals at home to get more sleep because the job tired them out. As for it happening on the night of 9 June, I believe there is a good possibility that guards ate the meals, but I don't remember if they did or not."

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[147] NCIS (b)(3): 10 USC §130b, (b)(6),(6/14/2006 (TAB 86.a)

[148] NCIS 6/14/2006 (TAB 86.a)

[149] NCIS /8/2006 (TAB 84.b)

8. (~~FOUO~~) The Alpha Block NCO stated that the surplus chow that guards ate came from Camp 1 watch supervisors.

> 9. (~~FOUO~~) MA1 (b)(3 stated that "On 09Jun06, we had some extra food and offered it to the detainees."150 MA1 (b)(3 :10 responded to the questions "What about surplus chow? Do guards eat any of it?" as follows: "At the end of chow, the surplus goes in the trash. Rovers bring chow to the block on the cart, any leftovers go in the trash. PLs & SOGs have separate extra chow out on the causeway, which guards can eat there or out at table at front of block [i.e., at the picnic table shelters located in (b)(2) Block]. Sometimes this surplus is available, sometimes not."[151]

10. (~~FOUO~~) I visually verified that the four squares drawn in Block (b)(2) in the map at Tab J-1 represent sheltered tables. The rectangle depicted in (b)(2) Block is a set of heads for guards.

(U) Findings of Fact: Quality of Guard Oversight on Alpha Block

XIII. (U) Vigilance of Alpha Block Guard Team, 9 June 2006

1. (~~FOUO~~) Per SOP (b)(2) (b)(2)

2. (~~FOUO~~) One Alpha Block guard stated that he felt the Alpha Block guard team did an inadequate job monitoring the detainees on the night of 9/10 June 2006.

> 3. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 stated "I feel that the guards and myself on Alpha block did an inadequate job monitoring the detainees that night to make sure that they were following the rules as to show some kind of (b)(2 while sleeping. I feel this happens with everyone on every block, everyday. We see and do the same things every day, and it gets old and boring. I wish I would have been more attentive and could have done something to save the detainees. I don't know if the detainees died on my watch, but I somehow feel responsible for their deaths."[152]
>
> 4. (~~FOUO~~) For reasons discussed in below in "Conclusions," I did not find this statement a credible characterization of the Alpha Block guard team.

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[150] (b)(3):10 USC /2006 (TAB B2.a)
[151] §130b,(b)(6),(/9/06 (TAB B2.c)
[152] b)(7)(C) /14/2006 (TAB B5.a)

5. (~~FOUO~~) One Alpha Block guard stated that the Alpha Block guard team was more vigilant than any other team.

> 6. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):10 USC responded to the question "Why do you think it took the Alpha Block guards so long to find the bodies?" with the following statement: "It is my personal opinion that if it had been any other block guard team on Alpha Block that night, that it is very possible that the detainees would not have been found until turnover that morning, and that more detainee deaths might have occurred."[153]

XIV. (U) Random Headcounts, 9 June 2006

1. (~~FOUO~~) Per SOP ¶ (b)(2) (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 A,(b)(2)

5. (~~FOUO~~) On 9 June 2006, DOC ordered the (b)(2) more than (b)(2) hours apart, (b)(2)

6. (~~FOUO~~) Alpha Block received the 9 June 2006 calls for (b)(2) at 2004 and 2335, and replied via DIMS at 2017 and 2350.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 A

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 A

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[153] (b)(3):10 /8/2006 (TAB B4.h)

[154] DIMS: Alpha Block Blotter, Entry DTG 09JUN2006 2017L (TAB J5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 A

15. (~~FOUO~~) Alpha Block guards stated that they do not know who made the random headcount entries for their block at 2017 and 2350 on 9 June 2006.

16. (~~FOUO~~) MA1 (b)(3) :10 tated "he did not make the [random headcount] entry and did not know who did." MA1 (b)(3):10 also stated that "anyone on the block can make random headcount entries."[160]

17. (~~FOUO~~) MA2 (b)(3): 10 stated that "I didn't log in any of the computerized DOC random head counts that night." [161]

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[155] DIMS Headcount Report 09JUN2006 2004L (Complete) (TAB J6)
[156] DIMS Headcount Report 09JUN2006 2004L (Complete) (TAB J6)
[157] DIMS: Alpha Block Blotter, Entry DTG 09JUN2006 2350L (TAB J5)
[158] DIMS Headcount Report 09JUN2006 2004L (Complete) (TAB J6)
[159] DIMS Headcount Report 09JUN2006 2004L (Complete) (TAB J6)
[160] NCIS (b)(3 /16/2006 re-interview (TAB B2.b)
[161] NCIS):10 6/15/2006 (TAB B3.a)

18. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 said in an NCIS re-interview on 16 June 2006 "[r]egarding the DIMS headcount entry made at 2350 hours, [that] he did not make the entry and did not know who did." In the same re-interview, "MA3 (b)(3):1 said he was not on A-Block at 2350 hours; he came back late from chow around 2355 hours after stopping to see MAC (b)(3): at (b)(2) Block."[162]

19. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 said "I have no knowledge on who replied to those random headcounts, as I was walking the block from 2330 to 2400, [and] I was not told to do an actual headcount, or that there was even a headcount initiated."[163]

20. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 stated that "he did not make the entry and didn't remember anyone doing the headcount" and that "No one had ordered a head counts [sic] that day except for the one that I performed at the beginning of the shift."[164]

21. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 USC stated "The A-block team did the head counts like we were supposed to by visually seeing (b)(2) in every cell at the beginning of the shift, because I was the one that conducted it, and the other one was done when I was in the shack and the NCO told someone I don't remember who to do it and they did the head count."[165]

22. (~~FOUO~~) Camp 1 guard force personnel gave conflicting accounts of proper procedures for conducting a random headcount at night during detainee sleep time, between lights dimmed at 2200 and lights restored at 0600.

23. (~~FOUO~~) One Alpha Block guard stated that a random head count required immediate visual confirmation of detainee (b)(2) in each cell.

24. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):1 stated that when "the random head counts are done right[,] (b)(2) (b)(2) How you perform a head (b)(2) counting the detainees by physically looking into the cell and visually seeing (b)(2) as per SOP. You walk to one end, turn around and do the other side the same way."[166]

25. (~~FOUO~~) Three Alpha Block guards stated that a random head count was for enumerating guards, not detainees.

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[162] (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

[163]

[164] re-interview 6/17/2006 (TAB B6)

[165]

[166]

26. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 stated words to the effect that he "understood this [i.e., a random head count] to be an administrative check focusing on how many guards were on hand, rather than on detainees."[167]

27. (~~FOUO~~) MA1 (b)(3) stated that "Random headcounts were administrative. (b)(2) (b)(2) for whichever block and it would have the number of detainees accounted, present, and out. The Block NCO or a Block Guard who is authorized to (b)(2)

28. (~~FOUO~~) MA2 (b)(3): 10 responded to the question, "Were you aware of guards not visually confirming the headcount via sighting of (b)(or (b)(2) ?" by stating that "The On-Coming and Off-Going Headcounts was when we visually conducted a sighting of (b)(2) and they were written into the DIMS system as (b)(2) but a visual sighting of (b)(2) was not conducted by any guards in Camp Delta during a (b)(2) ."[169]

29. (~~FOUO~~) In the same statement, MA2 (b)(3) :10 added "We were told it (b)(2) was for administrative purposes to show our manpower." [170]

XV. (U) Frequency with which Guards Checked Detainees

1. (~~FOUO~~) Per SOP (b)(2) (b)(2)

2. (~~FOUO~~) While all the lights were on, Alpha Block guards normally walked the cell tier at their own pace.

3. (~~FOUO~~) MA2 (b)(3): 10 stated that until lights out "there was no set time as to how long it took to walk a tier, (b)(2) (b)(2)

4. (~~FOUO~~) Camp Delta detainees at risk for self-harm were observed at fifteen-minute intervals.

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[167] (b)(3): 10 USC §130b ,(b)(6) Interview 7/26/2006 (TAB B5.c)
[168] atement 8/9/2006 (TAB B2.c)
[169] tatement 8/8/2006 (TAB B3.b)
[170] tatement 8/8/2006 (TAB B3.b)
[171] tatement 8/8/2006 (TAB B3.b)

5. (~~FOUO~~) A day-shift Sergeant of the Guard log entry six weeks before the

(b)(2)

6. (~~FOUO~~) This SOG log entry is consistent with SOP directives regarding

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

8. (~~FOUO~~) No Alpha Block detainees were identified as current self-harm risks in the Platoon Leader and Sergeant of the Guard logs on 9 June 2006.

9. (~~FOUO~~) During the (b)(2) were required by SOP to sight (b)(2)

10. (~~FOUO~~) (b)(3):10 USC responded to the question "How long does it take to make a circuit of the tier after lights out?" as follows: "Depending on how many detainees

(b)(2)

XVI. (U) Rules for Guard Sightings of Detainees at Night

(b)(2)

2. (~~FOUO~~) (b)(3):10 USC responded to the question, "Were you aware of guards not visually confirming the headcount via (b)(2) (b)(2)" by stating that "The On-Coming and Off-Going Headcounts was when we visually conducted a (b)(2), and they were written into the DIMS system as On-Coming or Off-Going, but a visual sighting of (b)(2) was not conducted by any guards in Camp Delta during a Random Initiated Headcount."[174]

(b)(2)

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[172] SOG Log 4/29/2006 (TAB J10)

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) /8/2006 (TAB B4.b)

t 8/8/2006 (TAB B3.b)

4. (~~FOUO~~) The Alpha Block guards set up an informal watch bill for walking their tier after lights out on 9 June 2006.

5. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):10 stated that during his 2200-2230 stint on the tier, he "did not take note of anything out of place in cells A5, A8 or A12. But, he knew he conducted a thorough walk-through, because he remembered specifics about detainees in other cells."[175]

6. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 USC had the 2230-2300 tier watch and failed to check cells (b)(2)[176]

7. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 0 USC stated that while she was walking tier watch from 2300 to 2330, "I looked in all the cells as I walked by. I always start on the left side walking from (b)(2) and come back on the right side from (b)(2) One if not both of the detainees in A-5 and A-12 were on the floor covered with a sheet." MA3 (b)(3):1 further stated "I looked in cell A-8 and saw what I believed to be him sleeping in his bed under a blanket."[177]

8. (~~FOUO~~) MA1 (b)(3) stated that "I walked another shift on the tier between either 2330-0000 or 0000-0030. I really can't remember which." [It was the former.] He further stated that "I do remember that the detainee in cell A-8 had a (b)(2) (b)(2) looking in from the tier to the cell. It appeared as I walked by that he was in his bunk. I saw some form under a blanket, but I could not see his head because the view was blocked, (b)(2) I don't know for sure if any of the three deceased detainees were alive when I was walking the tier at this time, because I didn't (b)(2) hat time."[178]

> 9. (~~FOUO~~) In a separate statement, MA1 (b)(3):10 said that "Guards had to see (b)(2) during their rounds, but some detainees would [position] themselves in such a way that it was very difficult to tell and this issue was brought to the attention of the chain of command. We were told not to wake detainees because it could be construed as harassment. The PLs and SOGs said this was coming from the upper chain of command OIC/AOIC.[179]

10. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that "MA1 (b)(3):10 was walking the tier between 0000-0030, 10Jun06. At 0030 MA2 (b)(3) took over the next shift 0030-0100."[180]

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

[175] 16/2006 reinterview (TAB B5)

[176] /14/2006 (TAB B6.a)

[177] 15/2006 (TAB B4.a)

[178] /2006 (TAB B2.a)

[179] /9/2006 (TAB B2.c)

[180] 4/2006 (TAB B5.a)

11. (~~FOUO~~) As is discussed in Section VII above, MA3(b)(3):1 0 USC is mistaken as to the time; MA1(b)(walked the tier from 2330 to 2400, when he was relieved by MA2(b)(3): 10

12. (~~FOUO~~) MA2(b)(3): 10 stated that "I relieved MA1(b)(3) at 0000, and began my rounds of the cellblock. I didn't complete my rounds because MA3(b)(3):1 0 USC stopped me and asked if I would trade shifts with him."[181]

13. (~~FOUO~~) In the same statement, MA2(b)(3): stated that "I had walked only a few cells down before MA3(b)(3): 10 came up behind me and asked to switch shifts." [182]

14. (~~FOUO~~) MA3(b)(3):1 stated that shortly before he switched times with MA2 (b)(3): he "got word from the Sergeant of the Guard (SOG) to come talk to him after 0100 about my leave chit. I went to MA2(b)(3): 10 and switched with him on the shift at approximately 0036. [MA3(b)(3):1 is mistaken; he started his turn on tier watch several minutes after midnight.] I started at cell (b)(2) and proceeded down one side of the tier. My normal practice is to go down one side then back up the other. I do not like to go back and forth across the tier. I stopped at cell (b)(2 because he had a sheet over his head. I tapped lightly on his bean hole and asked him to take down his sheet so I could see his head. He complied with my request. I also stopped at cell A-20 because he was lying on his stomach. I stayed there for about 45-60 seconds until I could be sure he was moving." [183]

XVII. (U) Failure of Guards to (b)(2) 9 June 2006

1. (~~FOUO~~) Per SOP(b)(2) (b)(2)

2. (~~FOUO~~) Per SOP (b)(2) (b)(2)

3. (~~FOUO~~) One Alpha Block guard stated that on the night of 9/10 June, he did not check all cells during his 2200—2230 turn on the tier. Two cells he did not check--A5 and A8--held detainees who committed suicide.

4. (~~FOUO~~) MASN(b)(3):10 USC stated that during his 2230-2300 tier watch, "I walked the entire block. From (b)(2) [i.e., the right-hand side of the tier, seen from the guard shack, and the opposite side of the tier from the suicides' cells], I made sure that I saw every detainee's (b)(2) From (b)(2), I did see each of the detainee's (b)(. When I arrived at A12, I saw a blue blanket

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[181] (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) /15/2006 (TAB B3.a)
[182] nt 8/8/2006 (TAB B3.b)
[183] /14/2006 (TAB B5.a)

on the floor. The blanket appeared to have something or someone under it so I proceeded on. I interpreted this to be the detainee lying underneath it. I did not visually scan the cell to see if anything or anyone was hanging inside. I proceeded past (b)(2), but I didn't look in any of the cells because I was thinking about the blanket on the floor in (b)(I continued to walk the block until my shift was over but I didn't look in each individual cell each time I passed them."[184]

5. ~~(FOUO)~~ Two additional Alpha Block guards reported that during their tier (b)(2) (b)(2)

6. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 (b)(3):1 responded to the question "During your 2300-2330 shift, were you able to see (b)(2) on all detainees?" by stating "No. I cannot say I was able to see (b)(2) on all detainees."[185]

7. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA1 (b)(3 "I don't know for sure if any of the three deceased detainees were alive when I was walking the tier at this time [2330---2400], because I didn't see (b)(2) at that time."[186]

XVII. (U) What to Do when Guards Could Not See (b)(2)

1. ~~(FOUO)~~ The SOP (b)(2) (b)(2)

2. ~~(FOUO)~~ I found no directive (b)(2) (b)(2)

3. ~~(FOUO)~~ CDR (b)(3): the JDG Deputy Commander, stated that "If the order for a headcount came during the time detainees were sleeping, the guards would check for (b)(2) (b)(2) (b)(2)

4. ~~(FOUO)~~ (b)(2) (b)(2)

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[184] (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) 6/14/2006 (TAB B6.a)

[185] /15/2006 (TAB B4.a)

[186] /2006 (TAB B2.a)

[187] (Tab D-3)

5. ~~(FOUO)~~ The JDG Commander and some Camp 1 guard team supervisors and guards believed that the SOP directed (b)(2) guards could not see (b)(2)

6. ~~(FOUO)~~ The Commander Joint Detention Group at the time of the suicides, (b)(3):10 USC stated that "ICRC [International Commission of the Red Cross] has just recently raised the issue of the (b)(2) detainees during the night when the standard (b)(2) met. In my discussions with them I left the issue with them saying I would not (b)(2) unless ordered by higher officials."[188]

7. ~~(FOUO)~~ A Platoon Leader in Camp 1, MAC (b)(3):10 stated that when he toured Camp 1 cell blocks at night, he always waited to see (b)(2) If he couldn't see (b)(2) he would question the guard, (b)(2) detainee.[189]

8. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA1 (b)(3):1 stated to me that "At night, you needed to make the rounds and look for (b)(2) " MA1 (b)(3):1 also stated that "if you can't see (b)(2) wake up the detainee."

9. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA1 (b)(3):10 statement to me is contradicted by a report that he passed the word at a Camp 1 guard mount not to wake detainees; see MA3 (b)(3):10 statement below for the full report.

10. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that on the night of 9/10 June, "I stopped at cell (b)(2 because he had a sheet over his head. I tapped lightly on his bean hole and asked him to take down his sheet so I could see his head. He complied with my request."[190]

11. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that "According to the SOP (b)(2) (b)(2) (b)(2) [191]

12. ~~(FOUO)~~ Other Camp I personnel thought that they were prohibited from waking a detainee at night.

13. ~~(FOUO)~~ A former Platoon Leader in Camp 1, ETSC (b)(3):1 responded to (b)(2) "Did guards have to sight (b)(2) (b)(2) with the following statement: "No. (b)(2)

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

[188] 6/17/2006 (Tab D-1)
[189] /14/06 (TAB E1)
[190] 2006 (TAB B5.a)
[191] 006 (TAB B4.b)
[192] 14/2006 (TAB E2)

14. ~~(FOUO)~~ In the week preceding the suicides, BM1/SW (b)(3):10 A Camp (Block NCO from Second Platoon, counseled MA2 (b)(3):1 one of his guards, for not waiting until detainees were awake to confiscate contraband concealed in bean holes.[193]

15. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA1 (b)(stated (b)(2) (b)(2)

16. ~~(FOUO)~~ Subsequently, MA1 (b)(3) stated "(b)(2) (b)(2) The PLs and SOGs said this was coming from the upper chain of command OIC/AOIC."[195]

17. ~~(FOUO)~~ Notwithstanding MA3 (b)(3):1's belief that the SOP required (b)(2)

18. ~~(FOUO)~~ In a subsequent statement, MA3 (b)(3):1 said that "The work week before the suicides, MA2 (b)(3):1 (b)(2) (b)(2) (b)(2) She continued to do so and received more counseling chits from Chief (b)(3):10 USC for taking contraband out of the bottom bean holes of cells while the detainees were sleeping. We were told at the next guard mount by [Sergeant of the Guard] MA1 (b)(3):1 'Do not be bothering the detainees, don't give them a reason to riot, don't poke at them with sticks in the middle of the night,' actually meaning not to (b)(2) (b)(2)[197]

19. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 (b)(3):1 stated (b)(2) (b)(2)"[198]

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[193] (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) 6/3/2006, (TAB F4.b)

[194]

[195]

[196]

[197]

[198]

(U) Findings of Fact: Detainee Preparations for Suicide

Your second charge to me was to investigate whether failure to follow the Camp Delta SOP contributed to the ability of the detainees to commit suicide on the night of 9/10 June.

XIX. (b)(2)

1. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that "We guards have complained to our chain of command that the detainees should not be allowed to have anything hanging in their cells but we were only allowed to instruct them to remove items from the door. In March 2006, ENS (b)(3):1 Camp 1 AOIC, told us at evening Guard Mount that "The SOP is only a guideline and to use common sense and to not take anything from the detainees that wasn't necessary like extra sheets, blankets, linen and food and to not disturb them [i.e., do not disturb the detainees]."[199]

2. ~~(FOUO)~~ Camp 1 log entries reveal a lenient attitude about giving sheets to detainees, even in self-harm cases.

   3. ~~(FOUO)~~ (b)(2) tied a noose out of his sheet, threatened to hang himself. Sheets taken away.[200]

   4. ~~(FOUO)~~ (b)(2) Hung a sheet with intent to use it to hang himself. Talked him out of it. Took sheet. Given back as per BHS.[201]

   5. ~~(FOUO)~~ (b)(2) Threatened to hang himself by 1200 if not seen by medical. Took sheet. Detainee stated that he only made threat to be seen by medical. Sheet given back as per BHS.[202]

XX. (U) Unauthorized Modification of Uniforms by Detainees

1. ~~(FOUO)~~ Per SOP (b)(2) (b)(2)

2. ~~(FOUO)~~ SOP (b)(2) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

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[199] (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) n 6/15/2006 (TAB B4 a)

[200] 9/2006—5/18/2006, entry dated 4/17/2006 Day. (TAB J8)

[201] /17/2006 Day (TAB J10)

[202] /17/2006 Day (TAB J10)

(b)(2)

4. ~~(FOUO)~~ Detainees prepared their apparatus for suicide in a context of JDG toleration for detainee modification of clothing.

5. ~~(FOUO)~~ The practice of tolerating the alteration of clothes by detainees predated the first mention of the (b)(2) because it was taking place during MAC (b)(3):10 's brief tenure as a Camp 1 Platoon Leader (six 12-hour tours on 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, and 24 April 2006).[203]

6. ~~(FOUO)~~ MAC (b)(3):10 stated that "When I insisted to complete thorough cell searches a lot of contraband was confiscated. Guards would confiscate altered clothing and other contraband items that weren't (b)(2) [but the] OIC or AOIC would tell the next shift to give them back. Examples: 1.) one time guards found TU-061 with fourteen water bottles—how could he collect so many, especially if the rule was one-for-one (b)(2) (b)(2) (b)(2) This violated SOP, but guards weren't allowed to take the garment off that detainee; they were told it would cause too much trouble. 3.) Detainees transferred to Camp 1 from Camp (b) brought with them large prayer rugs, but only small rugs were authorized in Camp 1. I (b)(2) there was no authorization for them to have large rugs. On the next shift, the OIC or AOIC would have the rugs returned. 4.) Detainees are authorized one prayer cap. A detainee had a second one made from a re-sewn trouser leg. Guard said 'Which do you want?' Detainee indicted both, guard took the one off detainee's head, creating an assault on the guard and caused an uproar on the tier."[204]

7. ~~(FOUO)~~ Detainees intensified pressure on Camp 1 guards to relax rules about modified clothing in late April 2006.

8. ~~(FOUO)~~ Camp 1 Sergeants of the Guard noted numerous instances of detainees breaking rules about modified clothing over 27—29 April 2006. The annotation "508" indicates a report made for the purpose of disciplining a detainee.

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[203] (b)(3):10 statement 8/14/2006 (TAB E2); PL Log entries dated 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24 April 2006.

[204] statement 8/14/2006 (TAB E2)

9. ~~(FOUO)~~ "If detainee is wearing altered clothes get it before show[er] / rec[reation]."[205]

10. ~~(FOUO)~~ (b)(2) sheet = robe 508" [206]

11. ~~(FOUO)~~ (b)(2) sheet = robe 508" [207]

12. ~~(FOUO)~~ "(b)(2) altered pants = 508" [208]

13. ~~(FOUO)~~ "Do not take altered prayer beads."[209]

14. ~~(FOUO)~~ (b)(2) Altered pants" [210]

15. ~~(FOUO)~~ Altered pants" [211]

16. ~~(FOUO)~~ "Altered pants." [212] [No further information or context.]

17. ~~(FOUO)~~ In early May 2006, about a month before the suicides, a new JDG policy (b)(2)

18. ~~(FOUO)~~ Camp 1 Platoon Leader MAC (b)(3):1 stated words to the effect that "(b)(2) which violated SOP. Finally, despite guard opposition, policy was changed & a sewing cell was established, in which detainees were placed with one pair of trousers to hem. Guard then handed them (b)(2) with one length of thread, watched them while they sewed, recovered the needle before letting them out."[213]

19. ~~(FOUO)~~ The first Guard Mount Message mentioning sewing is dated 8 May 2006; it states in full that "All Detainees placed in a sewing cell will have a maximum time limit of (b)(2) to sew clothing. After the maximum time limit of (b)(2) Detainee will be returned to his original cell."[214]

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[205] SOG Log 4/27/2006 Night. (TAB J10)
[206] SOG Log 4/28/2006 Night. (TAB J10)
[207] SOG Log 4/28/2006 Night. (TAB J10)
[208] SOG Log 4/28/2006 Night. (TAB J10)
[209] SOG Log 4/29/2006 Day (TAB J10)
[210] SOG Log 4/29/2006 Night (TAB J10)
[211] SOG Log 4/29/2006 Night (TAB J10)
[212] SOG Log 5/3/2006 (TAB J10)
[213] (b)(3):1 nterview 8/14/2006 (TAB E1)
[214] DIMS Guard Mount Message 08MAY2006 1752L, subject "Detainee Sewing Cell." (TAB A3)

20. ~~(FOUO)~~ On 12 May 2006, the Camp 1 duty Platoon Leader noted that "Sewing kits given to A, E, F, G & H. Following cells were designated as sewing cell: (b)(."[215]

21. ~~(FOUO)~~ No Guard Mount Message supersedes SOP prohibitions against detainee modification or destruction of bedding and clothing.

22. ~~(FOUO)~~ The destruction of bedding and clothing by detainees, to include the practice of allowing detainees to sew in special cells, was a violation of SOP ¶8-17b and ¶8-23c.

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

4. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 (b)(3):1 described his observations made in an ambulance with ISN 093, en route to Guantanamo Bay Naval Hospital. MA3 (b)(3): 10 stated that "I know that the material [used (b)(2)

(b)(2)

5. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA2 (b)(3): stated that "I saw the detainee [ISN (b)(2) [218]

6. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that ISN 093 was hung by (b)(2)

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[215] PL Log 060219—060518, entry dated 5/12/2006, Days. (TAB J8)

[216] NCIS Exhibit 115, Enclosure D24, D24 (TAB K5)

[217] NCIS (b)(3): 10 /14/2006 (TAB C4.a)

[218] NCIS 5/2006 (TAB B3.a)

7. ~~(FOUO)~~ The standing end of the cord was tied through the upper mesh of the wall shared by cell A8 and cell (b)(2)[20]

8. ~~(FOUO)~~ The cord was wrapped tightly around ISN 093's neck in three or four round turns.

9. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that while administering CPR

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

11. ~~(FOUO)~~ The medical examiner further reported about ISN 093 that (b)(2)

(b)(2)

12. ~~(FOUO)~~ Relevant photographs taken in cell A8 by NCIS on 10 June 2006 are included in this report as Exhibits D25 and D32 in TAB K5.

13. ~~(FOUO)~~ On 9 June 2006, ISN 588 hung himself in cell A12 with a cord noose.[224]

14. ~~(FOUO)~~ NCIS crime scene photographs indicate the cord of ISN 588's noose or ligature (b)(2)[25]

(b)(2)

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[219] NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

[220] NCIS K5)

[221] NCIS

[222] Final (ISN 093), Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Armed F ugust 2006 (TAB H1).

[223] Final (ISN 093), Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, dated 2 August 2006 (TAB H1).

[224] NCIS Exhibit 115, Enclosure C10, C13, C17, C18, C19, (TAB K4)

[225] NCIS Exhibit 115, Enclosure E10, E18, E19, E20, E21, E22 (TAB K6)

16. ~~(FOUO)~~ MASN (b)(3):10 stated that he "saw the (b)(2)

17. ~~(FOUO)~~ MASN (b)(3):10 stated that after pulling down the (b)(2)

(b)(2)

19. ~~(FOUO)~~ MASN (b)(3):10 stated that "I do not remember (b)(2)

(b)(2)

21. ~~(FOUO)~~ MASN (b)(3):10 stated that (b)(2)

(b)(2)

22. ~~(FOUO)~~ The medical examiner reported about ISN 588 that "There is a dried abrasion furrow around the neck. The furrow is regular with the width varying from ¼ to ½ inch. Within the furrow the skin is imprinted with a very fine weave type pattern."[231]

23. ~~(FOUO)~~ On 9 June 2006, ISN 693 hung himself in cell A5 with a cord noose.

24. ~~(FOUO)~~ NCIS crime scene photographs indicate the cord of ISN 693's (b)(2)

25. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA2 (b)(3):1 stated that "[MA1 (b)(3):1 held up ISN 693's body, while another guard cut the apparatus holding the body up. I helped the other guard to find the right place to cut the apparatus. [MA1 (b)(3):1 and the other guard then lowered the body to the ground, while I continued to remove (b)(2)

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[226] NCIS (b)(3):10 14/06 (TAB C2.a)
[227] NCIS USC 2006 (TAB C15.a)
[228] NCIS §130b,(b)(6 Enclosure E29, E36, E37, E38, E39 (TAB K6)
[229] NCIS),(b)(7)(C) 14/06 (TAB C2.a)
[230] NCIS 2006 (TAB C15.a)
[231] Final Autopsy Report for Mani Shaman Turki Alutaybi (ISN 588) dated 31 July 2006. (TAB H2)
[232] NCIS Exhibit 115, Enclosure C10, C11, C17, C18, C19. (TAB K4)

(b)(2)

26. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA2 (b)(3):10 stated that upon looking into cell

(b)(2)

27. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA2 (b)(3):10 stated that she "remove[d] the cloth

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

28. ~~(FOUO)~~ TAB K6 contains NCIS crime scene photographs of cell A12 depicting the (b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

XXII. (U) Detainee Preparations for Suicide: Full Suspension of the Bodies

1. ~~(FOUO)~~ The three detainees hung themselves fully suspended above their cell decks.

2. ~~(FOUO)~~ Four of the initial MAs on the scene stated that ISN 093 was fully suspended above the deck of cell A8.

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[233] NCIS (b)(3):1 /14/2006 (TAB C11)
[234] NCIS 0 USC 6/14/2006 (TAB C7)
[235] NCIS §130b,(/14/2006 (TAB C11)
[237] NCIS b)(6),(b 15, Enclosure C10 (TAB K4)
[238] NCIS)(7)(C) 14/2006 (TAB C5.a)

3. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 (b)(3):1 0 USC stated that "The detainee was [suspended] totally upright against the cell wall between cells A-8 and (b)(next to the sink."[239]

4. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA1 (b)(3 stated that "The detainee was suspended above the floor on the side of the cell between cell A-8 and (b)(2."[240]

5. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 (b)(3):1 0 USC §130b (stated that "From what I saw from (b)(the first thing MA3 and I noticed was his feet were not touching the ground. When I opened the cell and MA1 (b)(3) pulled back the sheet I could see that his body was suspended and his toes were pointing down towards the deck."[241]

6. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 (b)(3):1 0 USC stated that when he looked into A8 through the outside window, "I saw the detainee hanging by his neck." MA3 (b)(3):1 further stated that "I saw the detainee's feet off the ground approximately one and a half inches with no shoes on."[242]

7. ~~(FOUO)~~ Three of the initial MAs on the scene stated that ISN 588 was fully suspended above the deck of cell A12.

8. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA1 (b)(3):1 0 USC further noted that ISN 588 was suspended with his "feet off the ground, and no shoes."[243]

9. ~~(FOUO)~~ MASN (b)(3):10 USC stated that "the detainee's feet were dangling."[244]

10. ~~(FOUO)~~ In the same statement, MASN (b)(3):10 also stated that "I grabbed the detainee around the buttocks area, as his waist was about the level of my chest, and lifted him up. Somebody must have cut him down or loosened the cloth because as I lifted him up the detainee drooped over my shoulder."[245]

11. ~~(FOUO)~~ In the same statement, MASN (b)(3):10 gave his height as 68 inches tall.

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[239] (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) /2006 (TAB B5.a)
[240] 006 (TAB B2.a)
[241] 8/20/2006 (TAB B4.c)
[242] /2006 (TAB C13.a)
[243] 5/2006 (TAB C16)
[244] 5/14/06 (TAB C2.a)
[245] 5/14/06 (TAB C2.a)

12. ~~(FOUO)~~ The final autopsy report lists ISN 588's height as 69.5 inches tall.[246]

13. ~~(FOUO)~~ MASN (b)(3):10 stated that "ISN 588 was relatively short, and I recall that he was about eye level with me when I walked into [the] cell. ISN 588 was not kneeling, and I am almost positive that he was hanging with his feet slightly above the floor."[247]

14. ~~(FOUO)~~ MASN (b)(3):10 USC stated that his height is 72 inches.[248]

15. ~~(FOUO)~~ The final autopsy report lists ISN 588's height as 69.5 inches tall.[249]

16. ~~(FOUO)~~ One of the initial MAs on the scene stated that ISN 693 was fully suspended above the deck of cell A5.

17. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA1 (b)(3):1 stated that "I approached the body and lifted it to release the tension on the noose. ISN 693's waist was against my chest. ISN 693 was suspended approximately six (6) inches from the deck. No part of his body was in contact with the deck."[250]

18. ~~(FOUO)~~ In the same statement, MA1 (b)(3): gave his height as 72 inches.

19. ~~(FOUO)~~ The final autopsy report lists ISN 693's height as 68 inches tall.[251]

XXIII. (U) Detainee Preparations for Suicide: (b)(2)

1. ~~(FOUO)~~ The three detainees who committed suicide all had significant (b)(2)

2. ~~(FOUO)~~ According to eight guards and four medical personnel, ISN 093 had (b)(2)

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[246] Final Autopsy Report for Mani Shaman Turki Alutaybi (ISN 588) dated 31 July 2006 (TAB H2

[247] (b)(3):10 USC /14/2006 (TAB C15.a)

[248] ent 8/21/2006 (TAB C13)

[249] Final Autopsy Report for Mani Shaman Turki Alutaybi (ISN 588) dated 31 July 2006 (TAB H2

[250] (b)(3):10 /14/2006 (TAB C5.a)

[251] Final Autopsy Report for Ali Abdullah Ahmed (ISN 693), dated 1 August 2006 (TAB H3).

3. (~~FOUO~~) In the cell of the first-discovered suicide, A8, all six first responders observed that ISN 093 had a quantity of (b)(2) (b)(2)

4. (~~FOUO~~) MA1 (b)(3):10 stated that while ISN 093 was still hanging, MA1 saw "what looked like a (b)(2) (b)(2)

5. (~~FOUO~~) MA2 (b)(3): stated that he helped cut down ISN 093's hanging body, and that "When we removed (b)(2) (b)(2)

6. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that "A8's (b)(2) (b)(2) his (b)(3):1 USC described how "I observed (b)(3):10 USC try to pull a (b)(2) but they were not able to." MA3 (b)(3):1 also stated that later, at the medical clinic, "I told them [i.e., medical staff] they needed to (b)(2) and we had already tried."

7. (b)(3):1 (b)(2) beneath intricate "There was (b)(2)

8. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 0 USC stated that when he looked into cell A8 through the outside window, "I saw the detainee hanging by his neck. His face was towards me with his head slouching down (b)(2) some (b)(2)

9. (~~FOUO~~) MA1 (b)(3):1 stated that when he observed ISN 093 being secured to a backboard outside cell A8, (b)(2)

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252 (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) 15/2006 (TAB B2.a)
253 /15/2006 (TAB B3.a)
254 ent 8/20/2006 (TAB B4.c)
255 6/15/06 (TAB B4.a)
256 6/14/06 (TAB B5.a)
257 6/14/2006 (TAB C13.a)

(b)(2)

10. ~~(FOUO)~~ Two JDG guards who observed ISN 093 shortly (b)(2)

11. ~~(FOUO)~~ MASN (b)(3):10 USC stated that when he assisted placing ISN 093 on a backboard for transport to the medical unit, "A8 had something (b)(2) (b)(2) and something white ar (b)(2) MASN (b)(3):10 further stated that "MA1 (b)(3 attempted (b)(2) but he could not."

12. ~~(FOUO)~~ MASN (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) as he arrived on Alpha Block, MA MASN (b)(3):10 MA3 (b)(3):1 removing one of the detainees [ISN 093] from the block. MASN (b)(3):10 further stated that the only thing he noticed was "(b)(2)[260]

13. ~~(FOUO)~~ Five JTF medical personnel in the Camp Delta medical clinic who were attempting to resuscitate ISN 093 described (b)(2) ISN 093's (b)(2) One of them was (b)(2) A sixth corpsman who arrived later di (b)(2) (b)(2)

14. ~~(FOUO)~~ HN (b)(3):10 stated that "The detainee [ISN 093] (b)(2) thought w was."[261]

15. ~~(FOUO)~~ HN (b)(3):10 stated that he observed ISN 093 from a distance of about five when ISN 093 arrived in the clinic, and that he "noticed that the detainee had a (b)(2)

16. ~~(FOUO)~~ HN (b)(3):10 USC stated that "I noticed a (b)(2) (b)(2) I mentioned it to

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[258] NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) 4/2006 (TAB C14)
[259] NCIS 4/06 (TAB B6.a)
[260] NCIS 6/14/06 (TAB C2.a)
[261] NCIS 16/2006 (TAB F5)
[262] NCIS 6/16/2006 (TAB F9)

(b)(2)

(b)(2) (b)(2)

17. (~~FOUO~~) HM1 (b)(3):10 stated that "The detainee (b)(2)

18. (~~FOUO~~) HN (b)(3):1 0 USC stated that "there was a (b)(2) (b)(2)

19. (~~FOUO~~) HM2 (b)(3 arrived in the treatment room with ISN 093 after HM1 (b)(3):10 had started cardio-pulmonary resuscitation, and she stated that "I did not observe anything in the detainee's (b)(2)"[266]

20. (~~FOUO~~) In the cell of the second-discovered suicide, A12, four of the initial responders observed that ISN 588 (b)(2) or a quantity (b)(2) A fourth initial responder also saw some other (b)(2) ISN 588's (b)(2)

21. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that "I do remember 588 (b)(2) (b)(2) (b)(2) MA1 (b)(3):10 USC helped (b)(2) (b)(2)[267]

22. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 USC stated that after he lowered ISN 588 to the deck of the cell, "MA3 (b)(3):1 0 USC removed the noose

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[263] NCIS (b)(3):1 16/2006 (TAB F6)
[264] NCIS 0 USC gh 6/15/2006 (TAB F10)
[265] NCIS §130b,(/16/2006
[266] NCIS b)(6),(b /2006 (TAB F4)
[267] NCIS)(7)(C) /15/2006 (TAB B4.a)

(b)(2)

mouth. MA3 (b)(3):1 (b)(2) I believe (b)(2) t in the cell."[268]

23. (~~FOUO~~) (b)(3):10 USC stated that upon enter cell A12, he saw ISN 588 hanging by the neck, and "he had some sort of (b)(2) (b)(2)."[269]

24. (~~FOUO~~) MA2 (b)(3):1 assisted in transporting ISN 693 to the Camp Delta medical clinic. Just after bringing ISN 693's body inside the clinic, she heard a call for help in an adjoining room. She stated that there she and MA1 (b)(3):10 USC "helped a corpsman, who was performing CPR on another hanging victim, ISN 588." She further stated that she assisted in CPR on ISN 588 by "holding an oxygen mask in place over the detainee's mouth. While I was holding the oxygen mask in place, I moved the detainee's hand out of the way, so I could do a better job holding the oxygen mask in place." MA2 (b)(3):1 described how "There was a problem because the detainee's mouth would not open, so another corpsman arrived with a special instrument to try and pry the detainee's mouth open. She [the unidentified corpsman] struggled, and she was able to open the detainee's lips, but the detainee's teeth were clenched shut. I noticed at this point, when the lips were opened, that there were a la (b)(2) (b)(2) I could not tell for sure what these were. I was unable to tell if they were, for example, (b)(2) other substance."[270]

25. (~~FOUO~~) JTF medical personnel in the Camp Delta medical clinic who were trying to resuscitate ISN 588 described (b)(2) ISN 588's (b)(2) Two corpsmen stated that they observed what appeared to be peanut butter (b)(2) (b)(2) and a nurse stated that there was some sort of (b)(2) (b)(2) ISN 588's (b)(2) A third corpsman stated that he never saw the detainee's (b)(2)

26. (~~FOUO~~) HN (b)(3):1 stated that he tried to clear ISN 588's (b)(2) "[271]

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[268] NCIS (b)(3):10 6/14/06 (TAB C2.a)

[269] NCIS USC 5/2006 (TAB C16)

[270] NCIS §130b,(b) /2006 (TAB C11)

[271] NCIS (6),(b)(7)(5/2006

27. (~~FOUO~~) HN (b)(3):10 USC stated that "I noticed that the detainee had (b)(2) looked like p (b)(2)

(b)(2)

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[272] Final Autopsy Report for Mani Shaman Turki Alutaybi (ISN 588), Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, dated 31 July 2006 (TAB H2)

[273] NCIS Exhibit 47

[274] NCIS Exhibit 47

[275] Final Autopsy Report for Mani Shaman Turki Alutaybi (ISN 538), Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, dated 31 July 2006 (TAB H2).

[276] NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b.(b)(6/2006 (TAB F9)

[277] NCIS 2006 (TAB F6)

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

40. (~~FOUO~~) A JDG guard who observed ISN 693 shortly after his body was cut down and laid on the deck of cell A5 described seeing a (b)(2) (b)(2)

41. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 stated that he went to Alpha Block after the first detainee was transported out of the block, and that "When I arrived, I saw ISN 693 lying on the deck inside cell A5." MASN (b)(3):10 further stated that "I noticed a (b)(2) (b)(2) "[282]

42. (~~FOUO~~) A detainee escort and three JTF medical personnel in the Camp Delta medical clinic who were trying to resuscitate ISN 693 described foreign material in ISN 693's mouth.

43. (~~FOUO~~) HN (b)(3):10 USC stated that he assisted Dr. (b)(3):10 USC in opening ISN 693's (b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) "[283]

44. (~~FOUO~~) LT (b)(3):1 stated that "With an attempt to open the airway of the third detainee [ISN 693] it was observed that his

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[278] NCIS (b)(3):1 /15/2006 (TAB F3)

[279] NCIS 0 USC 14/2006 (TAB C5.a)

[280] NCIS §130b,(5/2006 (TAB B3.a)

[281] NCIS b)(6),(b 14/2006 (TAB C13.a)

[282] NCIS)(7)(C) 6/15/2006 (TAB C8)

[283] NCIS /15/2006 (TAB F8)

(b)(2) (b)(2) I instructed a Corpsman to begin CPR."

45. ~~(FOUO)~~ HM3 (b)(3):10 USC stated that "When I returned to the exam room [#11] where I had spent most of my time, the SMO [Senior Medical Officer, Dr. (b)(3):10 was there trying to get the (b)(2)

46. ~~(FOUO)~~ MASA (b)(3):1 stated that after he escorted ISN 693 into the Camp Delta medical clinic, "A medical doctor on (b)(2)

XXIV. (U) Detainee Preparations for Suicide: Face Masks

1. ~~(FOUO)~~ In the cell of the first-discovered suicide, A8, initial responders reported that the detainee ISN 093 had a (b)(2)

2. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA1 (b)(3):10 stated that "There was what looked like (b)(2) (b)(2) .[286]

3. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA2 (b)(3):10 stated that (b)(2) ."[287]

4. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that ISN 093 had (b)(2) (b)(2)

5. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA1 (b)(3):1 stated that when the Alpha Block guard team entered cell A8, he stood outside the cell looking in, and saw that "While still

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[284] NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) /15/2006 (TAB F3)
[285] NCIS 6/16/2006 (TAB F7)
[286] NCIS /2006 (TAB B2.a)
[287] NCIS 2006 (TAB B3.a)
[288] NCIS 4/06 (TAB B5.a)

(b)(2)

6. (~~FOUO~~) In the cell of the second-discovered suicide, A8, initial responders reported that the detainee ISN 588 had (b)(2)

7. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 stated "I ran dow (b)(2) MA3 (b)(3):1 further stated "I do remember (b)(2) (b)(2) MA1 (b)(3):10 USC

8. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 USC stated that "MA3 (b)(3):10 removed the noose (b)(2) (b)(2) (b)(2) MA3 (b)(3):1 removed (b)(2) I believe MA3 (b)(3):1 tossed aside the cloth she removed and left it in the cell." [291]

9. (~~FOUO~~) MA1 (b)(3):10 stated that upon entering cell A12 and removing a (b)(2) "I then saw the detainee [ISN 588] hanging by his neck. The detainee's eyes were open, he had some (b)(2) (b)(2) "[292]

10. (~~FOUO~~) One initial responder reported that in the cell of the third-discovered suicide, A5, the detainee ISN 693 had a (b)(2) No other initial (b)(2)

11. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that after a (b)(2) (b)(2) (b)(2)

XXV. (U) Detainee Preparations for Suicide: (b)(2)

ISN 093/A8

1. (~~FOUO~~) Four initial responders reported that in the first cell they entered, A8, ISN 093's (b)(2) stated that

2. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that when he looked into cell A8 through the outside window, "I saw the detainee [ISN 093] hanging by his neck." MA3

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[289] NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) 006 (TAB C14)
[290] NCIS 6 (TAB 84.a)
[291] NCIS 4/06 (TAB C2.a)
[292] NCIS 006 (TAB C16)
[293] NCIS 006 (TAB C13.a)

(b)(3):1 further stated that "I looked down and saw (b)(2) t waist (b)(2)

3. (~~FOUO~~) MA1 (b)(3) stated that (b)(2) (b)(2)

4. (~~FOUO~~) MA2 (b)(3): stated that he could see the suicide's "i (b)(2) (b)(2) [296]

5. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that (b)(2) his ankles." MA3 (b)(3):1 further stat (b)(2)

6. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that "A8's (b)(2) (b)(2)

7. (~~FOUO~~) MA1 (b)(3):1 ran for help as soon as other initial responders cut down ISN 093. (b)(2)

8. (~~FOUO~~) Two additional JDG guards observed ISN 093 shortly after his removal from cell A8, and described seeing (b)(2)

9. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 stated that while he was standing post as a guard in (b)(2) Block, he observed other guard force personnel "transporting a detainee [ISN 693] on a backboard through the sally toward the Detainee Clinic." MASN (b)(3):10 further stated that "Regarding ISN 093, I only (b)(2)

10. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):10 stated that shortly after he arrived at Camp Delta medical clinic and saw ISN 093, "I observed a Corpsman (b)(2) (b)(2) removed the (b)(2) a few minutes earlier. One reason I noticed this is

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[294] NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) /2006 (TAB C13.a)

[295] NCIS 006 (TAB B2.a)

[296] NCIS 006 (TAB B3.a)

[297] NCIS 06 (TAB B5.a)

[298] Jenso 8/20/2006 (TAB B4.c)

[299] NCIS 5/2006 (TAB C8)

because usually escorts [like MA3 (b)(3):10 USC respond to the cell on a Code (b)(2) and (b)(2) s are used, but in this instance we did not go to the cell, and the detainee was (b)(2) [by the cell block guards].”[300]

11. ~~(FOUO)~~ Two JTF medical personnel in the Camp Delta medical clinic stated that (b)(2)

12. ~~(FOUO)~~ HM (b)(3):10 USC stated that immediately after ISN 093 was brought into the clinic, “(b)(2) with what I beli (b)(2)

13. ~~(FOUO)~~ HM stated that “The first detainee had what (b)(2)

14. ~~(FOUO)~~ LT (b)(3):10 USC stated that “I noticed that ISN 093 had a piece of (b)(2)

15. ~~(FOUO)~~ LT (b)(3):1 stated that “I did not observe his [ISN 093’s] hands (b)(2)

16. ~~(FOUO)~~ HN (b)(3):10 stated that “I did not see the detainee’s [ISN 093’s] (b)(2) [304]

17. ~~(FOUO)~~ HM2 (b)(3) arrived in the treatment room with ISN 093 after HM1 (b)(3):10 had started cardio-pulmonary resuscitation, and she stated that “(b)(2) ”[305]

ISN 588/A12

18. ~~(FOUO)~~ Regarding the second-discovered detainee suicide in cell A12, the statements of initial responders vary about whether the detainee ISN 588 had (b)(2) (b)(2) (b)(2) together.

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[300] NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) 14/2006 (TAB C4.a)
[301] NCIS /16/2006 (TAB F8)
[302] NCIS /15/2006 (TAB F2)
[303] NCIS /15/2006 (TAB F3)
[304] NCIS 5/16/2006 (TAB F5)
[305] NCIS /2006 (TAB F4)

(b)(2) e initial responder stated positively that he

19. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 stated (b)(3):10 USC §130b
which I (b)(2)

20. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 stated tha
(b)(2) .[307]

21. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that "
hands."

22. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):1 stated tha
588's] hands were, but I do not think t

23. (~~FOUO~~) MA1 (b)(3):1 stated that "
his hands."[309]

24. (~~FOUO~~) A JDG guard who observed ISN
A12 described seeing (b)(2)

25. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 stated that he went to Alpha Block after the first detainee was transported out of the block, and that after he was instructed to start waking and checking the remaining Alpha Block detainees, "I then witnessed ISN 588, A12, having been placed on the backboard and being readied for transport to the Detainee Clinic. I noticed both of the detainee's (b)(2)

26. (~~FOUO~~) A JDG corpsman who saw ISN 588 arrive at the clinic stated that ISN 588's (b)(2) hen he arrived. Two other JTF medical personnel in the Camp (b)(2) who were attempting to resuscitate ISN 588 stated that ISN 588's (b)(2) he time they saw him inside the clinic.

27. (~~FOUO~~) HN (b)(3):10 stated that "His [ISN 588's] (b)(2)
(b)(2) (b)(2) on them. Somebod (b)(2)
and cut his shirt off."[311]

28. (~~FOUO~~) LT (b)(3):1 stated that "I did not observe his [ISN 588's] (b)(2)
(b)(2) pon the time of my arrival to the bedside."[312]

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[306] NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) 5/14/06 (TAB C2.a)
[307] NCIS 4/06 (TAB B6.a)
[308] NCIS 4/2006 (TAB C15.a)
[309] NCIS 5/2006 (TAB C16)
[310] NCIS 5/2006 (TAB C8)
[311] NCIS /16/2006 (TAB F9)
[312] NCIS /2006 (TAB F3)

29. ~~(FOUO)~~ HN (b)(3):10 stated that "I did not see the detainee's [ISN 588's] (b)(2) HN (b)(3):10 also stated that he was working on the first detainee to arrive at the clinic, ISN 093, when ISN 588 arrived at the clinic.[313]

ISN 693/A5

30. ~~(FOUO)~~ In the cell of the third-discovered suicide, A5, three of the initial responders stated that ISN 693 had (b)(2) and one of those three stated that ISN 693's (b)(2) (b)(2) A fourth initial responder stated that he did not remember seeing ISN 693's (b)(2)

31. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA1 (b)(3): stated that immediately after the noose was cut and ISN 693's body was placed on the ground, "I noticed ISN 693's (b)(2) (b)(2) (b)(2) fashioned fi (b)(3):1 added that "MA2 (b)(3):1 untied the noose from his [ISN 693] neck."[314]

32. ~~(FOUO)~~ MASN (b)(3):10 stated that "When I arrived [on Alpha Block], I saw ISN 693 lying on the deck inside cell A5." MASN (b)(3):10 further stated (b)(2)

33. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA1 (b)(3):10 stated that while he was in cell A12, "I heard (b)(2) Alpha 5.' I responded to Alpha 5 [but] another group had already made entry into the cell. The detainee [ISN 693] was in relatively the same position as the detainee in Alpha 12. There was a harness around his neck, (b)(2)

34. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 (b)(3): 10 stated that after (b)(2) was pulled down, he saw that "The body [ISN 693] was relatively the same set up as A8 (b)(2)"[317]

35. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA2 (b)(3) stated that he did not remember seeing ISN 693's (b)(2)[318]

36. ~~(FOUO)~~ One nurse in the Camp Delta medical clinic who was attempting to resuscitate ISN 693 stated positively that ISN 693's (b)(2) she arrived bedside. Two corpsmen in the Camp Delta medical clinic described a (b)(2)

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[313] NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) 16/2006 (TAB F5)

[314] NCIS /2006 (TAB C5.a)

[315] NCIS 15/2006 (TAB C8)

[316] NCIS 5/2006 (TAB C16)

[317] NCIS 4/2006 (TAB C13.a)

[318] NCIS 2006 (TAB B3.a)

37. (~~FOUO~~) LT (b)(3):1 0 USC stated that "I did not observe his [ISN 693's] (b)(2) (b)(2) upon the time of my arrival to the bedside."[319]

38. (~~FOUO~~) HM2 (b)(3) stated that "When trying to hook this detainee [ISN 693] to the AED [defibrillator] I found a (b)(2) (b)(2)

39. (~~FOUO~~) HM3 (b)(3):10 (b)(2)

XXVI. (U) Detainee Preparations for Suicide: (b)(2)

(b)(2)

2. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 was taking his turn walking the Alpha Block tier when he noticed that something was wrong in cell A8. MA3 (b)(3): stated that (b)(2)

3. (~~FOUO~~) In the same statement, MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that when MA1 (b)(3) (b)(2) (b)(2)

4. (~~FOUO~~) MA2 (b)(3): stated that "It appeared like the detainee [ISN 093] (b)(2)[323]

5. (~~FOUO~~) In the same statement, MA2 (b)(3): said that "(b)(3 (b)(2)

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[319] NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) /15/2006 (TAB F3)
[320] NCIS /2006 (TAB F4)
[321] NCIS 6/16/2006 (TAB F7)
[322] NCIS 14/2006 (TAB B5.a)
[323] NCIS 5/2006 (TAB B3.a)

6. (~~FOUO~~) MA1 (b)(3) :10 said that when he was walking the tier from 2330 to 0000 "It appeared as I walked by that he [ISN 093, in cell A8] was in his (b)(2)

7. (~~FOUO~~) In the same statement MA1 (b)(3 described his (b)(2)

8. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 0 USC stated that she was observing at cell A8 when "MA1 (b)(3 (b)(2) (b)(2)

9. (~~FOUO~~) In the cell of the second-discovered suicide, A12, ISN 588 h (b)(2) (b)(2)

10. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 stated that when he reached cell A12, "I (b)(2)

11. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):1 stated that when he looked in cell A12, "ISN 588 (b)(2)

12. (~~FOUO~~) In the same statement, MASN (b)(3):1 stated that (b)(2)

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[324] NCIS (b)(3):10 006 (TAB B2.a)

[325] NCIS USC 6/2006 (TAB B4.a)

[326] NCIS §130b,(b) 6/14/2006 (TAB C2.a)

[327] NCIS (6),(b)(7)(4/2006 (TAB C15.a)

13. (~~FOUO~~) In the cell of the last-discovered suicide, A5, ISN 693 also had (b)(2)
(b)(2)

14. (~~FOUO~~) MA1 (b)(3):1 stated that "When I arrived [at cell A5], I paused to
(b)(2)

15. (~~FOUO~~) In the same statement, MA1 (b)(3):1 also described how a sailor unknown to him, but otherwise identifiable as MA3 (b)(3):10 "unlocked the cell door and partially entered the room, hesitant to fully enter the room without further backup. The unknown service member [MA3 (b)(3):10 (b)(2)
(b)(2)

XXVII. (U) Detainee Preparations for Suicide: Concealing the Bodies

1. (~~FOUO~~) Summary: Guard force members stated that they found each of the
(b)(2)

2. (~~FOUO~~) In the cell of the first-discovered suicide, A8, the first responders were MA3 (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
(b)(2)

3. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that (b)(2)
(b)(2)

4. (~~FOUO~~) MA1 (b)(3 stated that when he found the bed empty in cell A8, "I thought he [ISN 093] might be waiting behind the blanket" hanging up by the sink in the rear of the cell. MA1 Tuft went on to state that "We yanked on the blanket, which did not immediately come down and then I pushed it aside and immediately lifted up the detainee."[330]

5. (~~FOUO~~) MA2 (b)(3) stated "I assumed the detainee [in cell A8] was hiding or attempting to harm himself (b)(2) MA2 (b)(3) further stated that "(b)(3): (b)(2) I saw the detainee hanging."[331]

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[328] NCIS (b)(3): 6/14/2006 (TAB C5.a)
[329] NCIS 10 6/14/2006 (TAB B5.a)
[330] NCIS USC 15/2006 (TAB B2.a)
[331] NCIS §130b 15/2006 (TAB B3.a)
(b)(6)

6. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 0 USC stated that "I opened (b)(2 [i.e., the cell adjoining cell A8"], which was empty, and (b)(3):1 and I jumped on the bed and tried to get a visual of where 93 was. (b)(3):1 0 USC (b)(2) him hanging by his neck."[332]

7. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 0 USC arrived at cell A8 as MA1 (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) were discovering the (b)(2) in ISN 093's (b)(MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that as he stood outside cell A8, "(b)(2) the cell near the sink. I also saw another sheet or another half of the blanket covering up the cell wall behind the diagonally hung blanket. In addition, I also saw about a quarter of the shutter to the cell covered up. My first thought was that the detainee was behind the blanket and I was unsure of what he could be doing."[333]

8. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 0 USC further stated that "When everyone else [on the Alpha Block watch team] was coming to the cell, I decided to go outside the block and look (b)(2) I estimate it took me seven seconds to leave the front of the cell door and arrive at the outside (b)(2) the detainee hanging by his neck."[334]

9. (~~FOUO~~) MA1 (b)(3):1 0 USC was in the Alpha Block NCO shack when block guards detected that something was wrong in cell A8. MA1 (b)(3):10 stated that when he went to cell A8, (b)(2) extending to the floor, and partitioning the back left corner of the cell from view from where I was standing. At this time, I noticed MA3 (b)(3):10 USC was outside and behind the tier looking into the cell. [MA3] (b)(3):1 0 USC stated that he saw the detainee hanging from inside the cell."

10. (~~FOUO~~) In the cell of the second-discovered suicide, A12, four initial responders stated that they found the body of ISN 588 hanging (b)(2)

11. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 USC stated that "I went to cell 12 and noticed that the detainee had a (b)(2) (b)(2)

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[332] NCIS (b)(3):1 /15/2006 (TAB B4.a)
[333] NCIS 0 USC /14/2006 (TAB C13.a)
[334] NCIS §130b, /14/2006 (TAB C13.a)

(b)(2)

12. ~~(FOUO)~~ In the same statement, MASN (b)(3):10 declared that when the door to cell A12 opened, he (b)(2) (b)(2) (b)(2) Finally, MASN (b)(3):10 stated that "I also (b)(2)

13. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA1 (b)(3):1 stated that "When I got near the cell, I heard, '(b)(2) Alpha 12.' I went to Alpha 12 and saw a group of people ready to go inside the cell. When I got to Alpha 12, (b)(2) (b)(2)

14. ~~(FOUO)~~ MASN (b)(3):1 stated that "I glanced at cell A12, and realized (b)(2)

15. ~~(FOUO)~~ MASN (b)(3):10 further stated that "The three of us [(b)(3):1 MASN (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) entered the cell A12 and (b)(2) 37

16. ~~(FOUO)~~ MASN (b)(3):10 stated he went to cell A12 with MA3 (b)(3):10 and that "(b)(3): unlocked the cell and we entered. After entering the cell, I (b)(2)

17. ~~(FOUO)~~ In the cell of the third-discovered suicide, A5, the first responders were MA3 (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) They found the body of ISN 693 (b)(2) (b)(2)

18. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that after the discovery of the second hanging detainee, "I said someone needs to walk the block and I was told to walk toward the end of the tier when I heard Alpha 5. I ran that way and shouted five is down. There were escorts there so I opened the door. Someone shouted we need shears so I ran to Echo Block and when I got back, detainee 693 had already been cut down and was ready to be transported to medical."[339]

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[335] NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) 6/14/06 (TAB C2.a)
[336] NCIS 5/2006 (TAB C16)
[337] NCIS 14/2006 (TAB C15.a)
[338] NCIS 4/06 (TAB B6.a)
[339] NCIS 5/2006 (TAB B4.a)

19. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA1 (b)(3):1 stated that an unidentified "person yelled 'Alpha 5' in an attempt to wake ISN 693. When I arrived [at cell A5]," (b)(3): (b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

20. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA2 (b)(3 stated that "I went to cell 5 and I didn't see anyone inside. (b)(2) MA2 (b)(3):1 0 USC further stated that upon entering the cell with two other MAs, "We removed (b)(2) and discovered A5 hanging."[340]

21. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA2 (b)(3):1 stated that he returned to Alpha Block from escorting ISN 093 to the medical clinic, and shortly afterwards "I heard the call for assistance with A5 by MA2 (b)(3): MA3 (b)(3):1 arrived with keys to (b)(2) fourth person came in and picked [up] the hanging detainee by the waist for someone else to cut him down."[341]

22. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA2 (b)(3):10 stated that she brought a back board to the Alpha Block tier outside cell A5, preparatory to moving ISN 693 from the cell to the Camp Delta medical clinic. She further stated that upon looking into cell A5, she saw (b)(2) (b)(2)

23. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA2 (b)(3):1 did not mention a (b)(2) "I also noticed, just as I entered the cell and before we started taking the body down, that there was some material, blue in color, right next to ISN 693's head. Since we started to take the body down immediately, I didn't get a chance to see what the material was attached to."[342]

24. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA1 (b)(3):10 USC stated that while he was in cell A12, "I heard (b)(2) Alpha 5." I responded to Alpha 5 [but] another group had already made entry into the cell. The detainee [ISN 693] was in relatively the same position as the detainee in Alpha 12."[343]

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

[340] 5/2006 (TAB B3.a)

[341] /14/2006 (TAB C13.a)

[342] /14/2006 (TAB C11)

[343] 6/15/2006 (TAB C16)

25. (~~FOUO~~) The statement of MA1 (b)(3):1 contains nothing relevant to (b)(2)[344]

(U) Findings of Fact: Camouflage and Concealment by Detainees

XXVIII. (U) An Authorized SOP Modification Permitted Hanging Items on Camp 1 Cell Walls

1. (~~FOUO~~) Per the SOP, (b)(2) (b)(2)

2. (~~FOUO~~) The sources for this section include Guard Mount Messages and an updated version of the table "Authorized/Unauthorized Activities" found on page B-4 of the December 2005 SOP. The revised table is dated 12 March 2006.

3. (~~FOUO~~) JDG provided copies of all (b)(2) or the 7 (b)(2)

4. (~~FOUO~~) I selected the 7 December 2005 parameter because several of this report's exhibits refer to a (b)(2) on that date, and because the latest version of the SOP before the suicides was published in December 2005. I chose the other parameter, 10 June 2006, because it is the day after the suicides.

5. (~~FOUO~~) Essential findings of fact regarding an authorized modification to the Camp Delta SOP that permitted compliant detainees to (b)(2). (b)(2)

6. (~~FOUO~~) On 15 May 2006, the JDG J3 Chief of Discipline, MACS (b)(3): transmitted as an attachment to a NIPR email a new list of "Authorized / Unauthorized Activities."

7. (~~FOUO~~) The new list of "Authorized/Unauthorized Activities" was dated 12 March 2006.[345]

8. (~~FOUO~~) The NIPR email was addressed to three group addresses: (b)(2)

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[344] NCIS (b)(3): 6/17/2006 (TAB C3.a)

[345] Guard Mount Message 16MAY2006 0130L (TAB A3)

9. (~~FOUO~~) The NIPR email was Cc: to COL (b)(3):10 and to two additional officers who were the JDG Operations Officer (S3) and JDG Executive Officer (XO).

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

(b)(2) (b)(2)

15. (~~FOUO~~) The all-caps emphasis is in the revised table; it is not my addition.

16. (~~FOUO~~) Related findings of fact regarding procedures for modifying the Camp Delta SOP include:

17. (~~FOUO~~) (b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
exclusively

18. (
Curr
SOP
state

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[246] Guard Mount Message 16MAY2006 0130L (TAB A3)

(b)(2)

XXIX. (U) Concealment by Detainees: The SOP

1. ~~(FOUO)~~ (b)(2)

(b)(2)

2. ~~(FOUO)~~ Per the SOP table "*Authorized/Unauthorized Activities*," p. B-4

(b)(2)

3. ~~(FOUO)~~ Per the SOP table "*Authorized/Unauthorized Activities*," dated 12

(b)(2)

XXX. (U) Chain of Command Comprehension that SOP Permitted Hanging Items

1. ~~(FOUO)~~ COL (b)(3):10 stated on 17 June 2006 that the "Authorized / Unauthorized Activities" table on SOP page B-4 was the existing Camp Delta directive on the night of the suicides.[348]

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[347] Summary of (b)(3):1 Interview, 8/17/2006 (Tab A4).
[348] NCIS (b)(3):10 5/17/2006 (TAB D1)

2. (~~FOUO~~) Specifically, COL (b)(3):10 stated that "B-4 also states that nothing can be hung off the cell walls."

3. (~~FOUO~~) COL (b)(3):10 also stated that "I am informed in the aftermath of the events that numerous detainees washed their blankets that day and hung them in their cells to dry. (b)(2) (b)(2)

4. (~~FOUO~~) Additionally, COL (b)(3):10 noted that "Guard messages on (b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

7. (~~FOUO~~) Several factors curtail the likelihood that the Commander Joint Detention Group was unaware that the (b)(2) (b)(2)

8. (~~FOUO~~) On 17 June 2006, COL (b)(3):10 (b)(2) (b)(2)

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[349] NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) 6/17/2006 (TAB D1)

[350] Guard sage, 1103L on 7 December 2005 (TAB A3)

[351] Guard sage, 1144L on 24 May 2006 (TAB A3)

[352] NCIS 6/17/2006 (TAB D1)

9. (~~FOUO~~) Page B-3 of the December 2005 SOP immediately precedes page

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

13. (~~FOUO~~) Despite COL (b)(3):10 USC §130b (b)(6) (certainty that on 9 June 2006 the SOP still (b)(2) (b)(2) With the exception of COL (b)(3):10 USC §130b (b)(6) (none of the relevant command or duty personnel from the Deputy Commander JDG to the Alpha Block Guards believed that detainees could not hang items on cell walls.

14. (~~FOUO~~) On 14 August 2006, the Deputy Commander Joint Detention Group provided a five-paragraph statement to answer the question, "What were the rules regarding hanging things on the cell walls?" Her response includes the following two quotes.[355]

(b)(2)

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[353] (b)(3):10 USC 6/17/2006 (TAB D1)
[354] §130b,(b)(6),(b)(6/17/2006 (TAB D1)
[355] 7)(C) Tab D2)

guards still had to be able to see into the cell. (Rule of thumb no higher [than] about waist level.)"[356]

19. (~~FOUO~~) CW2 (b)(3):1 is the former Assistant Officer in Charge of Camp 1 who was on duty on the night of the suicides. He was not interviewed by NCIS. In an interview with me at Camp America on 28 July 2006, CW2 (b)(3): responded to the question "What are the rules on hanging things in cells?" with

(b)(2)

20. (~~FOUO~~) ENS (b)(3): is the other former Assistant Officer in Charge of Camp 1; she was off duty at the time of the suicides. She was not interviewed by NCIS. In a statement dated 28 July 2006, she responded to the question "What are the rules on hanging things in cells?" as follows: "At the time the incident

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

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[356] (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Statement (Tab D3)
[357] ent (Tab C12)
[358] ent (Tab D4)
[359] SOG Log (Tab A5)
[360] SOG Log (Tab A5)
[361] SOG Log (Tab A5)

(b)(2)

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

27. (~~FOUO~~) MS1 (b)(3):1 a Camp 1 Sergeant of the Guard, told me in an interview that "Anytime the OIC or AOIC said you (b)(2) (b)(3):1 (b)(2) (b)(2) "[364]

XXXI. (U) Concealment by Detainees on Alpha Block, 9 June 2006

1. (~~FOUO~~) An initial responder after the discovery of the suicides reported that (b)(2)

2. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 stated that on the night of 9/10 June, after he assisted secure ISN 693 to a backboard on the Alpha Block tier, "I then told (b)(2)

3. (~~FOUO~~) The following statements refer to instances of hanging blankets on 9 June 2006 before the suicides were discovered. For additional details regarding hanging blankets that were observed by guard force personnel after the discovery of the bodies, see Appendix entitled "Eyewitness Testimony Relevant to Time of Death."

4. (~~FOUO~~) MA2 (b)(3) stated that at approximately 1900[366], while retrieving the trash after the evening meal, "I believe I saw a blanket hanging in the rear corner of A5 cell at that time. A5 was squirting his blanket down with water. The detainees usually wash and dry their blankets this way."[367]

5. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that around 2000, he saw "the detainee in cell A-8 squirting his blanket with water as if he was washing it."[368]

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[362] PL Log (Tab A4)

[363] (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) iew 8/14/2006 (TAB E2)

[364] iew 8/14/2006 (TAB C14.b)

[365] nder 6/14/2006 (TAB C2.a)

[366] Block Blotter, entry dtg 09JUN2006 1900L, states "Finished detainee meal." (TAB I5)

[367] /15/2006 (TAB B3.a)

[368] 6/14/2006 (TAB B5.a)

6. (~~FOUO~~) In a subsequent interview, MA3 (b)(3):1 0 USC stated that he "specifically remembered seeing the detainee in A8 washing his blanket around 2015-2020 hours, when he was mopping the block with MA3 (b)(3):1 MA3 (b)(3):1 took note of A8, because they had 'gotten into it' before."[369]

7. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that shortly before 2130, she "saw that 0093 in cell (b)(2) "[370]

8. (~~FOUO~~) In the same interview, MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that while she was walking tier watch from 2300 to 2330, she noted that the detainee in cell A-8 (b)(2)

9. (~~FOUO~~) MA1 (b)(3) :10 stated that while he walked the tier around midnight, he noticed that "the detainee in cell A-8 had a blanket hanging up back by his sink."[372]

10. (~~FOUO~~) The detainee who committed suicide in cell A8, ISN 093, used his (b)(2)

11. (~~FOUO~~) Speaking with reference to the detainee in cell A-8 (ISN 093), MA1 (b)(3 stated (b)(2) (b)(2) "[373]

12. (~~FOUO~~) MA2 (b)(3): 10 stated that "Once I arrived at A8, (b)(2) (b)(2) "[374]

13. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that when he detected (b)(2) in the A8 (b)(2)

14. (~~FOUO~~) NCIS crime scene photographs from cells A5, A8, and A12 depict (b)(2)

(b)(2)

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[369] NCIS (b)(3): /16/2006 (TAB B5.b)
[370] NCIS 10 5/15/2006 (TAB B4.a)
[371] NCIS USC 6/15/2006 (TAB B4.a)
[372] NCIS §130b, 5/2006 (TAB B2.a)
[373] NCIS (b)(6),(5/2006 (TAB B2.a)
[374] NCIS b)(7)(15/2006 (TAB B3.a)
[375] NCIS C) /14/2006 (TAB B5.a)

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

XXXII. (U) Amount of Light Available for Night Observation by Guards 9 June 2006

(b)(2)

2. (~~FOUO~~) Findings of fact regarding the illumination inside Alpha Block on the night of 9/10 June 2006 include:

(b)(2)

5. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):10 stated that (b)(2)
(b)(2)

6. (~~FOUO~~) COL (b)(3):10 stated that "To the best of my recollection, the lights on the South side of Alpha [Block], the side

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[376] NCIS Exhibit 115 (TAB K4).

[377] NCIS Exhibit 115, Enclosure D8, D24, D25, D42, D45 (TAB K4)

[378] NCIS Exhibit 115, Enclosure E7, E10, E13, E15 (TAB K4)

[379] NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) /14/2006 (TAB B5.a).

(b)(2)

7. (~~FOUO~~)

8. (~~FOUO~~) COL (b)(3):10 USC stated that (b)(2) (b)(2)

9. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that it was (b)(2) (b)(2)

10. (~~FOUO~~) The (b)(2)a Block NCO, MA1 (b)(3) stated that (b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

(b)(2)

12. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 said (b)(2) (b)(2)

13. (~~FOUO~~) MA1 (b)(3 stated that (b)(2) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

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[380] (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) 17/2006 (TAB D1)
[381] 17/2006 (TAB D1)
[382] 006 (TAB B5.a)
[383] 6 (TAB B2.a)
[384] 006 (TAB B5.a)
[385] 6 (TAB B2.a)
[386] ry of Interview 060821

(b)(2)

11. (~~FOUO~~) **Conclusion #1 regarding SOP ¶8-6f:** On 9 June 2006, an unknown member of the Alpha Block guard team falsely reported at 2350 the completion of a random headcount. The report is false because no member of the Alpha Block guard team responded to the directive to conduct a random headcount by walking the tier, examining every cell, and sighting (b)(2) or (b)(2) for every detainee. The violation is insignificant because by the time DOC ordered a random headcount at 2335, the medical examiners' opinion is that the detainees already had been hanging for about an hour or more. Consequently, compliance with SOP ¶8-6f would not have prevented the suicides, and failure to comply could not have facilitated the suicides.

(b)(2)

13. (~~FOUO~~) The following SOP violations potentially but not demonstrably contributed to the suicides:

(b)(2)

17. (~~FOUO~~) **Conclusion regarding SOP ¶8-6c, 8-8g, and 8-5b:** The suicides of ISNs 093, 588, and 693 could have succeeded even if the Alpha Block guards complied in full with all (b)(2)

According to the expert medical opinion of Dr. (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b (Tab I-3), the "typical jail house hanging" achieves fatality within four minutes, and when a person committing suicide deliberately blocks his own airway and suspends himself fully by the neck, death occurs faster. A guard following the SOP needs to see a detainee's (b)(2) and a guard making a circuit up one side of the tier and down the other would be in front of any given cell (b)(2) Even an interval of (b)(2) between observations appears too long to prevent a determined suicide: if a detainee waited for a guard to pass and then openly hanged himself in the front of his cell, the detainee still could achieve death before the guard returned close enough to see into the cell. Except for the nooses, the elaborate preparations of the detainees in advance of their deaths only served to shrink the already small chance that doctors could revive them.

XXXIV. (U) Culpability

1. (~~FOUO~~) I consider it likely but impossible to prove that the detainees committed suicide shortly after 2230, during the tier watch of MASN (b)(3):10 USC

2. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 statement to NCIS includes a number of remarks that suggest he is not being completely forthcoming.[390]

3. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 described how while walking the tier between 2230 and 2300, his attention was drawn to cell (b)(, [redacted]

4. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 also described how he did not investigate further, and did not inspect cells A8 and A5; these cells subsequently proved also to hold detainees who committed suicide.

5. (~~FOUO~~) In the course of his NCIS statement, MASN (b)(3):10 asserted several times a lower level of professionalism for the Alpha Block guard team than other sources indicate. I interpreted these statements as attempts to spread the blame around while obliquely denying he had anything to do with the deaths.

6. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):1 also confessed to several lesser offenses against rules and procedures, to include reading a magazine in the guard shack, sending food to the guard shack, and failing to walk his post in a military manner. I interpreted these statements as attempts to distract attention from whether he should have spotted the detainees who committed suicide.

7. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 appeared deceptive when I interviewed him.

8. (~~FOUO~~) According to the medical examiners, it is probable that the detainee in cell A12, ISN 588, committed suicide at least two hours before his body was discovered at about 0035 on 10 June 2006.

9. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 USC s 2230—2300 stint on the tier represents the latest tier watch consistent with the two hour estimate.

10. (~~FOUO~~) MA (b)(3):10 USC §130b (b conducted the 2200—2230 tier watch before MASN s shift.

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[390] NCIS (b)(3): 6/14/2006 (TAB B6.a)

11. (~~FOUO~~) The shifts of MASN (b)(3):10 USC §130b (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) are the only shifts consistent with the two hour estimate that also were during the period of (b)(2)

12. (~~FOUO~~) I consider it unlikely that the detainees committed suicide before the (b)(2)

13. (~~FOUO~~) The three detainees who committed suicide took several precautions against an early discovery, so it would have been consistent for them to wait to (b)(2)

(b)(2)

15. (~~FOUO~~) ISN 093 in particular made elaborate arrangements that he could not prudently have done in brighter light.

16. (~~FOUO~~) In addition to the guard force, HN (b)(3):1 0 USC stated he was on Alpha Block for the purpose of delivering medication "during roughly the time frame 2137 to 2149."[391]

17. (~~FOUO~~) I consider it unlikely that the detainees committed suicide during the tier watch of MA3 (b)(3):10 USC

18. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 0 USC was an experienced no-nonsense brig MA with a reputation for holding detainees to the rules.

19. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 0 USC §130b,(had a history of confrontation with ISN 093, so it is unlikely that MA3 would ignore ISN 093's cell.[392]

20. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 was the guard who first recognized that something was amiss in ISN 093's cell.

21. (~~FOUO~~) No evidence suggests that MA3 (b)(3):1 0 USC was a careless watch stander.

22. (~~FOUO~~) I consider it likely that the detainees were waiting for MASN (b)(3):10 tier watch, because of the strong likelihood that they had correctly identified him as the least observant member of the Alpha Block guard team.

23. (~~FOUO~~) When asked to assess MASN (b)(3):10 USC §130b (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that "I counseled him twice for being late to work. He's not energetic, not enthusiastic, and basically not a good Sailor."[393]

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

[391] 6/16/2006 (TAB F6)

[392] 6/16/2006 reinterview (TAB B5.5)

[393] ent 8/14/2006

Recommendations

XXXV. (U) Disciplinary Action

1. As noted above, I surmise that the detainees committed suicide during MASN (b)(3):10 2230—2300 tier watch, but I do not believe that this can be proved. Consequently, I cannot recommend disciplinary action against MASN (b)(3):10

2. No disciplinary action appears to be justifiable against guards who failed to see (b)(2) in Alpha Block cells. I conclude this because the SOP authorized no response if guards were uncertain about a sleeping detainee's condition.

3. I am providing information separately to your judge advocate general regarding a possible false official statement.

XXXVI. (U) Commendations

1. Some of the guard force personnel who behaved very well during the emergency period following the discovery of the suicides merit your attention.

2. In the Alpha Block guard team, the following persons deserve your recognition:

> 3. **MA2** (b)(3):10 USC raised the original alarm once the deception was discovered in cell A8. He retrieved the (b)(2) sheers, entered the cell, and cut down ISN 093, after which he and other guards secured ISN 093 to a backboard and carried him to the clinic at a run. When the guards returned to Alpha Block, the second and third suicides were discovered. MA2 (b)(3) called for assistance, entered cell A5 with other guards, and discovered the body of ISN 693; again he cut down the detainee. In accordance with SOP, MA2 (b)(3): shackled ISN 693's legs and helped secure the detainee to a back board. Subsequently he walked the tier making detainees remove items from cell walls until ordered outside to take a breather. MA2 (b)(3): stated that "I tried to hold it together and be a leader but the whole ordeal seemed like a nightmare."[394] Regardless of his mental state, MA2 (b)(3) kept making sound decisions and taking effective action.
>
> 4. **MA3** (b)(3):10 USC was a ubiquitous presence in the emergency. When MA2 (b)(3): raised the alarm she opened the (b)(2) kit, gave (b)(3) the sheers, and brought other essential (b)(2) equipment to cell A8. When the deceptively arranged bedding was discovered, MA3 (b)(3):1 opened the empty adjoining cell, A7, and along with MA3 (b)(3):10 was able to see that ISN 093 was hanging. She jumped back onto the tier, unlocked A8, and once other guards cut down ISN 093, she helped carry the detainee out onto the tier, where she (b)(2) MA3 (b)(3):10 then was part of the

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[394] NCIS (b)(3) 6/15/2006 (TAB B3 a)

team that carried ISN 093 to the clinic at a run. She advised the medical personnel that there was (b)(2) that the guards were unable to remove, and then on orders from MA1 (b)(3) ran back to Alpha Block. MA3 (b)(3):10 arrived on the tier just as guards were getting suspicious about cell A12, so she unlocked that cell, and when guards discovered the suspended body of ISN 588, she cut his cord. Once ISN 588 was lowered to the deck, MA3 (b)(3):10 and another MA (b)(2) around ISN 588's head. She went back onto the tier to check on other detainees, and heard the alarm at cell A5. She opened that cell to admit a team of escort guards, and when she couldn't find the shears, she ran to (b)(2) Block for another pair. Upon returning, she found that ISN 693 had been cut down and prepared for transport to the clinic, so she resumed walking the tier, checking on cells, waking up detainees, and ordering them to remove all hanging items from the walls. MA3 (b)(3):1 kept her head in the crisis, made sound decisions, and kept turning up at the right place and right time.

5. **MA3** (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(was walking the Alpha Block tier when he became suspicious of cell A8. In the initial effort to understand what was happening, MA3 (b)(3):1 entered the empty adjoining cell (b)(2 along with MA3 (b)(3):10 and was able to see that ISN 093 was hanging. MA3 (b)(3): entered A8 with other guards and helped cut down the detainee, and upon seeing that the detainee had a (b)(2) MA3 (b)(3):1 tried unsuccessfully to remove the obstruction from the airway. After securing ISN 093 to a backboard, MA3 (b)(3):1 and the other guards carried the detainee to the clinic at a run. After delivering ISN 093, MA3 (b)(3):1 heard a second (b)(2) alarm and so carried a back board from the clinic to Alpha Block, where he helped secure ISN 693 for transportation. MA3 (b)(3):1 did not remember having done so, but he then helped carry ISN 693 to the clinic. Throughout the emergency, MA3 (b)(3):1 kept making sound decisions and kept up the physically demanding work involved in cutting down two detainees, preparing them for transport to the clinic, and then carrying those detainees to the clinic at a run.

6. Other members of the Camp 1 guard team who deserve your recognition include:

7. **MASN** (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) were sent to Alpha Block by the (b)(2) Block NCO after the first (b)(2) was called for ISN 093. When they arrived, the Alpha Block guards were leaving the block with ISN 093. The Sergeant of the Guard was standing outside the block, as was MASN (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) went on the tier and began examining detainees and cells. They detected a problem in cell A12 and sent MASN (b)(3):10 to look in the window. After MASN (b)(3):1 discovered ISN 588 hanging, (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) into cell A12, uncovered ISN 588's body, cut him down, and (b)(2) (b)(3):10 and (b)(3):10 helped secure ISN 588 to a backboard and helped carry him as far as the sally, where other guards took over as stretcher bearers. (b)(3):10 and

(b)(3):10 returned to Alpha Block, where they ranged up and down the tier ordering detainees to take down all items hanging on cell walls. They remained at this duty until properly relieved. They are especially notable for having made sound decisions and taken decisive action in the absence of senior leadership.

8. (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was a member of the escort team who rode in the ambulance taking ISN 093 to the hospital. He assisted the corpsman administering CPR by holding ISN 093's head and neck in place and compressing the air mask in time with the corpsman's chest compressions. In the course of this task a thick orange blood-like substance spewed out of ISN 093's mouth and over MA3 (b)(3):10 hands. As (b)(3): put it, "I pulled back, but the corpsman said to keep going," so (b)(3):10 did, for the remainder of a rough ride to the hospital.

9. (b)(3):10 USC led other MAs into cell A5, where he uncovered the hanging body of ISN 693. MA1 (b)(3):10 USC held the body up while another MA cut the cord. (b)(3):1 and others lowered ISN 693 to the ground, shackled him according to SOP, secured him to a backboard, and carried him to the Camp Delta medical clinic. Once in the clinic, MA1 (b)(3): heard someone in a different room with ISN 093 call for a combat camera, for which he is qualified, so he volunteered to run the video camera for approximately two minutes until instructed by COL (b)(3):10 to stop videotaping the event. He then directed two junior MAs in collecting and sorting the various materials that had come in with the detainees.

10. **MA2** (b)(3):10 USC was a guard on Sally Port 4. When she heard that a detainee was attempting to hang himself, she yelled an order to another sailor on Sally Port 3 to prepare for the arrival of medical personnel. Acting on orders from MAC (b)(3) she ran to the clinic for another backboard, which she brought to cell A5. She assisted in preparing ISN 693 for transportation, and then helped carry him out of the block and to the medical clinic. While running backwards, she held ISN 693's head to prevent its uncontrolled motion. After delivering ISN 693 to the clinic, she returned to her post at Sally Port 4.

11. **MA2** (b)(3):10 USC was on the escort team. She ran from the escort control room to Alpha Block in response to a (b)(2) brevity code, and was one of the first people to enter cell A5. She helped cut ISN 693 down, and once he was on the floor removed the (b)(2) She and other guards secured ISN 693 to a backboard and carried him to the clinic. Inside the clinic, she responded to a call from help in an adjoining room, and began to assist a corpsman conducting CPR on ISN 588. First she stabilized the corpsman, who was balanced on the table with ISN 588, and then held the oxygen mask over the detainee's mouth. After ISN 588 was pronounced dead, MA2 (b)(3): 10 drove with two other escort guards to the

Naval Hospital, but found that ISN 093 was also dead. The guards then returned to Camp Delta.

12. (b)(3):10 USC was a (b)(2) Block guard who was visiting Alpha Block when guards there first were recognizing something was wrong in cell A8. While the guards were assembling outside A8 in preparation to enter, MA3 (b)(3):1 thought to run outside, open the shutter, and check on ISN 093's status. When he saw that ISN 093 was hanging, he shouted to the rest of the guards to enter, and then ran around to rejoin the others. MA3 (b)(3): helped secure ISN 093 to a backboard and carry him to the clinic. Upon returning to Alpha Block, MA3 (b)(3):1 found that two more suicides had been discovered; he was one of the first guards to enter cell A5, and he pulled aside the concealing blanket to reveal ISN 693. After helping cut down ISN 693, MA3 (b)(3):1 retrieved restraints for use in accordance with SOP, and then went to cell A12, where he joined the team that carried ISN 588 to the clinic. After that, he returned to his own block and resumed his duties there.

XXXVII. (U) Recommendations Regarding Development of Junior Leaders

1. Develop explicit training for staff NCOs and junior officers to help them resist detainee wheedling, intimidation, or other manipulative behavior designed to persuade camp and JDG leaders to relax standards. It is especially important that the incoming members of the Naval Expeditionary Guard Battalion get a demonstration of firm enforcement during their training period—clearly detainees exploited the turnover last year.

2. Ensure that performance reviews are neither positively nor negatively tied to the frequency of disciplinary actions, detainee complaints, or riots—COL (b)(3):10 alluded to this practice in his statement to NCIS.

3. Redirect the focus of shift supervisors and junior officers who bartered for relative detainee quiescence at the expense of guard credibility. Two junior officers in particular, ENS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) are named by an array of sources as failing to back up sailors in the firm enforcement of Camp 1 rules. Guard morale took a beating as a result. Of all the personnel in Camp 1, junior petty officers and seamen represent the greatest proportion of pro-enforcement sentiment, and they expressed strongly positive feelings about their job when they are working for Sergeants of the Guard and Platoon Leaders who back them up. This positive attitude helps them shrug off detainee bad behavior.

XXXVIII. (U) Confirmation of Command Philosophy

1. A surreal pair of Camp 1 Sergeant of the Guard Log entries from 27 April 06 (night) demonstrate something of the extent to which JDG command philosophy and detainee mindset were misaligned in Camp 1 last spring: "If detainees (b)(2) (b)(2) per MAC (b)(3):10 USC (S3)" and "No (b)(2)

(b)(2) The discontinuity in command philosophy extended through JDG as well: I spoke to no first class petty officers, chief petty officers, or commissioned officers who had made a one-on-one formal office call with their superiors in the chain of command in order for those superiors to enunciate the command philosophy. It is essential for leaders to say, and for followers to hear, "This is what I believe, this is what I promise, this is what I expect."

XXXIX. (U) Intelligence Analysis

1. The Joint Intelligence Group's Fusion Branch or another appropriate JIG team must analyze and report on the carefully planned campaign that culminated in the detainee suicides. The Platoon Leader and Sergeant of the Guard Logs will be a valuable resource for the study: (b)(2) (b)(2)

XL. (U) DIMS Revision

1. I was told by Detainee Operations Center personnel that DIMS has no ability to produce rosters of cell blocks populations on a given past date. If this is true, I recommend the addition of this feature: such a tool would be valuable for epidemiological purposes as well as intelligence research.

Appendix A. Eyewitness Testimony Relevant to Estimated Time of Death

1. Six members of the Camp 1 duty guard force initially responded to the discovery of the first suicide in cell A8 (ISN 093).

MA2 (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	Alpha Block Guard	Tab B-3
MA3	Alpha Block Guard	Tab B-4
MA3	Alpha Block Guard	Tab B-5
MA3	(b)(2) Guard	Tab C-13
MA1	Sergeant of the Guard Relief	Tab C-14
MA1	Alpha Block NCO	Tab B-2

2. Five members of the Camp 1 duty guard force initially responded to the discovery of the second suicide in cell A12 (ISN 588).

MASN (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	(b)(2) Guard	Tab C-2
MASN	Alpha Block Guard	Tab B-6
MA3 T	Alpha Block Guard	Tab B-4
MASN	(b)(2) Guard	Tab C-15
MA1 K	Sergeant of Guard Supernumerary	Tab C-16

3. Eight on-duty members of the Camp 1 guard force initially responded to the discovery of the third suicide in cell A5 (ISN 693).

MA1 (b)(3):10 USC	LPO, Escort Department Squad 2	Tab C-3
MA1 §130b,(b)(6),(b)	LPO, Escort Department Squad 1	Tab C-5

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[395] Per (b)(3):10 USC was a guard on duty in (b)(2) Block on the night of 9/10 June. Just before the discovery of ISN 093's body, MA3 (b)(3): came to Alpha Block "to talk with their guards on duty." As a consequence, he was on hand for the emergency.

[396] NCIS (b)(3): 6/14/2006

[397]

[398] Per NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was an (b)(2 Block guard on the night of 9/10 June. When the initial alarm was raised, (b)(3):1 block NCO sent him to Alpha Block to assist. MASN (b)(3):1 arrived at Alpha Block just as guards were exiting with ISN 093 on a body board. MASN (b)(3):1 entered Alpha Block and began a headcount. MASN (b)(3): detected that something was wrong in A12, and sent MASN (b)(3): outside to look in A12's exterior window. After MASN (b)(3): reported that ISN 588 was hanging, MASN (b)(3):1 and other members of the guard force entered cell A12 and found ISN 588.

[399]

[400] Per NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was serving on the night of 9/10 June as a member of the Camp Delta Escort Team led by MA1 (b)(3): The Escort Team was based in Camp Delta at Building One, co-located with the Detainee Operations Center (DOC). On being notified of a (b)(2) (radio brevity code for attempted suicide), MA1 (b)(3): immediately led MA1 (b)(3):1 and other members of his team to Alpha Block, where MA1 (b)(3): saw first ISN 588 and then ISN 693.

[401] Per NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was serving in Camp 1 on the night of 9/10 June as the duty Camp Delta Escort Team LPO. The Escort Team was based in Camp Delta at Building One, co-located with the Detainee Operations Center (DOC). On being notified of a (b)(2) (radio brevity code for attempted suicide), MA1 (b)(3): immediately led his team to Alpha Block, where he saw first ISN 588

MA2	(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	Alpha Block Guard	Tab B-3
MA2		Sally Port 4 Guard	Tab C-7
MA3		Alpha Block Guard 2	Tab B-4
LI1 J.		Escort Department Squad 2	Tab C-10
MA2		Escort, Escort Department Squad 2	Tab C-11
MA3		(b)(2) Guard	Tab C-13
MA1		Sergeant of Guard Supernumerary	Tab C-16
Rank		Escort, Escort department Squad 1	Tab C-17

4. Two on-duty members of the Camp 1 duty guard force who participated in the emergency following discovery of the detainee suicides in Alpha Block provided statements relevant to this investigation.

MA3	(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	Escort, Escort Department Squad 2	Tab C-4
MA2		Escort, Escort Department Squad 1	Tab C-9

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and then ISN 693. Per SOP 7-4a, members of the escort team accompany detainees to various locations, including to the medical clinic.

[402] Per NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was standing watch on the night of 9/10 June 2006 at Sally Port 4. She described Sally Port 4 as "the secure area that individuals must go through to get to Camp 1. Acting on the orders of MAC (b)(, she ran to the Camp Delta medical clinic for a back board, which she brought to Alpha Block for the removal of ISN 693 to the medical clinic.

[403] Per NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was serving on the night of 9/10 June as a member of the Camp Delta Escort Team. He and his partner, (b)(3):10 responded a radio brevity code indicating a serious medical situation in Alpha Block.

[404] Per NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was serving on the night of 9/10 June as a member of the Camp Delta Escort Team. She and her partner, LI1 (b)(3):10 responded to a radio brevity code indicating a serious medical situation in Alpha Block.

[405] Described above.

[406] Described above.

[407] Per NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was serving in Camp 1 on the night of 9/10 June as a member of the duty detainee escort team (b)(2) When a guard from Camp 1 summoned all the escorts to Alpha Block, MASA (b)(3): helped carry ISN 693 on a backboard to the medical clinic.

[408] Per NCIS (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was serving in Camp 1 on the night of 9/10 June as a member of the (b)(2) Escort Team, based in Camp Delta at Building One, co-located with the Detainee Operations Center (DOC). MA3 (b)(3): described his duties this way: "As an escort team member, I was responsible for timely movements of detainees to medical and interrogations." DOC directed MA3 (b)(3) and his fellow escort team member MA2 (b)(3 to report to Camp 1 in response to a radio brevity code message which meant that a detainee was having life threatening symptoms. On arriving at Camp 1, a sally port guard told the escorts that the affected detainee already had been transferred to the Camp Delta medical clinic. At the clinic, the two escorts found ISN 093 in the care of clinic personnel. Denny escorted ISN 093 in the ambulance to the Guantanamo Bay Naval Hospital.

[409] Per NCIS (b)(3): 6/15/2006, MA2 (b)(3 was serving in Camp 1 on the night of 9/10 June 2006 as a duty detainee escort. She and MA3 (b)(3): were sent to the Camp Delta Medical Clinic to guard ISN 093. The two escorts rode in an ambulance with ISN 093 to the NAVSTA Guantanamo Bay hospital.

5. Ten on-duty medical personnel at the Camp Delta clinic who participated in the emergency that followed the discovery of detainee suicides in Alpha Block provided statements relevant to this investigation.

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

CW	Tab F-1
LT	Tab F-2
LT	Tab F-3
HM	Tab F-4
HN	Tab F-5
HN	Tab F-6
HM	Tab F-7
HN	Tab F-8
HN	Tab F-9
HM	Tab F-10

Appendix A: Eyewitness Testimony Relevant to Time of Death (continued)

ISN 093

1. ~~(FOUO)~~ In the cell of the first-discovered suicide, A8, the initial responders found the body of ISN 093. In addition to information provided in the main report above, the first responders also described other relevant aspects of the detainee's body.

> 2. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA1 (b)(3) stated that "his eyes were open, he was cold to the touch and his fingers and toes were blue."[410]
>
> 3. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA1 (b)(3): stated that "His fingertips were blue and he appeared to be lifeless." MA1 (b)(3): further stated that "The detainee looked like he was dead."[411]
>
> 4. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) tried to obtain a pulse but there was none. His eyes were wide open and his face was not discolored. I touched him and he was cool."[412]
>
> 5. ~~(FOUO)~~ MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that "The detainee [ISN 093] had urinated on himself and his eyes were open and white." MA3 (b)(3):1 further stated that "The detainee from cell A-8 had some light purple on his finger tips. Based on what I observed I would think the detainee in cell A-8 had been dead at least 30-40 minutes, before I found him."[413]
>
> 6. ~~(FOUO)~~ MASN (b)(3):10 stated that when he "saw ISN 588 hanging in his cell[, t]he first thing I observed was the discoloration of his lips, which appeared blue. His eyes were open and bloodshot. I could tell he wasn't breathing."
>
> > 7. ~~(FOUO)~~ MASN (b)(3):10 further stated that once the guards had lowered ISN 588 to the floor, "I checked for a pulse, but as I did this I realized the body was cold to the touch. ISN 588 seemed a little stiff. As ISN 588 lay there on the floor, MA3 (b)(3):1 came (b)(2) neck from the cloth."[414]

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[410] NCIS (b)(3): 10 USC §130b, (b)(6), 5/2006 (TAB B2.a)
[411] NCIS 15/2006 (TAB B3.a)
[412] NCIS 6/15/06 (TAB B4.a)
[413] NCIS /14/06 (TAB B5.a)
[414] NCIS 6/14/06

8. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 stated that ISN 093's "hands and body looked as if rigor mortis had set in."[415]

9. (FOUO) Guards and medical personnel who observed ISN 093 shortly after his extraction from cell A8 also described his physical appearance.

10. (~~FOUO~~) MA2 (b)(3):10 stated that while on duty at Sally Port 4, "MA1 (b)(3):1 came running up and said that there was a detainee hanging himself on Alpha Block." MA2 (b)(3):10 stated that shortly thereafter "the [Alpha] block guards were carrying out the first detainee [ISN 093] on a backboard [through Sally Port 4]. I observed that the detainee was blue. The detainee's feet were puffy and blue and it was blue around his mouth. I later learned that the detainee was from cell Alpha 8."[416]

11. (~~FOUO~~) MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that when he arrived at Camp Delta medical clinic, "The first thing I noticed about the detainee [ISN 693] was his blue feet. I also noticed the detainee was limp."[417]

12. (~~FOUO~~) MA2 (b)(3):10 arrived at the Camp Delta medical clinic with her Escort Team partner, MA3 (b)(3):1 She stated that once inside the clinic "I looked at ISN 093. He was right in front of me. I could see no movement and no signs of life in ISN 093. His eyelids were open, and his eyes did not move. I could see his chest. I did not remember him wearing a shirt. He had tan pants. He was not wearing any shoes. The skin on his chest was the normal color. However, his hands and feet were bluish in color. The skin underneath his toenails was purple in color. I could tell at the clinic, when I looked at him, the ISN 093 was deceased."[418]

13. (~~FOUO~~) MA1 (b)(3):1 stated that upon arriving at the Camp Delta medical clinic while escorting ISN 693, "Medical personnel directed us to take ISN 693 to room eleven (11). Along the way to room eleven, I noticed what I believe to be ISN-093 in the trauma area with emergency personnel performing CPR."[419]

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[415] NCIS (b)(3):1 6/14/06 (TAB B6.a)
[416] NCIS 0 USC 6/14/2006
[417] NCIS §130b,(/14/2006 (TAB C4.a)
[418] NCIS b)(6),(b 5/2006
[419] NCIS)(7)(C) /14/2006 (TAB C5.a)

ISN 588

14. (~~FOUO~~) In the cell of the second-discovered suicide, A12, the first responders found the body of ISN 588. In addition to the information provided above, the first responders also described other relevant aspects of the detainee's body.

> 15. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 USC stated that "I noticed that A12 had urinated and defecated on himself." Additionally, MASN (b)(3):10 stated that "All I could remember is that rigor mortis had set into his feet and that his feet were also very cold."[420]
>
> 16. (~~FOUO~~) MA2 (b)(3):10 provided a detailed description of ISN 588's clenched jaws, which is included above in the section concerning deliberate airway obstructions.[421]

17. (~~FOUO~~) Guards and medical personnel who observed ISN 588 shortly after his extraction from cell A8 also described his physical appearance.

> 18. (~~FOUO~~) MA1 (b)(3):1 stated that upon entering Alpha Block "I saw ISN 588 on the ground while a number of Sergeant of the Guard (SOG) and Alpha Block personnel were placing ISN 588 onto a backboard. I kneeled down and felt for pulse and respirations. I detected no signs of life. His eyes were open and blank. His mouth was open and I could see his teeth. I noticed his toenails and fingernails had already started to turn blue."[422]
>
> 19. (~~FOUO~~) LI1 (b)(3):10 USC stated that he briefly entered Alpha Block and then exited to get a stretcher. Then, he stated, "I returned to 588's cell and put the stretcher halfway into the cell door. I then assisted picking up the detainee and putting him on the stretcher by his ankles. When I grabbed his ankles, they were cold. I also noticed his toe and finger nails were purple and the palm[s] of his hands were very white."[423]

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[420] NCIS (b)(3):10 14/06 (TAB B6.a)
[421] NCIS USC /14/2006
[422] NCIS §130b,(b 4/2006 (TAB C5.a)
[423] NCIS)(6),(b)(/15/2006 (TAB C10)

ISN 693

20. (~~FOUO~~) In the cell of the third-discovered suicide, A5, the initial responders found the body of ISN 693. In addition to the information provided above, the initial responders also described other relevant aspects of the detainee's body.

> 21. (~~FOUO~~) MA1 (b)(3):1 stated that shortly after arriving in cell A5 and lowering ISN 693's hanging body to the ground, "I checked for respirations and a pulse but could not detect any sign of life. I noticed ISN 693 was cool to the touch. I saw and felt the ligature marks around his neck, the felt rough and 'plastic.' ISN 693's mouth was slightly open and I could see his teeth. I did not see anything in his mouth. His eyes were slightly open and one was open wider than the other."[424]
>
> 22. (~~FOUO~~) MA2 (b)(3):10 stated that "As to ISN 693's body, as I observed it at this time, I could tell that his eyes were dilated, eyelids half to three quarters opened. There was a large indentation around his neck, and I was immediately struck with how deep the indentation was. I remember seeing this indentation as a crescent shape, toward the side of his neck. I noticed the indentation after we lifted his chin. MA1 (b)(3):1 checked for a pulse, for a chest rising, but there was no motion and no sign of life. ISN 693's fingers were blue behind the fingernails. His toes were also blue. The skin on his face and arms appeared to be a normal color and hue." MA2 (b)(3):1 further stated that "The body itself was pliable enough that we were able to move the chin up, at which point we examined the indentation in the neck. The body was not completely stiff, like a board; it was still pliable."[425]
>
> 23. (~~FOUO~~) MA1 (b)(3):1 0 USC stated that he brought a back board to the tier outside A5, and "Then, MA1 (b)(3):10 USC §130b (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and one other guard rolled him [ISN 693] onto the back board and strapped him down." MA1 (b)(3):1 described almost nothing about the body's appearance, except that he "saw that his [ISN 693] eyes were open. I thought he might be alive, but unconscious."[426]
>
> 24. (~~FOUO~~) MA2 (b)(3):10 helped transport ISN 693 to the Camp Delta medical clinic. She stated that "As we were carrying him to the DET [Detainee Clinic, i.e., Camp Delta medical clinic] I noticed that his head flopped around a lot. I thought that people went stiff when they were dead, but I had to hold his head as I ran because it was flopping around and I was doing what I could to keep him from any additional injury. The backboard did not have a brace for the head. I had to run backwards in

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[424] NCIS (b)(3):1 /14/2006 (TAB C5.a)
[425] NCIS 0 USC /14/2006 (TAB C11)
[426] NCIS §130b,(7/17/2006

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

APPENDIX C. GRAPH OF ALPHA BLOCK ACTIVITIES, 9 JUNE 2006



C = Detainee Chow
S = Detainee Singing
z = Guard Off Block
t = On the tier
o = In Block NCO Office
T = Tier Watch
c = Guard at Chow
X = Guards found ISN 093

order to hold onto his head and the board. I observed that his eyes were open, but did not observe further down his body than his eyes."[427]

25. (~~FOUO~~) Guards and medical personnel who observed ISN 693 shortly after his discovery and extraction from cell A5 also described other relevant aspects of the detainee's physical condition.

26. (~~FOUO~~) MASN (b)(3):10 USC stated that he went to Alpha Block after the first detainee was transported out of the block, and that "When I arrived, I saw ISN 693 lying on the deck inside cell A5. I noticed his face seemed larger than normal, as if being swollen."[428]

27. (~~FOUO~~) In the same statement, MASN (b)(3):10 USC further noted that "ISN 693's facial color appeared to be darker, as if more "sun-tanned," than normal."

28. (~~FOUO~~) Finally, MASN (b)(3):10 also stated that he last saw ISN 693 "alive on 07JUN06, the last day I worked on Alpha Block."

29. (~~FOUO~~) MASA (b)(3):1 0 USC stated that when he and other escort team members arrived at Alpha Block, "ISN 693 had already been placed and strapped on a medical backboard. I noticed ISN 693's face was blue. I observed one of ISN 693's arms had fallen off the backboard. I returned his arm onto the backboard and noticed his arm was stiff."[429]

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[427] NCIS (b)(3):10 /14/2006
[428] NCIS USC /15/2006 (TAB C8)
[429] NCIS §130b,(19/2006

Appendix B. Sources Consulted

1. Upon receiving your letter of appointment as investigating officer, I interviewed the Alpha Block guards and the Camp 1 leadership who were on duty on the night of 9/10 June. These are:

Camp 1 Assistant Officer in Charge	CWO (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
Camp 1 Platoon Leader	MAC
Camp 1 Sergeant of the Guard	CTM
Alpha Block NCO	MA1
Alpha Block Guard	MA2
Alpha Block Guard	MA3
Alpha Block Guard	MA3
Alpha Block Guard	MAS

2. Additionally, I interviewed the following Joint Task Force--Guantanamo Bay personnel for background and context regarding Camp 1 and the enforcement of SOPs:

Deputy Commander, Joint Detention Group	CD (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
Camp 1 Officer in Charge	LT
Camp 1 Assistant Officer in Charge	EN
Camp 1 Platoon Leader/Ops Chief	ST
Camp 1 Platoon Leader	ET
Camp 1 Platoon Leader	M
Camp 1 Sergeant of the Guard	M
Camp 1 Block Guard	M
Camp 1 Sally Port Guard	M

3. The interviews averaged between an hour and a half and two hours, and preparing clean copies of my notes took as long as the interviews. Relevant portions of those interviews are attached to this report, and I filed with your Staff Judge Advocate my complete notes for each interview. The above personnel also provided official statements which are attached to this report.

4. I reviewed the December 2005 Camp Delta SOP (Exhibit A-1), which was current on the night of 9/10 June 2006. I also reviewed all Guard Mount Messages transmitted since the SOP's publication in December 2005. These official updates to Camp Delta's SOP also are attached to this report.

5. The former Camp 1 OIC, LT (b)(3):10 USC delivered the log books for the Camp 1 Sergeant of the Guard and Platoon Leader. I expeditiously reviewed them, and transcribed relevant portions which are attached to this report as Exhibit A-3, A-4, and A-5. I also reviewed all entries by Alpha Block personnel into the Detainee Information Management System (DIMS) from noon on 9 June 2006 to 10 June 2006.

a period encompassing the suicides of three detainees, and the discovery of their bodies (Exhibit J-5).

6. I examined U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative Service, "Guantanamo Bay Report of Investigation (Interim)," 20 June 2006, and its sequel, U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative Service, "Guantanamo Bay Report of Investigation (Interim)," 25 July 2006. The former includes NCIS Exhibits 1--114, and the latter contains NCIS Exhibits 114--143. I include a number of NCIS exhibits as attachments to this report. I also reviewed for each decedent the final autopsy reports issued by the Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, Rockville, Maryland (Exhibits H-1, H-2, and H-3).

7. I closely examined Exhibit 120 of U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative Service, "Guantanamo Bay Report of Investigation (Interim)," 25 July 2006. NCIS Exhibit 120 is entitled (U) "Review of SOP for Camp Delta, JTF-GTMO/22Jun06." This exhibit provides definitions and explanations of the SOP's contents that will be useful references for readers unfamiliar with Camp Delta operations. In the interest of concise presentation, I omit these basic explications from my report to you, but NCIS Exhibit 120 is attached hereto (Exhibit K-1).

8. I lacked the time to obtain, review, and assimilate additional material relevant to this case, such as official email. I discuss these lacunae separately in the appropriate places.

9. The sources available were sufficient to answer your questions. Predictably a number of sources differ from each other in non-substantial ways. For example, most narratives of events agree with each other in relative sequence, but vary in the events' timing; usually the variations are insignificant. As another example, the statements of guard personnel sometimes confuse identities of persons during their initial reaction to the emergency on the night of 9/10 June. Where there are significant contradictions—and they are relatively few—I made sure to include among the findings of fact the fullest possible direct quotes, and I discussed alternative interpretations of the differences.

ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY
Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner
1413 Research Blvd., Bldg. 102
Rockville, MD 20850
1-301-319-0000

FINAL AUTOPSY REPORT

Name: Ahmed, Ali Abdullah
Detainee Number: (b)(6) 000693DP
Date of Birth: 09 March 1969
Date of Death: 10 June 2006

Date of Autopsy: 11 June 2006 @ 0730
Date of Report: 01 August 2006

Autopsy No.: (b)(6)
AFIP No.: (b)(6)
Rank: Detainee
Place of Death: Detention Facility, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Place of Autopsy: Naval Hospital Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

Circumstances of Death: This 37 year-old detainee, by report, was found hanging in his secure cell at the detainee confinement facility at approximately 0020 on 10 June 2006. A suicide note was recovered from his shirt pocket. He was found with his feet and hands loosely bound and his face covered with a white cloth mask. Medical resuscitation was unsuccessful and he was declared dead at 0115. In the medical record it states he was unresponsive, pulse-less, apneic, with fixed and dilated pupils, and in rigor mortis when he arrived at the detention clinic at 0058. The medical report also states that the decedent had a piece of cotton-like material in his mouth and upper pharynx that was removed by medical personnel and seized by Naval Criminal Investigative Service.

Authorization for Autopsy: Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, IAW 10 USC 1471

Identification: Detention records. Fingerprints and DNA sample obtained.

Personnel present for the autopsy:

1. Special Agent (b)(6) Naval Criminal Investigative Service
2. (b)(6) Autopsy Assistant
3. (b)(6) Medical Photographer
4. (b)(6) Medical Examiner Investigator
5. (b)(6) Medical Examiner (b)(6) civilian observer

CAUSE OF DEATH: Hanging

MANNER OF DEATH: Suicide

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ and may be exempt from mandatory disclosure under FOIA. DoD 5400.7R, "DoD Freedom of Information Act Program", DoD Directive 5230.9, "Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release", and DoD Instruction 5230.29, "Security and Policy Review of DoD Information for Public Release" apply.

Final Autopsy Diagnoses

I. Hanging
   A. Dried abrasion collar anterior/lateral neck
   B. Scattered hemorrhage into the muscles of the neck
   C. Tardieu-like spots on the legs

II. Other Injuries
   A. Contusion, dorsum of left foot
   B. Healing abrasions (2), anterior left leg

III. Feet bound by cotton-like material

IV. Ligature encircling the abdomen

V. Natural disease processes/findings
   A. Scalp dermatitis
   B. Accessory spleen at the tip of the appendix
   C. Varicocele of the right testis
   D. Mild, focal chronic thyroiditis

VI. Artifact: Hyoid bone fracture, left side, during removal, no associated hemorrhage

VI. Toxicology – negative

EXTERNAL EXAMINATION

The body, received wrapped in a white sheet, is that of a well-developed, well-nourished appearing, muscular, 68 inches in length, 165 pounds (per medical record as of 06 June 2006), white male whose appearance is consistent with the reported age of 37 years. Lividity is posterior and fixed, rigor is beginning to pass equally in all extremities, and the temperature is that of the refrigeration unit (34-39 degrees Fahrenheit).

The head and neck are wrapped with a blue plastic pad secured with tape. The scalp is covered with black hair in a normal distribution. The irides are brown. The sclerae and conjunctivae are congested but free of petechiae. The external auditory canals are unremarkable. The ears are unremarkable. The nares are patent and the lips are atraumatic. The nose and maxillae are palpably stable. The teeth appear in good condition with a fracture of the lower left anterior incisor. Facial hair consists of a full beard and mustache. On the back of the head there are multiple round to irregular skin lesions with red-brown margins and central clearing.

The neck is straight, and the trachea is midline and mobile. The chest is symmetric. The abdomen is flat. There is a rope-like ligature around the abdomen. It consists of white, cotton-like material, consistent with a T-shirt. The material has been torn into a strip and rolled into several layers. The material is secured with a knot that, when received, is over the left side of the anterior abdomen. Distal to the knot the material are two loose ends that appear to have been cut. The genitalia are those of a normal adult circumcised male. The testes are descended and free of masses. The pubic hair is shaved. The buttocks and anus are unremarkable.

The upper and lower extremities are symmetric and without clubbing or edema. The feet are bound by thin, white cotton-like material consistent with a T-shirt tied with knots. SA (b)(6) has taken these bindings into custody. The hands are bound with surgical towels and secured with string.

CLOTHING AND PERSONAL EFFECTS

The following clothing items and personal effects are present on the body at the time of autopsy:

- Khaki colored short sleeve pull over shirt
- White T-shirt
- Khaki colored pants
- Khaki colored shorts over the pants

MEDICAL INTERVENTION

Evidence of medical intervention includes:

- Nasal Airway

- Intravenous catheter with attached tubing bag of intravenous solution, right antecubital fossa
- Defibrillator pad on the upper right chest. A second pad is on the shirt.
- Multiple electrocardiogram pads on the chest, abdomen, and left arm
- Puncture mark on the dorsum of the right hand
- Identification tags tied to the right wrist and right great toe

RADIOGRAPHS

A complete set of postmortem radiographs is obtained and are consistent the findings described below.

EVIDENCE OF INJURY

The ordering of the following injuries is for descriptive purposes only, and is not intended to imply order of infliction or relative severity. All wound pathways are given relative to standard anatomic position.

Evidence of Hanging

There is dried abrasion furrow on the neck. The furrow is regular with the width varying from 1/4 to ½ inch. Within the furrow the skin is imprinted with a very fine weave type pattern. The furrow is located 11 inches below the top of the head and below the thyroid cartilage at the anterior midline, 8 inches below the top of the head at the level of the left auditory meatus, and 8 inches below the top of the head at the level of the right auditory meatus. Behind the ears the furrow continues to course posteriorly and superiorly where it becomes less well defined and terminates 1 inch posterior to the right ear and 2 ½ inches posterior to the left ear.

Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) Agents present four pieces of material that were recovered from the floor of the cell of the decedent. Three are braided white cotton-like material. One of these has a knot at one end and the other end is cut. Encircling the knotted end is a knotted short loop of the same material. The second segment of this material has a loop at one end and the other end is cut. The third piece of material is a white cotton-like material with torn or cut defects. The evidence is minimally handled, photographed and returned to NCIS.

On both legs, tardieu-like spots encircle the legs. These spots commence 4 inches below the knees and extend distal for six inches terminating above the ankles. Similar spots are on the posterior thighs.

Internally, there are scattered hemorrhages throughout the anterior neck muscles:

1. Medial left sternocleidomastoid muscle, ¾ x 3/8 inches
2. Right thyrohyoid muscle ¾ x ½

The remainder of the anterior and posterior neck is free of hemorrhage into the soft tissue.

Additional Injuries

There is a ½ inch round contusion on the dorsum of the left foot. There are two, less than 1/8 inch in diameter healing abrasions on the anterior left leg.

Artifact

There is a fracture of the left side of the hyoid bone, anterior to the lesser horn, that occurred during the removal of the neck organs. The surrounding soft tissue is free of hemorrhage.

INTERNAL EXAMINATION

HEAD:
The galeal and subgaleal soft tissues of the scalp are free of injury. The calvarium is intact, as is the dura mater beneath it. Clear cerebrospinal fluid surrounds the 1450 gm brain, which has unremarkable gyri and sulci. Coronal sections demonstrate sharp demarcation between white and grey matter, without hemorrhage or contusive injury. The ventricles are of normal size. The basal ganglia, brainstem, cerebellum, and arterial systems are free of injury or other abnormalities. There are no skull fractures. The atlanto-occipital joint is stable.

NECK:
The anterior strap muscles of the neck are homogenous and red-brown, without additional abnormalities. The thyroid cartilage is intact. The larynx is lined by intact white mucosa. The thyroid is symmetric and red-brown, without cystic or nodular change. The tongue is free of bite marks, hemorrhage, or other injuries.

BODY CAVITIES:
The ribs, sternum, and vertebral bodies are visibly and palpably intact. No excess fluid is in the right pleural, pericardial, or peritoneal cavities. The organs occupy their usual anatomic positions.

RESPIRATORY SYSTEM:
The right and left lungs weigh 500 and 450 gms, respectively. The external surfaces are smooth and deep red-purple. The pulmonary parenchyma is diffusely congested and edematous. No mass lesions or areas of consolidation are present.

CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM:
The 250 gm heart is contained in an intact pericardial sac. The epicardial surface is smooth, with minimal fat investment. The coronary arteries are present in a normal distribution, with a right-dominant pattern. Cross sections of the vessels show no

significant atherosclerosis. The myocardium is homogenous, red-brown, and firm. The valve leaflets are thin and mobile. The walls of the left and right ventricles are 1.5 and 0.4 cm thick, respectively. The endocardium is smooth and glistening. The aorta gives rise to three intact and patent arch vessels. The renal and mesenteric vessels are unremarkable.

LIVER & BILIARY SYSTEM:
The 1450 gm liver has an intact, smooth capsule and a sharp anterior border. The parenchyma is tan-brown and congested, with the usual lobular architecture. No mass lesions or other abnormalities are seen. The gallbladder contains 3 ml of green-black bile and no stones. The mucosal surface is green and velvety. The extrahepatic biliary tree is patent.

SPLEEN:
The 130 gm spleen has a smooth, intact, red-purple capsule. The parenchyma is maroon and diffluent.

PANCREAS:
The pancreas is soft and yellow-tan, with the usual lobular architecture. No mass lesions or other abnormalities are seen.

ADRENALS:
The right and left adrenal glands are symmetric, with bright yellow cortices and grey medullae. No masses or areas of hemorrhage are identified.

GENITOURINARY SYSTEM:
The right and left kidneys weigh 148 and 145 gms, respectively. The external surfaces are intact and smooth. The cut surfaces are red-tan and congested, with uniformly thick cortices and sharp corticomedullary junctions. The pelves are unremarkable and the ureters are normal in course and caliber. White bladder mucosa overlies an intact bladder wall. The bladder contains 25 ml of bloody urine. The prostate is normal in size, with lobular, yellow-tan parenchyma. The seminal vesicles are unremarkable. The testes are free of mass lesions or contusions. There is a fluid filled sac around the right testis.

GASTROINTESTINAL TRACT:
The esophagus is intact and lined by smooth, grey-white mucosa. The stomach contains approximately 150 cc of brown, partially digested food particles. The gastric wall is intact. The duodenum, loops of small bowel, and colon are unremarkable. The appendix is present. There is a 0.5 cm in diameter accessory spleen on the tip of the appendix.

MUSCULOSKELETAL SYSTEM
Muscle development is normal. No additional bone or joint abnormalities are noted. There is no soft tissue hemorrhage or injury of the chest, back, abdomen or extremities.

ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES

- Documentary photographs are taken by (b)(6)
- Evidence collected is seized by NCIS (b)(6)
- Specimens retained for toxicologic testing and/or DNA identification are: vitreous, central blood, peripheral blood, urine, spleen, kidney, lung, liver, brain, bile, gastric contents, adipose, and psoas muscle
- The dissected organs are forwarded with body

MICROSCOPIC EXAMINATION

1. Heart: Section of left ventricle is unremarkable.

2. Spleen: Autolysis, otherwise unremarkable.

3. Kidney: Autolysis of the proximal tubules with relative preservation of the glomeruli and distal collecting system. Multi-focal clacifications of the distal tubules.

4. Brain: Section of hippocampus is unremarkable.

5. Lungs: Congestion with intralveolar fluid and postmortem bacterial colonization.

6. Liver: No pathologic description.

7. Adrenal: No pathologic description.

8. Testis: No pathologic description.

9. Thyroid: Two foci of chronic inflammation, otherwise unremarkable.

10. Scalp: This specimen was reviewed in consultation with the Department of Dermatopathology. Microscopic sections and gross photographs were examined. The clinical images are suggestive of possible tinea capitis vs. other types of dermatitis such as seborrheic dermatitis and psoriasis. While tinea is favored, the only fungal elements identified are occasional pityrosporum.

TOXICOLOGY

1. Carbon Monoxide: The carboxyhemoglobin was less than 1% (normal 0-3%).

2. Ethanol: The blood and vitreous fluid were negative for ethanol at a cutoff of 20 mg/dL.

3. Cyanide: The blood was negative for cyanide at a cutoff of 0.25mg/L.

4. The blood was negative for screened medications and drugs of abuse.

OPINION

This 37 year-old detainee died of hanging. He was found hanging in his secure cell. Toxicology studies are negative. Based on the investigative information as of this date, there is no evidence of anyone else being involved with this death. Unusual tardieu-like spots on the legs and thighs may represent post-mortem artifact. The medical record from the time of resuscitation documents that a tooth broke during an intubation attempt. Also based on the medical documentation of the remains during the attempted resuscitation, the decedent had been dead for at least a couple of hours prior to the discovery of his body. Based on currently available information, the manner of death is suicide.

(b)(6)

Medical Examiner

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY
WASHINGTON, DC 20306-6000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFIP (b)(6)

TO:

OFFICE OF THE ARMED FORCES MEDICAL EXAMINER
ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY
WASHINGTON, DC 20306-6000

PATIENT IDENTIFICATION

AFIP Accessions Number	**Sequence**
(b)(6)	(b)(6)

Name
AHMED, ALI ABDULLAH

SSAN: **Autopsy:** (b)(6)
Toxicology Accession #: (b)(6)
Date Report Generated: June 16, 2006

CONSULTATION REPORT ON CONTRIBUTOR MATERIAL

AFIP DIAGNOSIS **REPORT OF TOXICOLOGICAL EXAMINATION**

Condition of Specimens: GOOD
Date of Incident: 6/10/2006 **Date Received:** 6/12/2006

CARBON MONOXIDE: The carboxyhemoglobin saturation in the blood was less than 1% as determined by spectrophotometry with a limit of quantitation of 1%. Carboxyhemoglobin saturations of 0-3% are expected for non-smokers and 3-10% for smokers. Saturations above 10% are considered elevated and are confirmed by gas chromatography.

VOLATILES: The **PERIPHERAL BLOOD AND VITREOUS FLUID** were examined for the presence of ethanol at a cutoff of 20 mg/dL. No ethanol was detected.

CYANIDE: There was no cyanide detected in the blood. The limit of quantitation for cyanide is 0.25 mg/L. Normal blood cyanide concentrations are less than 0.15 mg/L. Lethal concentrations of cyanide are greater than 3 mg/L.

DRUGS: The **BLOOD** was screened for acetaminophen, amphetamine, antidepressants, antihistamines, barbiturates, benzodiazepines, cannabinoids, chloroquine, mefloquine, cocaine, dextromethorphan, lidocaine, narcotic analgesics, opiates, phencyclidine, phenothiazines, salicylates, sympathomimetic amines and verapamil by gas chromatography, color test or immunoassay. The following drugs were detected:

None were found.

(b)(6)
Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner

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Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner

CERTIFICATE OF DEATH *(OVERSEAS)*
Acte dé décès (D'Outre-Mer)

NAME OF DECEASED *(Last First Middle)* Nom du décédé (Nom et prénoms) BTB AHMED, ALI ABDULLAH.	GRADE Grade	BRANCH OF SERVICE Arme Civilian	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER Numéro de l'Assurance Social (b)(6) 000693DP
ORGANIZATION Organisation	NATION *(e.g. United States)* Pays Yemen	DATE OF BIRTH Date de naissance 9 March 1969	SEX Sexe ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

RACE Race	MARITAL STATUS État Civil	RELIGION Culte
☐ CAUCASOID Caucasique	☐ SINGLE Célibataire	☐ PROTESTANT Protestant
☐ NEGROID Négroide	☐ MARRIED Marié	☐ CATHOLIC Catholique
X OTHER (Specify) Autre (Spécifier)	☐ WIDOWED Veuf	☐ JEWISH Juif
	☐ DIVORCED Divorcé	X OTHER (Specify) Autre (Spécifier) Muslim
	☐ SEPARATED Séparé	

NAME OF NEXT OF KIN Nom du plus proche parent	RELATIONSHIP TO DECEASED Parenté du décédé avec le sus
STREET ADDRESS Domicilé à (Rue)	CITY OR TOWN OR STATE *(Include ZIP Code)* Ville (Code postal compris)

MEDICAL STATEMENT Déclaration médicale

CAUSE OF DEATH *(Enter only one cause per line)* Cause du décès (N'indiquer qu'une cause par ligne)		INTERVAL BETWEEN ONSET AND DEATH Intervalle entre l'attaque et le décès
DISEASE OR CONDITON DIRECTLY LEADING TO DEATH[1] Maladie ou condition directement responsable de la mort[3]	Hanging	Minutes
ANTECEDENT CAUSES / Symptômes précurseurs de la mort — MORBID CONDITION, IF ANY, LEADING TO PRIMARY CAUSE Condition morbide, s'il y a lieu, menant à la cause primaire		
ANTECEDENT CAUSES / Symptômes précurseurs de la mort — UNDERLYING CAUSE, IF ANY, GIVING RISE TO PRIMARY CAUSE Condition morbide, s'il y a lieu, menant à la cause primaire		
OTHER SIGNIFICANT CONDITIONS[2] Autres conditions significatives[4]		

MODE OF DEATH Condition de décès	AUTOPSY PERFORMED Autopsie effectuée ☒ YES Oui ☐ NO Non	CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING DEATH DUE TO EXTERNAL CAUSES Circonstances de la mort suscitées par des causes extérieures
☐ NATURAL Mort naturelle	MAJOR FINDINGS OF AUTOPSY Conclusions principales de l'autopsie	
☐ ACCIDENT Mort accidentelle		
X SUICIDE Suicide	NAME OF PATHOLOGIST (b)(6)	
☐ HOMICIDE Homicide	DATE Date 11 June 2006	AVIATION ACCIDENT Accident à Avion ☐ YES Oui ☒ NO Non
DATE OF DEATH (day, Date de décès (le jour, le mois, l'année) 10 June 2006	PLACE OF DEATH Lieu de décès Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility Cuba	

I HAVE VIEWED THE REMAINS OF THE DECEASED AND DEATH OCCURRED AT THE TIME INDICATED AND FROM THE CAUSES AS STATED ABOVE
J'ai examiné les restes mortels du défunte: le conclus que le décès est survenu à l'heure indiquée et à la suite des causes énumérées ci-dessus.

NAME OF MEDICAL OFFICER Nom du médecin militaire ou du médecin sanitaire (b)(6)	TITLE OR DEGREE Titre ou diplôme (b)(6) Medical Examiner
GRADE Grade (b)(6)	INSTALLATION OR ADDRESS Installation ou adresse Rockville, MD
DATE Date 1 AUG 06	SIGNATURE (b)(6)

[1] State disease, injury or complication which caused deat…
[2] State conditions contributing to the death, but not relate…
[3] Préciser la nature de la maladie, de la blessure ou de la complication qui a contribué à la mort, mais non la manière de mourir, telle qu'un arrêt du coeur, etc.
[4] Préciser la condition qui a contribué à la mort, mais n'ayant aucun rapport avec la maladie ou à la condition qui a provoqué la mort.

DD FORM 1 APR 77 **2064** REPLACES DA FORM 3565, 1 JAN 72 AND DA FORM 3565-R(PAS), 25 SEP 75, WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY
Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner
1413 Research Blvd., Bldg. 102
Rockville, MD 20850
1-301-319-0000

FINAL AUTOPSY REPORT

Name: Alutaybi, Mani Shaman, Turki
Detainee Number: (b)(6) 000588DP
Date of Birth: 01 January 1976
Date of Death: 10 June 2006

Date of Autopsy: 11 June 2006 @ 1100
Date of Report: 31 July 2006

Autopsy No.: (b)(6)
AFIP No.: (b)(6)
Rank: Detainee
Place of Death: Detention Facility, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Place of Autopsy: Naval Hospital Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

Circumstances of Death: This 30 year-old detainee was found hanging in his secured cell at the detainee confinement facility at approximately 0020 on 10 June 2006. A suicide note was found in his pocket. By report, he was found with his legs and hands loosely bound, and a mask like material covering his face. Medical resuscitation was unsuccessful and he was declared dead at 0115. In the medical record it states he was unresponsive, pulse-less, apneic, with fixed and dilated pupils, and in rigor mortis when he arrived at the detention clinic at 0053.

The medical history is remarkable for a "donkey-kick" to the chest several years before he was placed into detention. This injury resulted several broken ribs.

Authorization for Autopsy: Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, IAW 10 USC 1471

Identification: Detention records, Fingerprints and DNA sample obtained.

Personnel present for the autopsy:

1. Special Agent (b)(6) Naval Criminal Investigative Service
2. (b)(6) Autopsy Assistant
3. (b)(6) Medical Photographer
4. (b)(6) Medical Examiner Investigator
5. (b)(6) Medical Examiner (b)(6) civilian observer

CAUSE OF DEATH: Hanging

MANNER OF DEATH: Suicide

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Final Autopsy Diagnoses

I. Hanging
   A. Circumferential dried abrasion collar around the neck
   B. Soft tissue of the neck free of hemorrhage

II. Additional Injuries -- Abrasion, left elbow

II. Natural disease processes/findings - None

III. Toxicology -- Negative

EXTERNAL EXAMINATION

The body, received wrapped in sheet, is that of a well-developed, well-nourished appearing, muscular, 67 ½ inches in length, 119 pounds (per medical record as of 06 June 2006), white male whose appearance is consistent with the reported age of 30 years. Lividity is posterior and fixed, rigor is no longer present, and the temperature is that the refrigeration unit (34-39 degrees Fahrenheit).

The head and neck are wrapped with a blue plastic pad secured with tape. The scalp is covered with black hair in a normal distribution. The irides are brown. The sclerae and conjunctivae are congested and free of petechiae. The external auditory canals are unremarkable. The ears are unremarkable. The nares are patent and the lips are atraumatic. The nose and maxillae are palpably stable. The teeth appear in good condition. Facial hair consists of a full beard and mustache.

The neck is straight, and the trachea is midline and mobile. The chest is symmetric and flat to concave. The abdomen is flat. The genitalia are those of a normal adult circumcised male. The testes are descended and free of masses. The pubic hair is shaved. The buttocks and anus are unremarkable.

The upper and lower extremities are symmetric and without clubbing or edema. On the dorsum of the right hand is a ½ x up to ¼ inch scar. There three healing eschars on the posterior-lateral side of the lower left leg. There are 1 ¼ x 1 inch scars on the anterior left and right legs. On the right knee is a ½ inch scar. The hands and feet are bound with surgical towels and secured with string.

CLOTHING AND PERSONAL EFFECTS

The following clothing items and personal effects are present on the body at the time of autopsy:

- Khaki colored short sleeve pull over shirt
- Khaki colored pants

MEDICAL INTERVENTION

Evidence of medical intervention includes:

- Intravenous catheter with attached tubing bag of intravenous solution, inserted into the left antecubital fossa
- Defibrillator pads on the upper right and lower left chest.
- Multiple electrocardiogram pads on the chest and abdomen
- Identification tags tied to the right wrist and right great toe

RADIOGRAPHS

A complete set of postmortem radiographs is obtained and are consistent the findings described below.

EVIDENCE OF INJURY

The ordering of the following injuries is for descriptive purposes only, and is not intended to imply order of infliction or relative severity. All wound pathways are given relative to standard anatomic position.

Evidence of Hanging

There is a dried abrasion furrow around the neck. The furrow is regular with the width varying from 1/4 to ½ inch. Within the furrow the skin is imprinted with a very fine weave type pattern. The furrow is located 11 ½ inches below the top of the head and over the lower margin of the thyroid cartilage at the anterior midline; 9 inches below the top of the head at the level of the left auditory meatus; and 9 inches below the top of the head at the level of the right auditory meatus. The furrow angles upward on the back of the neck and forms an inverted "v" with the apex 6 ¼ inches from the top of the head. On the left side of the front of the neck the furrow becomes faint and round with a 1 inch diameter. On the front of the neck, 1/4 inch inferior to the abrasion furrow is a 2-inch horizontal, linear area of hypopigmentation. Along the superior border of the furrow, over the thyroid cartilage, there are two, 1/8 inch in diameter, superficial skin defects that represent skin cuts during the shaving of the neck for documentation of the furrow. Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) Agents present several pieces of material that were recovered from the floor of the cell of the decedent. Three are braided white cotton-like material. One of these has a loop at one end and the other is cut. The second has two cut ends. A third has a loop at one end and a knot at the other end. There are also two white cotton-like material portions consistent with a T-shirt. Both have been cut or torn and each has two knots. Additionally submitted are several strips of white cotton-like material consistent with a bedsheet that have knots and have been tied together. The evidence is minimally handled, photographed and returned to NCIS.

By layer dissection, there is no hemorrhage into the soft tissue of the anterior or posterior neck.

Additional Injuries

There is a ¼ inch abrasion on the left elbow.

INTERNAL EXAMINATION

HEAD:
The galeal and subgaleal soft tissues of the scalp are free of injury. The calvarium is intact, as is the dura mater beneath it. Clear cerebrospinal fluid surrounds the 1500 gm brain, which has unremarkable gyri and sulci. Coronal sections demonstrate sharp demarcation between white and grey matter, without hemorrhage or contusive injury. The ventricles are of normal size. The basal ganglia, brainstem, cerebellum, and arterial systems are free of injury or other abnormalities. There are no skull fractures. The atlanto-occipital joint is stable.

NECK:
The anterior strap muscles of the neck are homogenous and red-brown, without abnormalities. The thyroid cartilage and hyoid are intact. There is dark colored area, ¾ x ½ inch, involving the right side of the thyroid cartilage that extends through the cartilage. The larynx is lined by intact white mucosa. The thyroid is symmetric and red-brown, without cystic or nodular change. The tongue is free of bite marks, hemorrhage, or other injuries.

BODY CAVITIES:
The ribs, sternum, and vertebral bodies are visibly and palpably intact. No excess fluid is in the right pleural, pericardial, or peritoneal cavities. The organs occupy their usual anatomic positions.

RESPIRATORY SYSTEM:
The right and left lungs each weigh 650. The external surfaces are smooth and deep red-purple. The pulmonary parenchyma is diffusely congested and edematous. No mass lesions or areas of consolidation are present.

CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM:
The 250 gm heart is contained in an intact pericardial sac. The epicardial surface is smooth, with minimal fat investment. The coronary arteries are present in a normal distribution, with a right-dominant pattern. Cross sections of the vessels show no significant atherosclerosis. The myocardium is homogenous, red-brown, and firm. The valve leaflets are thin and mobile. The walls of the left and right ventricles are 1.1 and 0.3 cm thick, respectively. The endocardium is smooth and glistening. The aorta gives rise to three intact and patent arch vessels. The renal and mesenteric vessels are unremarkable.

LIVER & BILIARY SYSTEM:
The 1150 gm liver has an intact, smooth capsule and a sharp anterior border. The parenchyma is tan-brown and congested, with the usual lobular architecture. No mass lesions or other abnormalities are seen. The gallbladder is empty. The mucosal surface is green and velvety. The extrahepatic biliary tree is patent.

SPLEEN:
The 145 gm spleen has a smooth, intact, red-purple capsule. The parenchyma is maroon and diffluent.

PANCREAS:
The pancreas is soft and yellow-tan, with the usual lobular architecture. No mass lesions or other abnormalities are seen.

ADRENALS:
The right and left adrenal glands are symmetric, with bright yellow cortices and grey medullae. No masses or areas of hemorrhage are identified.

GENITOURINARY SYSTEM:

The right and left kidneys weigh 130 and 150 gms, respectively. The external surfaces are intact and smooth. The cut surfaces are red-tan and congested, with uniformly thick cortices and sharp corticomedullary junctions. The pelves are unremarkable and the ureters are normal in course and caliber. White bladder mucosa overlies an intact bladder wall. The bladder contains 50 ml of clear yellow urine. The prostate is normal in size, with lobular, yellow-tan parenchyma. The seminal vesicles are unremarkable. The testes are free of mass lesions, contusions, or other abnormalities.

GASTROINTESTINAL TRACT:

The esophagus is intact and lined by smooth, grey-white mucosa. The stomach contains approximately 500 cc of brown, partially digested food particles including white and green vegetable material. The gastric wall is intact. The duodenum, loops of small bowel, and colon are unremarkable. The appendix is present.

MUSCULOSKELETAL SYSTEM

Muscle development is normal. No bone or joint abnormalities are noted. There is no soft tissue hemorrhage or injury of the chest, back, abdomen or extremities.

ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES

- Documentary photographs are taken by (b)(6)
- Evidence collected is seized by NCIS agent (b)(6)
- Specimens retained for toxicologic testing and/or DNA identification are: vitreous, central blood, peripheral blood, urine, spleen, kidney, lung, liver, brain, gastric contents, adipose, and psoas muscle
- The dissected organs are forwarded with body

MICROSCOPIC EXAMINATION

1. Thyroid cartilage - Reviewed in consultation with the department of Head and Neck Pathology. A section of the thyroid cartilage from the area that grossly appeared discolored is histologically normal. There is no hemorrhage on the surface or in the cartilage. Head and Neck pathology opines that the gross impression does not relate to any abnormality.

2. Liver: No pathologic description

3. Heart: No pathologic description

4. Kidney: Autolysis of the proximal tubules with relative preservative of the glomeruli and distal collecting system. Otherwise, no pathologic description.

5. Lung: Airspace edema fluid, bacterial overgrowth and focal fibrosis

6. Testis: No pathologic description

7. Spleen: No pathologic description

8. Adrenal: No pathologic description

9. Brain (Cortex): No pathologic description

10. Thyroid: No pathologic description

TOXICOLOGY

1. The blood carboxyhemoglobin level was less than 1% (normal 0-3%)
2. The blood and vitreous fluid were negative for ethanol at a cutoff of 20 mg/dL
3. The blood was negative for cyanide at a cutoff of 0.25 mg/L
4. The urine was negative screened medications and drugs of abuse

OPINION

This 30 year-old detainee died of hanging. By report, he was discovered in his secure cell suspended by the neck by braided segments of material. The description of the body during the attempted resuscitation indicates that the death occurred at least a couple of hours before he was discovered. The toxicology screen was negative. Based on the information available at this time, the manner of death is Suicide.

(b)(6)

(b)(6) Medical Examiner

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY
WASHINGTON, DC 20306-6000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFIP (b)(6)

PATIENT IDENTIFICATION
AFIP Accessions Number (b)(6) **Sequence** (b)(6)
Name
ALUTAYBI, MANI SHAMANI
SSAN: **Autopsy:** (b)(6)
Toxicology Accession #: (b)(6)
Date Report Generated: June 19, 2006

TO:

OFFICE OF THE ARMED FORCES MEDICAL EXAMINER
ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY
WASHINGTON, DC 20306-6000

CONSULTATION REPORT ON CONTRIBUTOR MATERIAL

AFIP DIAGNOSIS **REPORT OF TOXICOLOGICAL EXAMINATION**

Condition of Specimens: GOOD
Date of Incident: 6/10/2006 **Date Received:** 6/12/2006

CARBON MONOXIDE: The carboxyhemoglobin saturation in the blood was less than 1% as determined by spectrophotometry with a limit of quantitation of 1%. Carboxyhemoglobin saturations of 0-3% are expected for non-smokers and 3-10% for smokers. Saturations above 10% are considered elevated and are confirmed by gas chromatography.

VOLATILES: The **BLOOD AND VITREOUS FLUID** were examined for the presence of ethanol at a cutoff of 20 mg/dL. No ethanol was detected.

CYANIDE: There was no cyanide detected in the blood. The limit of quantitation for cyanide is 0.25 mg/L. Normal blood cyanide concentrations are less than 0.15 mg/L. Lethal concentrations of cyanide are greater than 3 mg/L.

DRUGS: The **URINE** was screened for acetaminophen, amphetamine, antidepressants, antihistamines, barbiturates, benzodiazepines, cannabinoids, chloroquine, cocaine, dextromethorphan, lidocaine, narcotic analgesics, opiates, phencyclidine, phenothiazines, salicylates, sympathomimetic amines and verapamil by gas chromatography, color test or immunoassay. The following drugs were detected:

None were found.

(b)(6)
Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner

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ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY
Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner
1413 Research Blvd., Bldg. 102
Rockville, MD 20850
1-301-319-0000

FINAL AUTOPSY REPORT

Name: Al Zahrani, Yasir T.
Detainee Number: (b)(6) 000093DP
Date of Birth: 22 December 1984
Date of Death: 10 June 2006
Date of Autopsy: 10 June 2006 @ 1830
Date of Report: 02 August 2006

Autopsy No.: (b)(6)
AFIP No.: (b)(6)
Rank: Detainee
Place of Death: Detainee Facility, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Place of Autopsy: Naval Hospital Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

Circumstances of Death: This 21 year-old detainee, by report, was found hanging in his secure cell at the detainee confinement facility at approximately 0020 on 10 June 2006. Medical resuscitation was unsuccessful and he was declared dead at 0150. In the medical record it states he was unresponsive, pulse-less, apneic, with fixed and dilated pupils, and in rigor mortis when he arrived at the detention clinic at 0048.

Authorization for Autopsy: Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, IAW 10 USC 1471

Identification: Detention records. Fingerprints and DNA sample obtained.

Personnel present for the autopsy:

1. Special Agent (b)(6) Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS)
2. (b)(6) Autopsy Assistant
3. (b)(6) Medical Photographer
4. (b)(6) Medical Examiner Investigator
5. (b)(6) Medical Examiner (b)(6) civilian observer

CAUSE OF DEATH: Hanging

MANNER OF DEATH: Suicide

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Final Anatomic Diagnoses

I. Hanging
    A. Circumferential dried abrasion collar around the neck
    B. Diffuse hemorrhage into the muscles of the neck
    C. Hyoid bone intact
    D. Tardieu spots on the dorsum of the feet

II. Hands and feet bound by cotton-like material

III. Soft tissue hemorrhage lateral left wrist

III. No significant natural disease processes identified

IV. Status Post attempted resuscitation with intubation and cricoid pressure.

IV. Toxicology –Negative

EXTERNAL EXAMINATION

The body, received wrapped in a white sheet, is that of a well-developed, well-nourished appearing, muscular, 67 inches in length, 151 pound (per medical record as of 21 May 2006), white male whose appearance is consistent with the reported age of 21 years. Lividity is posterior and fixed, rigor is equal and fixed in all extremities, and the temperature is that of the refrigeration unit (34-39 degrees Fahrenheit).

The head and neck are wrapped with a blue plastic pad secured with tape. The scalp is covered with black hair in a normal distribution. The irides are brown. The sclerae and conjunctivae are congested and free of petechiae. The external auditory canals are unremarkable. The ears are unremarkable. The nares are patent and the lips are atraumatic. The nose and maxillae are palpably stable. The teeth appear in good condition. Facial hair consists of a full beard and mustache.

The neck is straight, and the trachea is midline and mobile. The chest is symmetric. The abdomen is flat. The genitalia are those of a normal adult circumcised male. The testes are descended and free of masses. Pubic hair is present in a normal distribution. The buttocks and anus are unremarkable.

The upper and lower extremities are symmetric and without clubbing or edema. Strips of bed-sheet-like material tied into knots loosely bind the hands and feet. SA (b)(6) has taken these bindings into custody. There are two round scars, 1 inch and ¾ inch in diameter on the back of the right leg. There is another ½ x ¾ inch scar proximal to the round scars on the leg. There is a ¼ inch scar on the back of the left thigh.

CLOTHING AND PERSONAL EFFECTS

The following clothing items and personal effects are present on the body at the time of autopsy:

None

MEDICAL INTERVENTION

Evidence of medical intervention includes:

- Nasal Airway
- Oral-gastric tube, appropriately located
- Orally placed endotracheal tube, appropriately located
- Intravenous catheter with attached tubing bag of intravenous solution, left antecubital fossa
- Urinary bladder catheter and attached bag
- Multiple electrocardiogram pads on the chest
- Puncture marks, left forearm and left and right antecubital fossae

RADIOGRAPHS

A complete set of postmortem radiographs is obtained and are consistent with the findings described below.

EVIDENCE OF INJURY

The ordering of the following injuries is for descriptive purposes only, and is not intended to imply order of infliction or relative severity. All wound pathways are given relative to standard anatomic position.

Evidence of Hanging

There is a circumferential dried abrasion furrow around the neck. The furrow is irregular with the width varying from 1/8 to 1 inch. Within the furrow the skin is imprinted with a very fine weave type pattern. The furrow is located 11 ½ inches below the top of the head at the anterior midline, 10 inches below the top of the head at the level of the left auditory meatus, and 10 inches below the top of the head at the level of the right auditory meatus. The anterior portion of the furrow is located below the thyroid cartilage. The furrow becomes less well defined and forms an inverted "v" on the back of the head, 5 ¾ inches below the top of the head and 1 inch to the left of the posterior midline. On the left side of the anterior neck there are additional well-defined and superficial abrasions adjacent to the main furrow, 1/8 to 1¼ inches in length. Encircling the neck are two segments of cotton-like material consistent with a T-shirt. The material has been cut or torn and tied with knots. Distal to the knots there are strips of material that have been cut leaving four loose ends per piece of material. SA (b)(6) has taken the material into custody.

Additional items are submitted by NCIS that were recovered from the cell of the decedent. Included are three segments of braided white t-shirt like material. One has a knot at one end and the other end is cut. The material is cut through two segments of the braiding near the knotted end. There is smaller loop of the same material tied with a knot and looped around the first segment. The third portion of braided material has one end cut and the other end is a loop that is secured by similar material wrapped around the two braided segments. Also submitted is another portion of white t-shirt like material that has been cut or torn into an elongated segment. The material is tied with a knot leaving two loose ends.

Internally, there are multiple hemorrhages throughout the anterior neck soft tissue:

1. Medial right sternocleidomastoid muscle, 1 x ¼ inch
2. Deep right sternocleidomastoid muscle, ¾ x ¼ inch
3. Anterior left sternocleidomastoid muscle, (2) each ½ inch in diameter
4. Deep left sternocleidomastoid muscle, ½ x ¼ inch
5. Left sternothyroid muscle, ¼ x ¼ inch
6. Left thyrohyoid membrane, ½ x 3/8 inches
7. Left longus capitus muscle, ¼ x ¼ inch

The posterior neck is free of hemorrhage into the soft tissue.

There are faint tardieu spots on the ankles and dorsal surface of the feet.

Additional Injuries

There is a 1 ½ x ½ inch area of soft tissue hemorrhage in the subcutaneous tissue of the lateral aspect of the left wrist (in the anatomic position).

INTERNAL EXAMINATION

HEAD:
The galeal and subgaleal soft tissues of the scalp are free of injury. The calvarium is intact, as is the dura mater beneath it. Clear cerebrospinal fluid surrounds the 1300 gm brain, which has unremarkable gyri and sulci. Coronal sections demonstrate sharp demarcation between white and grey matter, without hemorrhage or contusive injury. The ventricles are of normal size. The basal ganglia, brainstem, cerebellum, and arterial systems are free of injury or other abnormalities. There are no skull fractures. The atlanto-occipital joint is stable.

NECK:
Injuries of the anterior strap muscles have been described. The thyroid cartilage and hyoid are intact. The larynx is lined by intact white mucosa. The thyroid is symmetric and red-brown, without cystic or nodular change. The tongue is free of bite marks, hemorrhage, or other injuries.

BODY CAVITIES:
The ribs, sternum, and vertebral bodies are visibly and palpably intact. No excess fluid is in the pleural, pericardial, or peritoneal cavities. The organs occupy their usual anatomic positions.

RESPIRATORY SYSTEM:
The right and left lungs weigh 600 and 700 gms, respectively. The external surfaces are smooth and deep red-purple. The pulmonary parenchyma is diffusely congested and edematous. No mass lesions or areas of consolidation are present.

CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM:
The 230 gm heart is contained in an intact pericardial sac. The epicardial surface is smooth, with minimal fat investment. The ostium for the left anterior descending coronary artery and circumflex artery arise separately from the left coronary cusp; there is no left main coronary artery. The right coronary artery arises normally and is the dominant artery to the posterior myocardium. Cross sections of the vessels show no significant atherosclerosis. The myocardium is homogenous, red-brown, and firm. The valve leaflets are thin and mobile. The walls of the left and right ventricles are 1.2 and 0.3 cm thick, respectively. The endocardium is smooth and glistening. The aorta gives

rise to three intact and patent arch vessels. The renal and mesenteric vessels are unremarkable.

LIVER & BILIARY SYSTEM:
The 1300 gm liver has an intact, smooth capsule and a sharp anterior border. The parenchyma is tan-brown and congested, with the usual lobular architecture. No mass lesions or other abnormalities are seen. The gallbladder contains 3 ml of green-black bile and no stones. The mucosal surface is green and velvety. The extrahepatic biliary tree is patent.

SPLEEN:
The 215 gm spleen has a smooth, intact, red-purple capsule. The parenchyma is maroon and congested, with indistinct Malpighian corpuscles.

PANCREAS:
The pancreas is soft and yellow-tan, with the usual lobular architecture. No mass lesions or other abnormalities are seen.

ADRENALS:
The right and left adrenal glands are symmetric, with bright yellow cortices and grey medullae. No masses or areas of hemorrhage are identified.

GENITOURINARY SYSTEM:
The right and left kidneys weigh 128 and 120 gms, respectively. The external surfaces are intact and smooth. The cut surfaces are red-tan and congested, with uniformly thick cortices and sharp corticomedullary junctions. The pelves are unremarkable and the ureters are normal in course and caliber. White bladder mucosa overlies an intact bladder wall. The bladder is empty. Twenty-five ml of urine is recovered from the urinary catheter/bag. The prostate is normal in size, with lobular, yellow-tan parenchyma. The seminal vesicles are unremarkable. The testes are free of mass lesions, contusions, or other abnormalities.

GASTROINTESTINAL TRACT:
The esophagus is intact and lined by smooth, grey-white mucosa. The stomach contains approximately 150 cc of brown, partially digested food particles. The gastric wall is intact. The duodenum, loops of small bowel and colon are unremarkable. The appendix is present.

MUSCULOSKELETAL SYSTEM
Muscle development is normal. No non-traumatic bone or joint abnormalities are noted.

ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES

- Documentary photographs are taken by (b)(6)
- Evidence collected is seized by NCIS agent (b)(6)
- Specimens retained for toxicologic testing and/or DNA identification are: vitreous, central blood, peripheral blood, urine, spleen, kidney, lung, liver, brain, bile, gastric contents, adipose, and psoas muscle
- The dissected organs are forwarded with body

MICROSCOPIC EXAMINATION

1. Skin, dorsum of left foot: In the area corresponding to one of the grossly described tardieu spots, there is hemorrhage surrounding the superficial blood vessels without inflammation.

2. Kidney – Reviewed in consultation with The Department of Renal Pathology. There is autolysis of the proximal tubules with relative preservation of the glomeruli and distal collecting system. Adjacent to several glomeruli are collections of micro calcifications in the tubular lumens of uncertain etiology. There is also tubular simplification of the glomeruli with mild increase in the mesangial matrix. There is no significant inflammation or other abnormalities.

3. Heart: Section of left ventricle is unremarkable.

4. Spleen: Autolysis, otherwise unremarkable.

5. Lung: No pathologic description.

6. Liver: Focal centrilobular steatosis. No significant portal or parenchymal inflammation.

7. Brain, cerebral cortex: No pathologic description.

8. Thyroid: Autolysis

9. Adrenal: No pathologic description. Majority of tissue is unremarkable cortex with a single focus of medulla.

10. Testis: No pathologic description.

TOXICOLOGY

1. Carbon Monoxide: The blood carboxyhemoglobin was less than 1% (normal 0-3%).
2. Ethanol: The blood and vitreous were negative for ethanol at a cutoff of 20 mg/dL.
3. Cyanide: There was no cyanide detected in the blood.
4. The urine was negative for screened medications and drugs of abuse.

OPINION

This 21 year-old detainee died of hanging. The decedent was discovered hanging from a braided ligature tied through the steel mesh wall near the ceiling of his cell. According to reports, he was found with his hands and feet loosely bound by bed-sheet like material. A suicide note was found in his pocket. Hemorrhage in the left wrist may be the result of the standard operating procedure to shackle prisoners anytime they leave their cells. Hemorrhage into the neck muscles may be the result of the hanging or an artifact of cricoid pressure applied in the effort to intubate the decedent during the resuscitation attempt. Calcifications seen in kidneys are of uncertain etiology but did not contribute to the cause or manner of death. Toxicology studies were negative. After an extensive investigation there is no evidence to suggest that anyone else was involved in this death. Based on the information available, the manner of death is suicide.

(b)(6)

(b)(6) Medical Examiner

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY
WASHINGTON, DC 20306-6000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFIP(b)(6)

PATIENT IDENTIFICATION
AFIP Accessions Number (b)(6) **Sequence** (b)(6)

TO:

OFFICE OF THE ARMED FORCES MEDICAL EXAMINER
ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY
WASHINGTON, DC 20306-6000

Name
ALZAHRANI, YASIR TALA

SSAN: **Autopsy:** (b)(6)
Toxicology Accession #: (b)(6)
Date Report Generated: June 19, 2006

CONSULTATION REPORT ON CONTRIBUTOR MATERIAL

AFIP DIAGNOSIS **REPORT OF TOXICOLOGICAL EXAMINATION**

Condition of Specimens: GOOD
Date of Incident: 6/10/2006 **Date Received:** 6/12/2006

CARBON MONOXIDE: The carboxyhemoglobin saturation in the blood was less than 1% as determined by spectrophotometry with a limit of quantitation of 1%. Carboxyhemoglobin saturations of 0-3% are expected for non-smokers and 3-10% for smokers. Saturations above 10% are considered elevated and are confirmed by gas chromatography.

VOLATILES: The **BLOOD AND VITREOUS FLUID** were examined for the presence of ethanol at a cutoff of 20 mg/dL. No ethanol was detected.

CYANIDE: There was no cyanide detected in the blood. The limit of quantitation for cyanide is 0.25 mg/L. Normal blood cyanide concentrations are less than 0.15 mg/L. Lethal concentrations of cyanide are greater than 3 mg/L.

DRUGS: The **URINE** was screened for acetaminophen, amphetamine, antidepressants, antihistamines, barbiturates, benzodiazepines, cannabinoids, chloroquine, cocaine, dextromethorphan, lidocaine, narcotic analgesics, opiates, phencyclidine, phenothiazines, salicylates, sympathomimetic amines and verapamil by gas chromatography, color test or immunoassay. The following drugs were detected:

None were found.

(b)(6)
Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner

(b)(6)
Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner

CERTIFICATE OF DEATH *(OVERSEAS)*
Acte de décès (D'Outre-Mer)

NAME OF DECEASED *(Last, First, Middle)* Nom du décédé (Nom et prénoms): BTB ALZAHRANI, YASIR TALAL, ABDALI

GRADE Grade:

BRANCH OF SERVICE Arme: Civilian

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER Numéro de l'Assurance Social: (b)(6) 00093DP

ORGANIZATION Organisation:

NATION *(e.g. United States)* Pays: Saudi Arabia

DATE OF BIRTH Date de naissance: 22 September 1984

SEX Sexe: ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

RACE Race		MARITAL STATUS État Civil				RELIGION Culte		
☐	CAUCASOID Caucasique	☐	SINGLE Célibataire	☐	DIVORCED Divorcé	☐	PROTESTANT Protestant	X OTHER (Specify) Autre (Spécifier): Muslim
☐	NEGROID Negroïde	☐	MARRIED Marié	☐	SEPARATED Separé	☐	CATHOLIC Catholique	
X	OTHER (Specify) Autre (Spécifier): Saudi Arabia	☐	WIDOWED Veuf			☐	JEWISH Juif	

NAME OF NEXT OF KIN Nom du plus proche parent:

RELATIONSHIP TO DECEASED Parenté du décédé avec le sus:

STREET ADDRESS Domicile à (Rue):

CITY OR TOWN OR STATE *(include ZIP Code)* Ville (Code postal compris):

MEDICAL STATEMENT Déclaration médicale

CAUSE OF DEATH (Enter only one cause per line) Cause du décès (N'indiquer qu'une cause par ligne)		INTERVAL BETWEEN ONSET AND DEATH Intervalle entre l'attaque et le décès
DISEASE OR CONDITION DIRECTLY LEADING TO DEATH[1] Maladie ou condition directement responsable de la mort[1]	Hanging	Minutes
ANTECEDENT CAUSES Symptômes précurseurs de la mort. MORBID CONDITION, IF ANY, LEADING TO PRIMARY CAUSE Condition morbide, s'il y a lieu, menant à la cause primaire		
UNDERLYING CAUSE, IF ANY, GIVING RISE TO PRIMARY CAUSE Condition morbide, s'il y a lieu, menant à la cause primaire		
OTHER SIGNIFICANT CONDITIONS[2] Autres conditions significatives[2]		

MODE OF DEATH Condition de décès:
- ☐ NATURAL Mort naturelle
- ☐ ACCIDENT Mort accidentelle
- X SUICIDE Suicide
- ☐ HOMICIDE Homicide

AUTOPSY PERFORMED Autopsie effectuée ☒ YES Oui ☐ NO Non

MAJOR FINDINGS OF AUTOPSY Conclusions principales de l'autopsie:

NAME OF PATHOLOGIST Nom du pathologiste: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

DATE Date: 11 June 2006

CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING DEATH DUE TO EXTERNAL CAUSES Circonstances de la mort suscitées par des causes extérieures:

AVIATION ACCIDENT Accident à Avion ☐ YES Oui ☒ NO Non

DATE OF DEATH *(day, mo* Date de décès (le jour, le mois, l'année): 10 June 2006

LACE OF DEATH Lieu de décès: Guantanamo Bay Dentention Facility Cuba

I HAVE VIEWED THE REMAINS OF THE DECEASED AND DEATH OCCURRED AT THE TIME INDICATED AND FROM THE CAUSES AS STATED ABOVE.
J'ai examiné les restes mortels du défunt et je conclus que le décès est survenu à l'heure indiquée et à, la suite des causes énumérées ci-dessus.

NAME OF MEDICAL OFFICER Nom du médecin militaire ou du médecin sanitaire: (b)(6)

TITLE OR DEGREE Titre ou diplôme: (b)(6) Medical Examiner

GRADE Grade: (b)(6)

INSTALLATION OR ADDRESS Installation ou adresse: Rockville, MD

DATE Date: 01 AUG 06

(b)(6)

---

[1] State disease, injury or complication which caused death,
[2] State conditions contributing to the death, but not related t
[1] Préciser la nature de la maladie, de la blessure ou de la co … contribué à la mort, mais non la manière de mourir, telle qu'un arrêt du cœur, etc
[2] Préciser la condition qui a contribué à la mort, mais n'ayant aucun rapport avec la maladie ou à la condition qui a provoqué la mort.

DD FORM 1 APR 77 2064 REPLACES DA FORM 3565, 1 JAN 72 AND DA FORM 3565-R(PAS), 26 SEP 76, WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CERTIFICATE OF DEATH *(OVERSEAS)*
Acte dé décès (D'Outre-Mer)

NAME OF DECEASED *(Last, First, Middle)* Nom du décédé (Nom et prénoms) BTB ALUTAYBI, MANI SHAMAN, TURKI	GRADE Grade	BRANCH OF SERVICE Arme Civilian	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER Numéro de l'Assurance Social (b)(6) 000588DP
ORGANIZATION Organisation	NATION *(e.g. United States)* Pays Saudi Arabia	DATE OF BIRTH Date de naissance 1 January 1976	SEX Sexe ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

RACE Race		MARITAL STATUS État Civil				RELIGION Culte	
	CAUCASOID Caucasique		SINGLE Célibataire		DIVORCED Divorcé		PROTESTANT Protestant
	NEGROID Négroïde		MARRIED Marié		SEPARATED Séparé		CATHOLIC Catholique
X	OTHER (Specify) Autre (Spécifier) Saudi Arabia		WIDOWED Veuf				JEWISH Juif
						X	OTHER (Specify) Autre (Spécifier) Muslim

NAME OF NEXT OF KIN Nom du plus proche parent	RELATIONSHIP TO DECEASED Parenté du décédé avec lo sus
STREET ADDRESS Domicile à (Rue)	CITY OR TOWN OR STATE *(Include ZIP Code)* Ville (Code postal compris)

MEDICAL STATEMENT Déclaration médicale

CAUSE OF DEATH (Enter only one cause per line) Cause du décès (N'indiquer qu'une cause par ligne)			INTERVAL BETWEEN ONSET AND DEATH Intervalle entre l'attaque et le décès
DISEASE OR CONDITION DIRECTLY LEADING TO DEATH[1] Maladie ou condition directement responsable de la mort[1]		Hanging	Minutes
ANTECEDENT CAUSES Symptômes précurseurs de la mort	MORBID CONDITION, IF ANY, LEADING TO PRIMARY CAUSE Condition morbide, s'il y a lieu, menant à la cause primaire		
	UNDERLYING CAUSE, IF ANY, GIVING RISE TO PRIMARY CAUSE Condition morbide, s'il y a lieu, menant à la cause primaire		
OTHER SIGNIFICANT CONDITIONS[2] Autres conditions significatives[2]			

MODE OF DEATH Condition de décès	AUTOPSY PERFORMED Autopsie effectuée ☒ YES Oui ☐ NO Non		CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING DEATH DUE TO EXTERNAL CAUSES Circonstances de la mort suscitées par des causes extérieures
☐ NATURAL Mort naturelle	MAJOR FINDINGS OF AUTOPSY Conclusions principales de l'autopsie		
☐ ACCIDENT Mort accidentelle			
X SUICIDE Suicide	NAME OF PATHOLOGIST Nom du pathologiste (b)(6)		
☐ HOMICIDE Homicide		DATE Date 11 June 2006	AVIATION ACCIDENT Accident à Avion ☐ YES Oui ☒ NO Non
DATE OF DEATH *(day, month, ye* Date du décès (le jour, le mois, l'an 10 June 2006	PLACE OF DEATH Lieu de décès Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility Cuba		

I HAVE VIEWED THE REMAINS OF THE DECEASED AND DEATH OCCURRED AT THE TIME INDICATED AND FROM THE CAUSES AS STATED ABOVE.
J'ai examiné les restes mortels du défunt et je conclus que le décès est survenu à l'heure indiquée et à la suite des causes énumérées ci-dessus.

NAME OF MEDICAL OFFICER Nom du médecin militaire ou du médecin sanitaire (b)(6)	TITLE OR DEGREE Titre ou diplôme (b)(6) Medical Examiner
GRADE Grade (b)(6)	INSTALLATION OR ADDRESS Installation ou adresse
DATE Date 01 AU 6 0 6	SIGNATURE (b)(6)

[1] State disease, injury or complication which caused dea
[2] State conditions contributing to the death, but not relate
[1] Préciser la nature de la maladie, de la blessure ou de la complication qui a causé la mort, mais non la manière de mourir telle que arrêt du coeur, etc.
[2] Préciser la condition qui a contribué à la mort mais n'ayant aucun rapport avec la maladie ou à la condition qui a provoqué la mort.

DD FORM 1 APR 77 2064 REPLACES DA FORM 3565, 1 JAN 72 AND DA FORM 3565-R(PAS), 28 SEP 75, WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

AFME 30

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Legislative Affairs

Office of the Assistant Attorney General *Washington, D.C. 20530*

MAY 25 2010

The Honorable Anna G. Eshoo
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congresswoman Eshoo:

This responds to your letter, dated January 25, 2010, citing a *Harper's Bazaar* article which reported allegations about the suicides of three detainees at Guantanamo Bay in 2006.

The Justice Department recognizes that the deaths of individuals in the custody of the United States military raises serious concerns. Immediately following the deaths of Salah Ahmed Al-Salami, Mani Shaman al-Utaybi, and Yasser Talal Al-Zahrani, there was a thorough, year-long investigation by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). In all three cases, an autopsy performed by a senior medical examiner from the Department of Defense Armed Forces Institute of Pathology ruled the cause of death as suicide. A civilian, state-level medical examiner served as an independent observer for these autopsies and concurred with the conclusions. NCIS agents who investigated the case also found no evidence indicating that the three detainees died by means other than suicide.

In 2009, lawyers and investigators from the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation were tasked to review new allegations made by one of the perimeter guards who had been on duty the evening of these individuals' deaths. During its review, this investigative team traveled to Guantanamo camp, interviewed a number of persons, and examined large amounts of evidentiary material. They ultimately concluded that there was no credible evidence to support the allegations later reported in the magazine article to which you referred.

We hope this information is helpful. Please do not hesitate to contact this office if we may be of further assistance regarding this, or any other matter.

Sincerely,

Ronald Weich
Assistant Attorney General

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2437423